

SOUTH ASIA CHALLENGES NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

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Abstract

Primary focus of this paper is to test the hypothesis that India-Pakistan nuclear developments are posing challenge for the established norms of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Not only India-Pakistan is two different identities, but also nuclear weapons program over the course of years have been tangled. Nuclear proliferation in South Asia divulges that how a determined state can acquire necessary fissile material, technology and knowhow for the sake of nuclear program leading towards developing nuclear weapons. South Asia enjoys unique status among scholars of strategic studies because it has become a laboratory to analyze, understand and draw lessons, from the region to overt future crises. Owing to prevailing trust deficit, mutual suspicions and turbulent India-Pakistan history, Pakistan worries Indian aggression as the region has been passing through the security dilemma. Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons is posting a security dilemma, which has provided a breathing space for conventional and nuclear arms race in the region at least for the time being. Efforts to match or outpace opponent military capabilities result in qualitative and quantitative improvements in nuclear realm. Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons endorses realist dictum that self-help is the only recipe to survive in international anarchic system. Indian nuclear posture determines that only nuclear weapons deter nuclear arsenals. Causes of nuclear proliferation in South Asia need to be analyzed with their essential impact upon national security of Pakistan and their essential implications for the Non Proliferation Regime.

Key Words: NPT, Proliferation, Security Dilemma, Nuclear Weapon and South Asia.

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is focused on the covert development of nuclear weapons. History of proliferation in South Asian is probed to understand how motivated States can acquire fissile material, technology and knowhow for diverting nuclear program for the development of absolute weapon. Experts on the subject focus on the developments taking place in the region, as it involves major powers therefore it has far-reaching implications for international strategic stability. The region enables students of international relations to observe, understand and analyze crises behavior of nuclear opponents and draw lessons to overt future crises. This study aims to prove that despite the fact India- Pakistan are two different states their nuclear weapons program over the course of years have been jumbled. Primary focus of article is to test the hypothesis that India-Pakistan nuclear development challenges the established norms of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, India-Pak involvement in qualitative and quantitative nuclear proliferation has regional as well as global magnitudes.

Qualitative and quantitative developments in nuclear realm poses security dilemma- efforts to consolidate one's own security stimulate sense of insecurity, breeds anxiety and compel the opponent to increase its military power (Tang, 2009) for the opponent. Ominous conventional and nuclear arms race spiral significantly augmented Pakistan's security dilemma and enhanced reliance on nuclear weapons to deter larger Indian military. Nuclear weapons have thus been used by Pakistan to preserve country's territorial sovereignty and maintain status quo in South Asia. Pakistan's nuclear behavior endorses realist dictum that the self-help is the sole method, for states, in international system to survive and to serve their national interests. Conventionally weak Pakistan cannot assure India that it will not use nuclear weapons in future conflicts. Thus India relies on nuclear weapons. Indian nuclear posture endorses the old notion that only nuclear weapon deters nuclear weapons. Here, it is being briefly explained the development of the NPT, nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the impending challenge posed by South Asian States to the impending future of NPT.

An analysis of experts on nuclear proliferation dating back to early efforts embedded in Cold War era to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to post Cold War era and particularly overt

nuclearization of South Asia in May, 1998. The NPT in its current shape is the result of historical and gradual process started from a Conference held in Moscow on December 16, 1945 (Milestones: 1945-1952, 1945). During the Conference representative from United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain decided to establish a body under the supervision of United Nations (UN) to dismantle all radioactive material and nuclear weapons. The process of the development of NPT is well analyzed by Hans Blix (Blix, 2011). Blix highlights the importance of developing NPT, safeguards mechanism and orchestration of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an institution to ensure implementation of the safeguards, under Article III of the NPT. Blix correlates these safeguards with the NPT. Literature on the development and spread of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMDs) is tremendously available. However, these authors have applied various research techniques to prove their argument. Methods include theories of Nuclear Proliferation (Hymans, 2006), different models applied by Scott D. Sagan (Sagan, 1996-1997), Nuclear Domino Theory (Ladha, 2012), Karsten Frey contends that security threats pushes states to develop nuclear weapons (Frey, 2006) and belief that nuclear weapons stabilizes the strategic environment (Waltz, 1981).

