



EDITORIAL

The Third national Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) was successfully held in Nagpur from 1 - 3 February last. A brief report along with the texts of the Declaration and various resolutions passed are included in this issue. Even then, what needs be prominently flagged here is the essential direction for the anti-nuke peace movement in India that emerges from this national meet, a very crucial event in the peace calendar for the region.

The very opening calls of the Declaration are: Resist Indo-US Nuclear Deal! Free South Asia of Nuclear Danger! Abolish Nuclear Weapons Worldwide Now! Resist Mindless Drive for Nuclear Power! Calls have been issued also to end US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and fight national-chauvinist, majoritarian and militarist ideologies and political practices on the domestic terrain.

As regards the deal, the light seems to be dimming on it. The intensified obstruction offered by the Left parties in India coming on top of shrill opposition by the NDA and UNPA has, as it appears, queered its pitch. That the process is still on and the UPA-Left committee is due to examine the tentative agreement

Contents

A. Editorial \ 1

B. Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament \ 3

- I. Nuclear Disarmament: State of the World by J. Sri Raman
- II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Roadblock to Nuclear Disarmament by N.D. Jayaprakash
- III. Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament: From the Perspective of Indian Peace Movement by Achin Vanaik
- IV. Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament: Significance of Forthcoming NPT Review Conference by Hiroshi Taka
- V. Nuclear Disarmament and the NPT: The Responsibility of the Nuclear-Weapon States by Sergio Duarte

C. Indo-US Nuclear Deal \ 23

- I. US-India Nuclear Agreement: Bad for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Bad for Nuclear Disarmament by Philip White
- II. Interview by Shyam Saran

D. Nuclear Power \ 28

- I. How Safe and Desirable Is Nuclear Power? By Santanu Chacraverti

E. CNDP Third National Convention: Report, Declaration and Resolutions \ 37

F. Documents \ 44

- I. Keynote address to the 2008 Oslo Conference on Nuclear Disarmament
- II. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War: 18th World Congress
- III. The Promises of the 2000 NPT Review Conference

reached between the Indian government and the IAEA on the India-specific safeguards agreement, a necessary and crucial step towards operationalising the deal, on May 5th appears to be more a lifeless ritual. Robert Blackwill, former US Ambassador to India, quitting the post of chief lobbyist for India in the US, deployed to facilitate the fruition of the deal, is evidently much more than a straw in the wind. In fact Blackwill is so bitter and frustrated that he could not help venting it at the first International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)-Citi India Global Forum meet in Delhi on April 20. "If I may be characteristically blunt, the next American president will not have the same sunk costs in the US-India civil nuclear agreement that this president (George W. Bush) and the top of the administration has". He further added that while the US will not pay any price if the deal does not go through, "India will pay a substantial price in its future energy policy, and its lack of civil nuclear assistance from the outside world". The only consolation on offer was that if the nuclear deal was not reached this year, "it would not produce a large bump in the US-India bilateral relationship". In this issue, we have included an excerpt from a detailed interview by Shyam Saran, Indian Prime Minister's special envoy on the deal, essentially voicing the same pessimism, if only, in a far

more diplomatic way. However, the CNDP and the global anti-nuclear peace movement remain committed to scuttle the deal till it is formally dead. An article by Philip White of the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center from Japan, written for this issue, would clearly bear that out.

That the next round of the NPT review is due in 2010 has worldwide added momentum to the struggle for global nuclear disarmament. While the NPT Review Conference in 2000 had made a very tangible and welcome progress, as a direct consequence of George Bush taking over US Presidency in early 2001, the trend was dramatically reversed thereafter. The 2005 Review Conference, with the US hell bent on nullifying the agreement reached and commitments made in 2000, failed to come out even with a ritualistic declaration. The prospect of change of baton in the US offers at least a glimmer of hope. The cry of the day is, however, that a Nuclear Weapons Convention, on the lines of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions be immediately convened to move towards non-discriminatory universal nuclear disarmament in a clearly defined step-by-step manner, the journey commencing without any further delay. The gross failure, and worse, of the Nuclear Weapon States, the US being the prime culprit, to honour their part of the bargain as struck in the NPT has visibly

weakened the NPT regime. There is a serious threat of a spurt in both horizontal and vertical proliferation. The US, the leading architect of this admittedly lopsided treaty, is now, as it appears, actively engaged in subverting it in order to radically rewrite the rules to reflect the presumed shift in international power balance since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Bloc. Both the Indo-US nuclear deal and transparently hypocritical and harsh censure of Iran on account of its nuclear programme are unmistakable manifestations of such subversion. Quite understandably, a lot of bitterness is in the air in some quarters as regards the essential character of the NPT. This issue carries a number of articles capturing the upbeat mood and reinvigorated move towards global nuclear disarmament and the rather justifiable bitterness. The issue of having a nuclear weapon free South Asia is only a vital component of moving towards the goal of global nuclear disarmament. The speech of the CNDP Rep. at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), UK offers a possible outline of that approach.