Hans Blix and Severe Lodgaard in their seminal work attempted to highlight international community's efforts started during Cold War era to contain further spread of the world's deadliest weapons. Lodgaard attempts to enlighten readership that how Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) incorporated WMD in their military and war planning exercises during Cold War era. Lodgaard tries to explore the continuing relevance of the WMDs in post-Cold War era particularly in twenty first century and necessary impact on international strategic stability. Blix and Lodgaard's major concern is the continuing problem of nuclear proliferation. Both have divided the phenomenon of proliferation into three different categories for instance NWS failure to implement Article VI of the NPT. Article VI requires NWS to pursue dialogue in good-faith to dismantle their stockpiles of nuclear weapons (INFCIRC/140, 1970). However, the article could help international community to achieve the cherished goal. Implementation of the Article VI and universality of the NPT are two long desired goals of international community. Second category elaborates handicaps being posed by holdout nuclear capable states or the non-signatories to the NPT. Third category highlights the endangerments posed by the NPT member states to non-proliferation mechanism. It is being highlighted that how member states are trying

to cheat the international community and trying to secretly develop WMDs in violation of the statutes of the NPT.

Bhumitra Chakma is analyzing post nuclearized South Asian nuclear arms race while mentioning three reasons for the ongoing arms race. However, prior to elaborating these reasons it is pertinent to assert that research in nuclear realm to further modernize existing nuclear forces is vertical proliferation and against the spirit of arms control efforts. Chakma in his analysis explains the current pace of nuclear proliferation in nuclearized South Asia containing that India-Pakistan is in seminal phase, steps to control fissile material production and WMDs development are seen obstructing the credibility of the deterrent posture (Chakma, 2010). Consequently both States refuse to implement arms control measures. Chakma adds that continued hostility, history of wars and military crises heightens mutual threat perceptions and creates security dilemma.

Since India maintains large conventional forces mostly deployed against Pakistan. In such circumstances policymakers in Islamabad have incorporated nuclear weapons with conventional weapons. Anxiety or tension is the constant feature of South Asian strategic environment. Chakma stipulates that unless bilateral relations of these countries are not normalized they would not work on the arms controls policy. Similarly, Ken Berry (Berry & others, 2010) in an edited volume has carryout comparative analysis of Pakistan vis-à-vis India (geographically and conventionally larger military power as compared to Pakistan) and Russia vis-à-vis North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Berry asserts that Pakistan and Russia's adversaries are different however their adversaries enjoy strategic advantages and overall asymmetry favoring their opponents. Another common feature between NATO and India is both are nuclear capable identities. Resultantly, Pakistan and Russian nuclear policies will not change. This inference has been drawn from realists' teachings that nuclear weapons overcome strategic asymmetry against conventionally advanced and nuclear weapons equipped neighbors.

Severe Lodgaard tried to identify various reasons behind the competitive nature of South Asian strategic environment (Lodgaard, 2011). Issues identified by Lodgaard include New Delhi's hegemonic behavior and intensions at regional level. Pakistan, though under pressure from India, yet she has refused to accept the later as a regional policeman and refused to receive dictations from hegemonic India. Moreover, Pakistan is utilizing all its resources to achieve parity with

India as continued reliance on nuclear weapons enables it enjoying sovereignty despite regional anarchy and to deny strategic gains to its arch rival.

Since India wants to be regional hegemon therefore nuclear Pakistan is main hurdle or worry for India (Lodgaard, 2011). Lodgaard asserts that India receives special treatment by US for instance Indo-US nuclear deal enables India to produce fifty nuclear arsenals annually. So, it is a significant development from New Delhi's perspective and it can change the South Asian strategic asymmetry in Indian's favor. Parity that Islamabad tried to achieve after many years would not be longlasting. International anarchy existed as common border India sharing with China obliges the former to pursue conventional and nuclear military modernization program. China on occasions has been regarded primary threat to Indian security by the Indian ruling elite (Lodgaard, 2011). However, it is shocking that Indian military bulk is deployed near Pakistani border. India's military doctrine and modernization program are exclusively designed to deal with threats emanating from Islamabad. Lodgaard accomplishes that because of the unsettled issue of Kashmir both states can go to war in future which will result in horrible nuclear exchange.

Walter C. Ladwing, III holds Indian military's Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) a cause of worry and regarding it destabilizing South Asian strategic stability (III, 2007/08). CSD is potentially destabilizing because Indian military planners believe that newly orchestrated doctrine would enable Indian military to enter into Pakistani territory and quickly achieve military victory in any future battle or conflict. CSD requires heavy Indian military presence near Pakistani border. If implemented it would ignore Pakistan military's red lines and even more specific nuclear threshold. It would thus invite unprecedented damage. If Pakistan uses WMDs against invading Indian military it would provide justification to India to use WMDs on massive level against Pakistan.

In any case Cold Start Doctrine is lethal for strategic stability or regional status quo. South Asian nuclear developments are linked with international strategic environment this broader strategic landscape has been well explained by James M. Acton (Acton, 2012). Acton contends that the presence of China, geographically and militarily strong as compared to India, poses security dilemma for India. In order to deal with national security threat India started its nuclear submarine program (to gain assured second strike capability). However, steps taken by India to

deter foreign aggression undermine China's as well as Pakistan's security, thus former's security arrangements compels the later to respond in more aggressive or at least in similar way. China as an emerging power is viewed as a potential danger by US and Russia. Chinese counter measures obstruct Washington-Moscow arms control measures rather their reliance on WMDs has further heightened. The broader action-reaction process is thus called as "systematic dilemma."

How India Pakistan started developing their nuclear weapons subsequently followed by the theme and how non NPT member states are posing challenges to the NPT mechanism are the burning questions of the day. It would not be out of place to be mentioned that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Lal Nehru laid foundation of Indian nuclear program in 1948 by enacting India's first Atomic Energy Act (Sethna). Hence, Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was developed. It was a gigantic development from strategic perspective. Pakistani ruling elite failed to take notice in time because of Nehru's rhetoric that India would use nuclear technology only for peaceful purpose. He publically denounced (Ending Nuclear Testing)of nuclear devices on several occasions. Opposition to the development of WMDs became foundation stone of Indian Nuclear Program.

India-Pakistan first conventional war over disputed Kashmir took place in 1948. Intelligent Nehru realized that Indian Army failed to deter poorly equipped Pakistani tribesman from creating fuss in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ& K). Nehru's future strategic planning was revealed on the occasion of passing IAEC where Nehru asserted that "if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way," (Arpi, 2010). In this statement Nehru highlighted three important factors for futuristic scenario that Indian if threatened will develop nuclear weapons. Second Indian nation will never forgo the development of nuclear arsenals if required. Third, Indian government will have to listen to her masses rather than international community to deal with grave security threat (while developing WMDs). It can be claimedthat Nehru in his mind was clear that India requires nuclear weapons therefore he tried to politicize Indian Nuclear Program.

Dr. Homi Bhaba Indian nuclear scientist advised Nehru to refrain from publically issuing statements regarding the development of nuclear weapons (Gupt, 2007). Bhaba was aware that the international community had already begun efforts to contain spread of nuclear weapons. Bhaba feared that international community would deny transfer of nuclear technology, material

and know-how to India if its leadership did not stop publically issuing statements regarding WMD development. On August 3, 1954 Nehru approved the development of the Department of Atomic Research in India (Ganguly, Spring, 1999). It was a prompt reaction of Indian strategic community to acquire sophisticated nuclear technology in reaction to the rapid developments occurring in international strategic environment to contain the further spread of nuclear weapons. Dr. Homi Bhaba thus laid the second pillar of Indian nuclear programme “nuclear weaponisation” and also became the architect of “nuclear opacity,” third pillar of Indian nuclear program.

According to Claude Arpi in 1954 Indian nuclear program was matured and it was ready to be diverted towards WMDs development (Arpi, 2010). Two years later Nehru while addressing the Indian Parliament issued a statement asserting that “if resources were delivered, an India bomb could be made in three or four years,” (Suryanarayan, 2010). Indian nuclear establishment authority comprising of Nehru and Bhaba decided to divert Indian efforts to acquire technology to reprocess spent fuel and procure plutonium (Perkovich, 2001). It is in this perspective to be claimed that in 1956 India decided to pursue plutonium route for the development of nuclear weapons.