Lastly, the issue of nuclear power has again been looked into. This is relevant both in the context of the debate over the deal and also the recent attempt to sell nuclear power as "clean" energy.

Section B : Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament: State of the World*

J. Sri Raman**

The first thing we know about the state of nuclear armaments in the world is that we do not know enough about it or with a sufficient degree of exactness. Every nuclear-armed state treats observance of the utmost secrecy about its arsenal of these weapons of mass destruction as a sacred task.

Almost a decade after Pokharan II, even the best-informed pundits, including ones enjoying close proximity to the nuclear establishment, can only play guessing games about the exact extent of India's nuclear arsenal. The mystery about Pakistan's nuclear weapons — and their whereabouts — spices up speculation about the safety of the custody and the spine-chilling stories we are told about the plans of Washington and the Pentagon to take these weapons out of the terrorists' reach. It is not, however, as if we knew much better about the arsenals of the bigger nuclear powers.

We get as clear an idea as we can hope to get from a paper by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen in the July/August 2006 issue of the widely respected *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. They note that the number of nuclear weapons in the world may have come down to its lowest in 47 years, but the picture still remains bleak. For, the number of nuclear-weapon states has risen in the same period from three to at least eight. Added to this are developments that have dramatically increased

the nuclear threat to humanity from the top two of nuclear powers, the US and Russia.

Norris and Kristensen estimate that the all the nuclear-weapon states together possess about 27,000 intact nuclear warheads, of which 97 percent are in US and Russian stockpiles. About 12,500 of these warheads are considered operational, with the balance in reserve or retired and awaiting dismantlement.

The Pentagon, according to them, has custody of nearly 10,000 stockpiled warheads, of which 5,735 are considered active or operational. Russia, in their estimate, has 16,000 intact warheads, of which about 5,830 are considered operational.

Of the lesser of the P5, Britain has a stockpile of about 200 strategic and sub-strategic warheads. The current French stockpile is estimated at 350 warheads. China is considered to have an arsenal of 200 nuclear warheads, "down from an estimated 435 in 1993."

In January 2007, the *Bulletin* thought it fit to warn that, despite the reduction of arsenals, especially since the end of the Cold War, the world had entered a "Second Nuclear Age marked by grave threats." Among the reasons it cited were: the continuing launch-ready status of at least 2000 of the about 20,000 nuclear weapons in the US and Russian arsenals, the unsecured nuclear materials in Russia (which could fall into terrorist hands), and even "new pressure from cli-

mate change for expanded civilian nuclear power that could increase proliferation risks."

Talking of the US arsenal alone, a review in the November/December 2006 issue of the *Bulletin* said that the Pentagon stored its nearly 10,000 nuclear warheads at 18 locations in 12 States and six allied countries.

The paper found the highest concentration of nuclear warheads at the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific in Bangor, Washington, which was home to more than 2,300 warheads - "probably the most nuclear weapons at any one site in the world." At any given moment, nearly half of these warheads were on board ballistic-missile submarines in the Pacific Ocean. About 1,700 warheads were found deployed on ballistic missile submarines operating in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

About 400 warheads were found to be stored at eight bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Britain.

The US is the only nuclear-weapon state that deploys nuclear weapons in foreign countries. The review found that over two-thirds of the US nuclear warheads were stored at bases for operational ballistic missiles and bombers, "though the Cold War ended more than 16 years ago." Over 2,000 warheads were found to be on high alert, ready to launch on short notice. Only about 28 per cent of the warheads have been

moved to separate storage facilities.

Writing in December 2006, Pakistan's peace activist and a close friend of India's anti-nuclear weapon movement Zia Mian recalled that the very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly passed in 1946, in the shadow of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." Mian, however, noted that the nuclear danger had "grown and spread from one country with a few weapons" to the present state.

Mian also recalled the more ominous warning from Mohamed El Baradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who ought to know, that there were another 20 or 30 "virtual nuclear-weapons states" that had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short time span. "For these countries," Mian said, "it may take a threat from an existing nuclear-armed state, a change in leadership, a new-found desire for national power and prestige, a resourceful scientist or unexpected access to technology to tip the balance."