Indian nuclear establishment authority reveals that India pursued development of the WMDs in the absence of real security threat to Indian sovereignty. Secondly it was just a prestige driven ambition to join the nuclear club and to be recognized as a great power in international community. In 1957, IAEA was established and the ambitious plans of Nehru and Bhaba were thus threatened. In 1958, Nehru empowered Bhaba to enjoy supreme authority over Indian nuclear program through an amendment in IAEC (Plutonium Reprocessing Plant, 2001). In 1962 Indian security forces were defeated by the Chinese forces (Abitol). Having dream for making India invincible and to gain status of great power, the unbridled wishes remained as the driving forces for Indian strategic and nuclear establishment elite to actively pursue the WMDs development. In 1962, Indian nuclear policy was criticized by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in the following words “eunuch government... in its ahimsic idiocy for the criminal folly of not pursuing nuclear weapons,” (Vikram, 2008).

In 1964, China tested nuclear device and joined the elite club of NWS (Paul, 1998). India government was posed with different challenges as on domestic front it was criticized by the

main opposition political party. Emerging conventionally strong and nuclear capable China could have posed challenge to Indian national security and territorial sovereignty. Changes in India's immediate external strategic environment from realist perspective required response. However, Indian nuclear establishment and government maintained tight control over Indian nuclear program thus the fourth feature "rigid nuclear culture," nurtured. History proves that despite Nehru's opposition to the development of WMDs India in 1964 acquired the ability, at Trombay reprocessing plant, where it was successfully reprocess 30 tons plutonium per annum, later used in Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).

Indian Prime Minister Shastri in 1964 authorized Bhaba to develop nuclear weapon (Leonard S. Spector, 1990). It was the era when international community was actively involved in the development of a regime to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. Resultantly, the net outcome was lately development of the NPT. India responded to it by refusing to sign on grounds that the Treaty divides international community into two distinguishable groups. The Treaty was regarded as discriminatory and India refused to sign because of its discriminatory nature and unless China signs it showing an insurmountable condition. Interestingly Indian authorities never claim for development of nuclear weapons.

Critical analysis reveals that the issues of strategic or deterrent role of nuclear weapons, doctrinal role, size and structure were never discussed publically by top ranking Indian leadership. WMDs were thus viewed as political currency needed to raise Indian stature in international community. However, the sense of Indian greatness was terribly shattered because of humiliating defeat in the hands of meticulous Chinese Armed Forces during Sino-China war. Indian erstwhile ruling elite decided to develop nuclear weapon to recover from the strong sense of embarrassment and humiliation. Indian nuclear tests on May 18, 1974 (Lee, 2006) known as the smiling Budha were the result of economic and political crises faced by Indira's government. She authorized Indian scientists because she wanted to divert the attention of Indian masses from domestic problems. Broader objective of these tests was strengthening (Indira's) government control on domestic affairs and her continuation to rule the country.

Indian active involvement in Pakistan's civil war which led to the dismemberment of the country (Squassoni, 2005) and nuclear tests heightened latter's security dilemma. Pakistan's strategic decision makers remained apprehensive that India wanted to undo the partition and considered

India as a permanent security threat. Pakistan's threat perception was confirmed on involvement of Indians in creation of Bangladesh. The development of WMDs to deter Indian forces was considered to be the only credible deterrent (Moeed Yousaf & Pandya, 2010). Pakistan's nuclear behavior remained predominantly security driven. It was exact interpretation of realists' logic that states develop nuclear weapons to address her personal security needs. Massive changes in (Pakistan's) strategic environment according to Sagan required policymakers of weaker state to attempt to restore the balance.

If a State pursues the path of nuclear proliferation, it would endanger rival's national security compelling the later to pursue the similar path as well (Sagan, 1996-1997). The phenomenon of India-Pakistan nuclear proliferation and uninterrupted race is rooted in Indian PNE. In 1970s Indian policymakers were worried that Pakistan and China were collaborating in nuclear realm. Secret development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan throughout 1980s and 1990s was a natural phenomenon. It was the result of growing insecurity, conventional and nuclear asymmetry, suspicions, mutual trust deficit and troubled history. Such elements led to the articulation of a strategy based on prudence and rationality. However, Islamabad's nuclear policy deprived the NPT from becoming a universal treaty and weakened the established norms of the non-proliferation. "Secrecy and tight control" both remained the hallmark pillars of Pakistan's nuclear program.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led Indian government tested nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998 (Maerli & Lodgaard, 2007). Nuclear tests altogether changed subtle strategic equation in strong favor of India. Undoubtedly it undermined Pakistan's security and requisite strategic response from Islamabad. Indian leadership was aware of the consequences and supreme dramatic transformation. Thus they issued threatening bombastic statements and tried to dictate Pakistan (Ashraf). The then Indian Home Minister categorically warned Pakistan that "Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world [and] roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to Kashmir," (Cooper, 1998). L. K. Advani another Indian leader alleged Pakistan of providing assistance to Kashmiri insurgents. Advani maintained that Indian security forces if necessary will carry out operations inside Pakistan administered Kashmir (Iype, 1998). Now, on one hand there was intense pressure of international community to refrain from testing nuclear devices and on the other hand, Indian hostile designs to redraw