I mentioned recent disturbing developments that made the nuclear outlook more dangerous. These were initiated with a "nuclear posture review" by the Bush administration in 2001, which called for a reduction in the amount of time needed to test a nuclear weapon. It also called for possible development of new nuclear weapons of a low-yield, "bunker-busting" design or the Robust Nuclear

Earth Penetrator. Work on such a design had been banned by Congress in 1994, but the banning law was repealed in 2003 at the request of the Department of Defense.

In 2006, the Bush administration also mooted the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, to develop an entirely-new family of nuclear ICBMs. The program, launched with the objective of producing "a simple, reliable, long-lasting, and low-maintenance future nuclear force" for the US, has been opposed as a breach of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Washington, however, has not appeared unduly worried by the opposition. The danger from the drive for new nukes has been dramatically heightened by the talk of nuclear derring-do heard the other day. A "radical manifesto for a new Nato", issued by five former armed forces chiefs, has called on the West to be ready to resort to a pre-emptive first strike in order to avert an "imminent" spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. According to the senior strategists from the US, Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands, the first-strike nuclear option remains an "indispensable instrument" since there is "simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world".

A similar threat, perhaps the more dangerous for emanating from a current armed forces chief, has been issued from Moscow. Russia's General Yuri Baluyevsky has asked the "international community" to "clearly understand that, for the defence of our sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, the armed forces will be

employed, including preventively the use of nuclear weapons".

The situation, perilous enough as it is, increases the chances of nuclear proliferation across continents dotted with local conflicts. As US peace activist Edward Perry puts it: "The progress (towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) is negative because the United States plans to restart the nuclear arms race with a new class of nuclear weapon called "mini-nukes". If the US has them, Russia will want them. If Russia gets them, China will want them. If China gets them, India will want them. If India gets them, Pakistan will want them. If Pakistan gets them, they will sell them to anyone who has the price." The tenor might appear frivolous to some, but the summing-up speaks of a frightening reality.

The situation, obviously, does not redound to the credit of the NPT and does not increase its popularity. Promoters of nuclear proliferation find in the treaty a powerful instrument. Typifying their taunt, which unfortunately touches chords in the developing world, Charles Pena asks: "Why should non-nuclear countries - especially those that feel threatened by the possibility of US military intervention, now including preemptive attacks to forestall threats that have not yet materialized - forgo pursuing a capability they don't have in exchange for the nuclear-armed powers' promise to give up a capability they already have? If you believe that the nuclear powers will disarm, then I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell you."

This, of course, is the same "deterrence" argument that has

served nuclear hawks in countries like India and Pakistan so well and their peoples so ill.

The NPT's credibility could have been shored up, if the P5 had shown a modicum of sincerity in taking the 13 practical steps towards the treaty's objective agreed upon in 2000. The most important are the principles of irreversibility, verification and transparency, a diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies, and a reduction in the operational status of nuclear weapons. As we have seen in the case of the US, the agreement on the steps has ceased to have any practical significance.

This is the situation that prompted Tariq Rauf, head of verification and security policy coordination, IAEA, to say: "It is time to abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons, but morally acceptable for others to rely on them. Our aim must be clear: a security structure that is based on shared humanity and not on the ability of some to destroy us all."

It is time, too, may I submit, for India's peace and anti-nuclear-weapon movement to take a fresh look at the NPT and its utility for the movement on major issues. Without going into the subject of the second session of this convention, but taking the campaign against the US-India nuclear agreement just as a current example, it is true that many of our friends in the world peace movement have opposed it as a violation of the NPT. They have their point. But we find it difficult to go to our people and tell them: "Here is a treaty which says five countries

can keep nuclear weapons and others cannot. It says that the five will make efforts in good faith to move towards nuclear disarmament and that, in return for the un-kept promise, others should not acquire nuclear arms. We must reject the US-India nuclear agreement because it violates such a fine treaty." Even George Bush could not have given anyone a better sales pitch for the agreement!

There are two ways of looking at the NPT. The first is to see it, as Australian peace activist John Hallam once put it in an animated after-dinner conversation, as something "between us and the nuclear abyss". It is possible to argue that this is the best the rest of the world has been able to get from the P5. The second way is to see the NPT as, actually, a source of nuclear proliferation. It has served as the most powerful argument for nuclear hawks in countries like India. We must fight these hawks, but cannot do so effectively if we swear, merely or mainly, by the NPT.

This convention can consider whether the CNDP should take the lead in India in raising the demand for an alternative to the NPT. This can be in the form of a convention for worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. The campaign for such a convention cannot and should not - let me repeat and emphasize, cannot and should not - spell the cessation or relaxation of our struggle for a nuclear-weapon-free South Asia.

The CNDP can serve its cause in India and in South Asia better by joining the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NCW) launched by international organizations like

the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). As the IPPNW spells it out: "The abolition of nuclear weapons is achievable through a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). The majority of UN Member-States call for immediate negotiation of such a treaty, which would prohibit the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat, or use of nuclear weapons. The NWC would provide for the elimination of nuclear weapons in much the same way comparable treaties have banned landmines and chemical and biological weapons."

Reflecting the growing recognition in the world peace movement of the fatal flaw in the non-proliferation regime under the NPT, the IPPNW adds: "The hypocritical claim that nuclear weapons are valuable instruments of policy and power projection in some hands but are intolerable threats when owned by others must be abandoned in theory and in practice."

This hypocrisy of the P5, the US in particular, must be exposed and countered, along with the "patriotic" hypocrisy of nuclear hawks in India, Pakistan and elsewhere who defend acquisition and preservation of nuclear weapons in the name of "national security" and "national sovereignty".

** Edited text of the speech delivered at the opening session of the CNDP Third National Convention on Feb. 1 2008.*

*** J. Sri Raman is a veteran journalist and member of the CNDP National Coordination Committee (NCC).* 

II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Roadblock to Nuclear Disarmament*

N.D.Jayaprakash**

Delhi Science Forum

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed on 01 July 1968 by USA, USSR and the UK. Subsequently, the NPT was opened for signature by other countries and till date, except India, Pakistan and Israel, all the other 189 countries have signed it. The NPT entered into force on 05 March 1970. [It may be noted that North Korea, which had ratified the treaty on 12 December 1985, withdrew from it on 10 April 2003 and, thereby, became the first and only country to do so as on date.] India has had to face a lot of criticism from a substantial section of the peace movement for not signing the NPT. The accusation was that India had refused to sign the NPT because it harboured the desire to join the nuclear weapon club. However, India's official position was that the NPT was a discriminatory treaty and hence India would not have anything to do with such an inequitable treaty. The attempt here is to examine the controversy surrounding the NPT and its actual impact on addressing the issue of nuclear disarmament.

INDIA and NPT

Why has India refused to sign the NPT? Few people are aware that India was one of the countries that had vociferously supported the proposal in the initial stages when the treaty



was being drafted. In fact, the UN resolution on "A Treaty to Prevent the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" was first proposed by India and seven other non-aligned countries and the said resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 19 November 1965. Therefore, what need to be examined are the reasons as to why India, which had proposed a resolution against proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1965, had opposed the NPT in 1968? The reasons behind India's opposition to the NPT in its present form could be found in the text of the said UN Resolution No.2028 (XX) dated 19 November 1965.

Clause 2 of the said UN resolution clearly states that an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based on the following main principles:

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutu-

al responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament;" 1

India refused to sign the NPT in 1968 precisely because the said three sub-clauses of Clause 2 of the said UN Resolution had been either consciously omitted from the 1968 NPT text or had been effectively undermined, thereby making the NPT in its present form not only discriminatory by also largely meaningless. The essential difference between the said UN Resolution, which was adopted in 1965, and the NPT signed in 1968 are as follows:

While the 1965 Resolution had opposed both vertical as well as horizontal proliferation, the NPT signed in 1968 was opposed only to horizontal proliferation and, thereby, paved the way for unbridled vertical proliferation by the nuclear weapon Powers;

The responsibilities and obligations in the NPT on



nuclear and non-nuclear Powers were different and were weighed completely in favour of nuclear weapon Powers, i.e., in favour of those nations that had conducted nuclear weapon tests before 1967;

c. Article VI of the NPT only entailed each of the Parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations “in good faith” for proceeding towards the goal of general and complete disarmament. That is, unlike Article III of the NPT that was solely applicable to the non-nuclear weapon states, no stringent mechanism was attached to the said Article VI to ensure that the nuclear weapon Powers took effective measures to cease the nuclear arms race.

It is pertinent to note that had the NPT included the crucial sub-clauses from the said UN Resolution of 1965, the nuclear arms race would have been contained in 1968 itself. The vast majority of the UN members had supported the proposals on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that India and seven other non-aligned countries had placed before the UN General Assembly in 1965. It is the subsequent refusal of USA, USSR and UK to accede to the said considered proposals, which resulted in the acceleration of the nuclear arms race since 1968. Indeed, if the principles enunciated in the said 1965 UN Resolution had been incorporated in the NPT, there would have been no excuse or perceived need for India to conduct nuclear tests in 1974 or in 1998. Under the circumstances, USA, Russia and UK have no moral right to criticise India for conducting nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998.