South Asian map Pakistan decided to test nuclear devices emphasizing on addressing the impending country's security threats. Ultimately, on May 28, 1998 Pakistan followed the suit (Medalia, 2011).

In the wake of nuclear tests Primer Muhammad Nawaz Sharif issued perfect statement asserting that "we never wanted to participate in this nuclear race," (1998: World fury at Pakistan's Nuclear Tests, 1998). India-Pakistan nuclear weapons development was sheer result of struggle to gain political strength in case of India. While in Pakistan's sense it was just a military strength. Domestic political consideration remained a common feature because of the emotional attachment or obsession of South Asian masses with nuclear arsenals. It is pertinent to assert that the nature of India as well as Pakistan nuclear weapons program remained distinguishable and different. India developed WMDs because of the discriminatory nature of the NPT. Pakistan's nuclear weapons system on the contrary remained India-specific and aimed to deter Indian regional hegemony. Ne plus ultra of the situation is that Pakistan's nuclear tests restored strategic balance in the region. Islamabad cautioned India to pursue safe policy of restraint. Islamabad realized the global community that military adventurism can lead South Asian states towards mutual destruction and suicide. Pakistan's nuclear signaling led to normalization of the situation. Furthermore, leaders from both states compelled to issue statements to avoid nuclear arms race, maintain minimum nuclear deterrence and to avoid impending confrontation.

Overt nuclearization of South Asia was in violation of the NPT, because both had not signed the Treaty. Non-proliferation mechanism remained under great stress because both States claimed to have become NWS (Scheinman). On the other hand, self-proclaimed status of NWS weakened the Article IX of the NPT which states that a NWS is one which developed and tested nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967 (INFCIRC/140, 1970). In line with this particular definition, India-Pakistan cannot become de-jure NWS. Accordingly, international community while realizing the critical fact and condemned nuclear tests with refusal to accept both India and Pakistan as NWS. World community recognized NWS those also known as Permanent Five (P 5). UN Security Council as well as Group of Eight (G8), an elite of advanced countries condemned nuclear tests (Scheinman). Both antagonists were urged by the international community to refrain from future nuclear tests and emphasized on signing Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB), and immediately stop development and deployment of the nuclear weapons. Both States

were asked to take practical steps to address contentious issues including Kashmir and support international community in nonproliferation endeavors.

The irony of the fate is that international community's approach towards India as well as Pakistan on account of nuclear proliferation gradually diametrically changed. Pakistan has been singled out in criticism for nuclear proliferation and augmented threats are being associated with Pakistan's WMDs program. International community failed to understand the reasons, nature and unique characteristics of Pakistan's WMDs program. On the contrary, Indian claim that acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and later on, diverted it for enriching Uranium, reprocessed spent fuel to acquire Plutonium and WMDs development- mysteriously granted a special status. New Delhi nuclear weapons program has been legitimized in the wake of Indo-US nuclear deal. Powerful state actors-US, Russia, France, Britain, Germany, Australia and Japan- have signed nuclear agreements with Indian and New Delhi has been granted a special waiver by Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG).

Conversely, Indian as well as Western analysts- Ashley J. Tellis and Vinod Kumar suggested amendment in the NPT to incorporate India in the system as a NWS. Crux of the issue is the analysts wanted to grab more concessions from NSG member states and their ultimate objectives are to strengthen Indian case for becoming de-jure NWS as well as member to the NPT. In the systematic struggle New Delhi has successfully de-hyphenated India from Pakistan.

Any attempt to accommodate India or even to Pakistan into the NPT requires amendment under Article VIII of the NPT. However, it is not a child's play rather a lengthy and difficult process. Procedure includes that proposed amendment to be submitted to the depository governments, responsible for the circulation among all member States. Convening of a particular Conference to discuss the fate of the proposed amendments is requiring consent of one third or majority parties for the particular alterations. Amendment needs majority votes including "depository governments" (INFCIRC/140, 1970) and vote from IAEA Board of Governors as well. Entry of India alone or Pakistan together, after proposed amendments in NPT would contradict the single cause to limit the number of NWS to five. It means that world has forgotten its goals to get rid of nuclear arsenals as well as making globe free of nuclear weapons and determination to regulate unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycles, which has threatened international peace and security.

Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) and technologically advanced threshold states may start questioning the utility of acceding to the NPT and ultimately relinquishing WMDs development option. It may also be possible that the threshold states would decide exercising Article X (INFCIRC/140, 1970) of the Treaty and quit the NPT to develop nuclear weapons and join the nuclear Club. On the basis of such fears worst case scenario would be chain reaction leading towards the spreading of nuclear anarchy. Crux of the matter is entry of India-Pakistan would undermine the actual spirit and lead towards collapse of the NPT. Since India-Pakistan cannot be accommodated in the NPT as de-jure NWS it raises the backburner issue that the NPT alone cannot bring these States into mainstream where NPT has evolved over the years.

It would be recalled that both South Asian antagonists have refused to join NPT as NNWS on several occasions e.g. Indian Minister for External Affairs in 2000 asserted that the NPT member states must understand India cannot join the NPT as a NNWS (Kumar, 2010). Nine years later the Indian permanent representative to UN in response to UNSCR 1887 categorically refused to sign the NPT as a NNWS. Pakistan's decades old principled stance is that it would only join the NPT if India joins it. A candid change has also been reported in Pakistan's stance in February, 2010 as Pakistan Foreign Office Spokesman Abdul Basit asserted that "we cannot sign the treaty. We cannot give up nuclear weapons." He further added that "if you have conventional imbalance between Pakistan and India, then obviously our reliance on nuclear weapons increases correspondingly," (Pakistan Rules Out Joining Nonproliferation Treaty, 2010). Basit categorically stated that Pakistan will only join the NPT if it is recognized as NWS. Nevertheless, on June 3, 2015 Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhry during deliberations with US officials reiterated Pakistan's newly adopted stance on joining the NPT that the treaty is discriminatory in nature and Islamabad cannot accede to it (Iqbal, 2015).

It would be safely to predict that South Asia's hold-out states will not join the NPT in near future because the Treaty does not offer any incentive on one side Islamabad security guarantee and on other side prestige rhetoric to India. Out of the box solution cannot be ruled out for making Treaty successful need to be offered to both antagonists. Critical examination of the international community's behavior towards India indicates that to satisfy Indian unbridled desire a gradual process including out of the box solution is in progression. India is going to be accepted as NWS

outside the NPT. India specific NSG waiver has provided a unique opportunity for international community to be indulged in nuclear commerce with New Delhi.

US is leaving no stone unturned in helping India to become member of the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Zangger Committee, the Australia Group and UNSC. On the other hand, these steps have been weakening the NPT as Indian access to international market to acquire fissile material enabled it to divert domestically produced material for WMDs production without any practical hurdle. NSG member states are using Article IV of the NPT- allowing States to carryout peaceful activities in nuclear realm- enabling India to get involve into vertical proliferation. NWS are in violation of the Article I and NNWS in violation of the Article II of the NPT are carrying out nuclear commerce with India. Furthermore, the future of non-proliferation mechanism based on the NPT is endangered.

Special status granted to India, ban on Pakistan's entry into such Groups and rejection of Pakistan's demands that nuclear deals similar to India is Islamabad's fundamental right has altogether increased India-Pakistan asymmetry in conventional as well as in nuclear arena. Islamabad is now compelled against its wishes to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons, introduce qualitative and quantitative improvements including fissile material production, introduction of more reliable short and medium range delivery vehicles. All such developments are known as vertical proliferation- prevented from signing the CTBT and the NPT. Pakistan's involvement in vertical proliferation, likely deployments of short range nuclear weapons near border- known as vertical extended deterrence- has already heightened Indian security dilemma. Indian countermeasures cannot be out ruled resulting in arms race spiral and doctrinal changes for strategic weapons.