However, this does not mean that India had the moral right to conduct nuclear tests either in 1974 or in 1998.

NPT – “Greatest Con Game”

Ever since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, drawing non-nuclear weapon states into the net of non-proliferation has been the primary agenda of the nuclear weapon states. There was a tacit understanding by the three nuclear weapon powers – USA, USSR and UK – that those countries that had tested nuclear weapons before 1967 would not only have the “right” to possess nuclear weapons but also would be free to indulge in unbridled vertical proliferation. Needless to add, there was no provision in the NPT that prohibited the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon states.

At the time of signing the NPT in 1968, the global nuclear weapon stockpile was approximately 39,202. Despite the SALT and INF treaties, the nuclear weapon stockpile actually rose to 56,396 in 1991 after peaking to a high of 69,490 in 1986.² These facts amply prove that the NPT had absolutely no impact on the attitude of the nuclear weapon powers; there was no compelling pressure on them to curb the nuclear arms race. While older and less potent nuclear weapons were removed through a number of much-publicized arms control treaties, newer and more potent ones were quietly added to the stockpile! (It is primarily due to the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 – than any other factor – that has resulted in a

relative reduction in the nuclear stockpile, which in 2006 was still very high and reportedly around 26,854.³) That apart, according to another report, the increasing stockpile of fissile material across the world is enough build over 300,000 nuclear bombs!⁴ Moreover, there was never any let up in the manufacturing and stockpiling of sophisticated ‘conventional’ weapon systems. Thus, what is very much evident is that the NPT, which was supposed to curtail the nuclear arms race, has only aggravated it. In addition, the quest for general and complete disarmament practically stands buried.

In this context, it is pertinent to shed light on what Zia Mian of Princeton University has discovered regarding the NPT. While exploring aspects of non-compliance of the obligations under the existing arms control treaties, Zia Mian discovered that: “Bill Epstein, a veteran United Nations official in the area of arms control and disarmament, records that “one of the American negotiators conceded privately that the NPT was ‘one of the greatest con games of modern times.’”⁵ (Emphasis added)

It may be relevant to mention here that William Epstein, who passed away in 2001, was – in the words of the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan – “indisputably one of the world’s leading advocates of global disarmament, having devoted his entire professional career and his long retirement to this noble cause.”⁶

Indeed, there is absolutely no doubt that the NPT has been ‘one of the greatest con games of modern times’!

Although William Epstein had recorded this fact in 1976, it was never given the prominence it deserved and had remained largely under wraps until recently. The proponents of the NPT, who may have been aware of this fact over 30 years ago, nevertheless, have had no compunctions in continuing to eulogize the NPT!

NPT REVCONS

The wrangling at each of the NPT Review Conferences, which have been held every five years after the NPT entered into force, gives a glimpse of the real controversies plaguing the NPT. An overview of the NPT Review Conferences (RevCons) from 1975 to 1995 and the developments thereafter can be found in the article titled "The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Challenging Times" by Rebecca Johnson (ACRONYM Report No.13, February 2000)⁷ and in the article titled "The Evolution of NPT Review Conference Final Documents 1975-2000" by Carlton Stoiber (The Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2003).⁸ Rebecca Johnson's article begins by pointing out that:

"Although the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee had been negotiating multilaterally, the final text of the NPT was largely the product of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union." (Para 3, Part-I)

This is an important observation since it proves that that the NPT was propounded in tandem with the evolution of the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) primarily to perpetuate the self-interests

of the U.S. and the USSR, since both of them had a vested interest in wanting to restrict the number of nuclear-armed adversaries. Thereby, the USSR, which had ardently championed the cause of general and complete disarmament until the signing of the PTBT in 1963, had struck a deal with the U.S. in 1968 to carry on the nuclear hegemony of the nuclear-haves. It is quite possible that USSR agreed to the compromise because it thought that it could outsmart USA with its scientific and technological capability⁹; while USA's strategy was to drive the USSR bankrupt by engaging it an expensive arms race. Ultimately, the US strategy prevailed: due to the unbearable military expenditure, which the USSR was forced to incur in pursuing the senseless arms race, the USSR collapsed in 1991 and completely disintegrated. This was because the US had far more resources at its disposal as compared to the USSR. NPT provided the perfect cover for the US to pursue its nefarious designs. Neither the US nor the USSR seems to have had any compunction in seeking to quietly bury the historic McCloy-Zorin Accord of 20 September 1961 and in adopting a patently discriminatory NPT with two different sets of obligations: pliable obligations for the nuclear weapons states and inviolable obligations for the non-nuclear weapon states! Neither of them has offered any explanation till date as to why the McCloy-Zorin Accord was summarily abandoned.