New doctrines have been incorporated by both States into their military war fighting doctrines particularly by Pakistan. The deadly combination of WMDs with conventional weapons and the policy of first strike reduced nuclear threshold and increased likelihood of the outbreak of deliberate or accidental nuclear war in crisis or crisis like situation. Crux of the issue is India-Pakistan rivalry and West's discriminatory policies endanger future of the NPT generally in the world and particularly in the South AsiaRegion.

Pakistan conventionally and geographically a small state effectively deters regional hegemon because of its nuclear capability and weaponry. It can set a dangerous precedence because in future the NPT member states can pose with existential threat unless Pakistan would have to decide for developing nuclear arsenals. Geographically large state can follow Indian course of action to withdraw from the NPT as US has already offered along with other technologically advanced countries for heavy investment even nuclear proliferation for massive economic gains. India-Pakistan are thus cracking the non-proliferation shell from outside NPT. The NPT members, Nuclear and NNWS, now indulged in nuclear commerce with non-NPT member States like India are cracking within. The NPT member states should have kept in mind that NSG was developed in the wake of PNE which was carried by the hegemonic India.

Conclusion

Sum and substance of the issue is that states develop nuclear weapons to deter their enemies as security dilemma is undeniable and a sheer naked fact. If the Superpower like US and other great powers including member of the NPT desirous for universalization of the Treaty they would have to address the security concerns of the smaller states like Pakistan. Constant presence of hegemonic and militarily strong state like India, on Pakistan's borders increases Pakistan's uninterrupted dependence on WMDs just to preserve her vital existence as a prime national security goal. Overall negative security framework has been operating in the South Asian Region wherein India miserably failed to provide assurance or guarantee to Pakistan that the former would never use military might against the later. In this wake, Islamabad cannot assure New Delhi that it will not introduce nuclear weapons in case of limited or full scale war with the hegemonic neighboring gigantic state such as India. New Delhi has been requiring nuclear forces to maintain the terror on the smaller states of South Asia like Pakistan. Now Islamabad and New Delhi are both entangled with nuclear arsenals and both countries are suffering from security dilemma but it is incontestable fact that both states are essentially requiring an equal treatment by international community.

Indian nuclear doctrine is based on the notion of second strike and now looking for Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). Thus, Indian policymakers asserted that Indian WMDs do not pose a serious threat to Pakistan's security. On the other hand, policymakers in Islamabad have zero tolerance and no trust upon such rhetoric assurances. Policymakers in Islamabad are enlightened that

capabilities rather than intentions matter in international geostrategic politics. It is as clear as crystal that Pakistan shall continue to rely on its WMDs to deter Indian aggression. Such policy requires testing, developing and deployment of necessity of WMDs and their delivery vehicles. Nuclear developments and nuclear arms race either South Asian State poses security dilemma for the opponent. Constant and continued nuclear and conventional arms race between South Asian rivals has been weakening the spirit of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Development of nuclear arsenals by a smaller state like Pakistan (comparison with India) and India (compared to China) can deter any strong and technologically advanced State of the globe. In addition, so far, nuclear weapons remained successful in provision of absolute security against threats by any hegemonic state. India-Pakistan parity in spite of continued rivalry would encourage weak states to follow the pathway.

Washington remained under severe criticism for signing the nuclear deal and granting India specific NSG waiver. US policy has been viewed as a reward granted to hegemon in South Asia - India for overtly testing nuclear devices. Anti-proliferation lobby has criticized nonconforming Indian behavior for NPT as a NWS on the sole ground that the NPT if amended would provide justification to threshold states. Technologically advanced states already are in possession of necessary nuclear technology, fissile material and essential knowledge-ability of developing WMDs and nuclear threshold. Special status granted to an aggressive state such as India by the international community has already weakened the non-proliferation treaty regime. There are no two opinions that the major powers and specially the NSG member states would have to equally treat both India and Pakistan, if they are actually desirous to achieve the cherished goal of universalization of the Non Proliferation Treaty. In the aforementioned arena, future of NPT, particularly with reference to the South Asian countries such as Pakistan and India's persistent tug of war scenario may not be much bright.

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