McCLOY-ZORIN ACCORD

The McCloy-Zorin Accord on General and Complete Disarmament¹⁰, which was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 1961 through Resolution No. 1722 (XVI), was the most momentous achievement in the annals of disarmament negotiations. The McCloy-Zorin Accord set forth eight principles. The preamble of the Accord states that: "The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to cooperate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles." The said eight principles were broadly as follows:

- that disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems;
- the disbanding of armed forces;
- the dismantling of military establishments including bases;
- the cessation of arms production; the liquidation of armaments, or their conversion for peaceful purposes;
- the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery;
- the abolition of military institutions; the cessation of military training and the

- discontinuance of military expenditures;
- that the disarmament program should be implemented in stages within specified time limits until completion; and
- that no State or group of States gain military advantage over another.”

Subsequently, the newly formed Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) – comprising five nations from NATO, five from the Warsaw Pact and eight from the non-aligned nations, including India – began its meetings at Geneva under the aegis of the UNGA on 14 March 1962 to effectuate the McCloy-Zorin Accord. On 15 March 1962, the USSR submitted its ‘Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control’¹¹, while the U.S., on 18 April 1962, submitted its ‘Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world’¹². Concurrently, on 20 March 1962, the ENDC decided to set up a sub-committee composed of the U.S., the USSR and the UK to consider a treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. However, the negotiations were rudely interrupted by the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.¹³

REDUCTION IN HOSTILITY

Following the amicable resolution of the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’, a perceptible reduction in hostility between the U.S. and the USSR was noticeable from the conciliatory speech that President Kennedy deliv-

ered on 10 June 1963 at the American University, Washington, D.C. Emphasizing the importance of pursuing peace, President Kennedy said:

- (a) “I have... chose this time and this place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived – yet it is the most important topic on earth: world peace.”
- (b) “What kind of peace do I mean? What kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about genuine peace – the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living ... not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women – not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.”
- (c) “While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both.”
- (d) “Confident and unafraid, we labor on – not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace.”¹⁴

President Kennedy’s historic speech, which hardly found a mention in the US media, was well publicized in the USSR. Within days, a memorandum was signed between the two major nuclear powers for establishing a direct communication line as part of measures to reduce the risk of

war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. Known as the “Hotline Agreement”, it was signed on 20 June 1963 at the ongoing Geneva talks.

Shortly afterwards, negotiations began in Moscow on 15 July 1963 supposedly for concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty. However, ten days later, on 25 July 1963, the three parties at the talks – USA, UK and USSR – agreed to conclude a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which outlawed nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, while permitting underground ones. The three parties signed the PTBT – also known as Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) – on 05 August 1963 with much euphoria. Although the U.S. Senate ratified the LTBT on 24 September 1963, about one-fifth of the senators opposed it on the ground that the LTBT had compromised USA’s national security.

In the background of the Cuban Missile crisis, the PTBT may have been signed in good faith in order to allay fears of a nuclear conflagration. However, from hindsight, it appears that in effect the signing of the PTBT constituted a retrograde step and a great betrayal of the peace movement. The signing of the PTBT – instead of the much-awaited comprehensive test ban treaty – not only succeeded in disrupting the peace movement but also misled the world into believing that the PTBT, which merely pushed the conduct of nuclear tests underground, was a significant step in the direction of nuclear dis-

armament. Indeed, nothing was farther from the truth! The peace loving people were so eager for some kind of agreement between the two adversaries that the majority of them were easily taken in by the rhetoric of the PTBT. The signing of the PTBT signalled the abandonment of the drive towards disarmament and led to the adoption of the convenient concept of “non-proliferation” ostensibly to stem the spread of nuclear weapons (which strictly meant horizontal non-proliferation.)

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Both Rebecca Johnson and Carlton Stoiber have correctly observed that the majority of NNWSs were using the RevCons as a forum to vent their frustrations regarding the lack of progress on the nuclear disarmament front. Therefore, it is evident that the main concern of the vast majority of the NNWSs has always been nuclear disarmament and not horizontal non-proliferation.

In the opinion of Dr. Johnson: “The non-nuclear countries are sending ever stronger signals that without nuclear disarmament the non-proliferation norm will become discredited. They cite the stagnation of the strategic arms reduction (START) process, NATO’s reaffirmation in April 1999 of the role of nuclear forces in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Russia’s ‘Concept of National Security’, declared in January 2000, and the strategic implications if the United States pushes ahead with ballistic missile defences, including the risk of a resurgent arms

race, possibly extending to outer space.” (Para 14, Summary)

Expressing a similar opinion, Carlton Stoiber, an expert on international law based in Washington, DC, and who had served in the U.S. Department of State and Nuclear Regulatory Commission for nearly 30 years, commented on the developments in the RevCons as follows:

- (a) “The most difficult and complicated negotiations over Final Documents at past RevCons have involved the nuclear arms race and disarmament provisions of Article VI.” (P.130)
- (b) “A constant theme in the Article VI debate has been dissatisfaction on the part of a majority of NNWS [non-nuclear weapon states] parties that the NWS [nuclear weapon states] have not made greater and more rapid progress toward reducing and eventually eliminating their nuclear weapon arsenals.” (P.140)
- (c) “Article VI has engendered the greatest controversy of any of the NPT provisions. And...fundamental differences over disarmament issues have usually been the primary stumbling block to reaching consensus on a Final Declaration.” (P.140)
- (d) “In light of its extremely ambitious objectives (end of the arms race, general and complete disarmament), it is no surprise that RevCon documentations have never expressed satisfaction that the parties to

the treaty have met their Article VI obligations. Rather, the language adapted under Article VI have typically reflected a litany of disappointments, frustrations, lost opportunities, and appeals for more rapid and concrete action on disarmament issues.” (P. 141)

SECURITY ASSURANCE

An equally important concern of the NNWSs was the issue of security assurances. As Stoiber has again noted:

“The issue of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT has been a central issue at NPT RevCons since 1975. The issue was actively debated during negotiations of the treaty itself. In fact, without the adoption of Security Council Resolution 255 in 1968, extending so-called positive security assurances to the NNWSs it is unlikely that the treaty would have been approved.” (P.143)

While Security Council Resolution 255 of 1968 was one the most abject resolutions ever to be passed by the UN Security Council, the point to be noted here is that the issue of security assurances to the NNWSs has remained a perpetual source of controversy in the RevCons. To ostensibly rectify the shortcomings in the UNSC Resolution 255 of 1968, the UNSC passed yet another resolution on 11 April 1995 (Resolution 984 of 1995). However, on 11 April 1995 itself the G-21 nations, representing the nonaligned nations in the UN, wrote a protest letter addressed to the Deputy

Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Disarmament against the said resolution. The letter stated that: “this resolution [UNSC Res. No.984 of 11.04.1995] does not take into account any of the formal objections made in the past by Non-nuclear Weapon States on the restrictive, restrained, uncertain, conditional and discriminatory character of the guarantees already provided.” Therefore, “it is for the Nuclear Weapon States to provide security assurances to Non-nuclear Weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in an internationally and legally-binding form.” 15

In a detailed article titled “The Legal Status Of U.S. Negative Security Assurances To Non-Nuclear Weapon States”¹⁶, George Bunn, who had served as general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) from 1961 to 1969, and who was one of the negotiators of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, laid bare the U.S. position on the issue. Exposing the U.S. stand, he wrote:

(a) “...in 1966, the eight non-aligned countries [which included India] that were members of the Geneva disarmament conference joined in a memorandum to the conference that recited their various individual NPT-related proposals including “the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and assurance of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.” They suggested that these “could be embodied in a treaty as part of its provi-

sions or as a declaration of intention.” [Fn. 35]

(b) “During the U.N. General Assembly debates on disarmament in the fall of 1966, 46 non-aligned countries introduced a draft resolution that invited the nuclear weapon states “to give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon States.” [Fn. 36]

(c) “ACDA [US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] sought authority from President Johnson for the U.S. representative to the United Nations to vote for the resolution.... The Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed ACDA’s draft: According to a State Department cable sent to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, who were abroad when the issue arose, the Chiefs’ “opposition was based on the reason that such a nonuse assurance could provide an impetus toward total prohibition of nuclear weapons...” [Fns. 37, 38] (Emphasis added)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had as early as 1966 correctly identified the crux of the issue: “a nonuse assurance could provide an impetus toward total prohibition of nuclear weapons”! This is precisely the reason why a negative security assurance, i.e., a pledge by the nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, is a prime necessity. It is the very first step that would provide the necessary impetus for moving towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

CONCLUSION

The worst role that meaningless treaties such as the present NPT, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), etc., have played over the last four decades has been to totally sideline the issue of general and complete disarmament and effectively obliterate from public memory the significance of the McCloy-Zorin Accord. It was not only the leadership of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military alliances who are guilty of this cover-up, but also a sizable section of the global peace movement, who were so overawed by NPT, NWFZ, etc., have unfortunately suffered from selective amnesia about the remarkable features of the McCloy-Zorin Accord! It is, therefore, very noteworthy that the CNDP at its Third National Convention at Nagpur in February 2008 has accorded due recognition to the McCloy-Zorin Accord. Hopefully, peace movements elsewhere would follow suit without further delay and would collectively begin to focus attention on the urgency of achieving the goals set out in the McCloy-Zorin Accord. Needless to add that until and unless principle changes are incorporated into the present NPT, it would continue to remain the biggest roadblock to nuclear disarmament.

** Expanded version of the speech delivered at the opening session of the CNDP Third National Convention.*

*** N.D.Jayaprakash is a member of the CNDP NCC.*



*III. Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament: From the Perspective of Indian Peace Movement**

*Achin Vanaik***

First of all let me say how honoured I am to be here at the 50th anniversary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), UK. I bring you fraternal greetings from the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India - a national network of over a 100 organisations which was formed in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests in India and has just held its third National Convention in February 2008. The CND was really the first and among the greatest of the post-war anti-nuclear movements and that you have persevered so long remains an inspiration to all of us struggling for a nuclear free world. South Asia is now, with the Cold War over, one of the genuine hot spots that could erupt in given circumstances into a hot war and from there carry all the dangers of moving towards a nuclear escalation. Yet India and Pakistan are now seemingly accepted as de facto nuclear powers that should perhaps even be given a certain degree of legitimacy as 'responsible' nuclear powers, especially in the case of India. This is hardly the message that we need to promote if we are going to move towards reducing the dangers of proliferation, both horizontal and vertical.

And what about the NPT?

India and Pakistan are the two avowed nuclear weapons

powers which (along with Israel as a covert nuclear power) remain outside the NPT and are not going to join it as non-nuclear weapons states. [In fact, these are the only three states out of the total 192 members of the UN sitting out of the NPT. N. Korea, which had opted out in early 2003, is engaged in a multiparty negotiation to rejoin.] What then are the perspectives, goals and measures - both transitional and final - that we who want to reverse this nuclearisation of South Asia must adopt? For a start we should recognize that efforts to bring India and Pakistan into the NPT as non-nuclear powers are not on. In any case there are better (because more comprehensive and realizable) alternative perspectives. What about existing efforts to effectively legitimize India's nuclear weapons status which by their nature also imply a degree of legitimization of Pakistan's new nuclear status? The central argument for supporting such a process of international legitimization is that in the name of realism it is better that India (and Pakistan) be brought in out of the cold and accepted as de facto and 'normalised' NWSs so that they abide by the existing rules and norms of non-proliferation regime and thereby participate in the efforts to prevent the possible spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

Certainly for India, this would be one major conse-

quence if the Indo-US Nuclear Deal finally goes through all the stages required for its operationalisation. What is also sometimes forgotten is that this Deal works in the other direction as well. It brings in India's legitimization of the US's existing nuclear behaviour. Unsurprisingly, parallel to the negotiations over the Deal is increasing acceptance and growing prospects of participation by India in the US's plans for BMD-TMD and in its illegal and dangerous Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Not just the cynicism, duplicity and hypocrisy of such an approach to India and Pakistan should be obvious, but also its unworkability. This will act as a spur to other potential nuclear powers whether motivated out of anger or hope at what is happening. Besides, one of the central pillars of the non-proliferation regime - the NPT - has suffered yet another body blow as so many of its members, NWSs and many NNWSs, are prepared now to 'reward' the nuclear weapons newcomers, especially India. Given the current and disturbing global scenario what then should be the appropriate political perspectives that committed anti-nuclearists in South Asia particularly, and elsewhere generally, need to develop to guide our advocacy and agitational activities and programmes?

The Wider Perspective

Almost a decade down the line from Pokharan and Chagai in May 1998 where do matters now stand? The US remains committed doctrinally to developing the Ballistic Missile Defense system and Theater Missile Defense systems, to developing battlefield and mini-nukes, to blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons on one hand and to doing the same with respect to weapons of mass destruction so that the use of nuclear weapons might be justified as a retaliation against enemy use of chemical or biological ones. India and Pakistan have quietly set up their respective nuclear command and control systems. They have made their deployments of nuclear weapons systems but high secrecy means we have little information about what they have been doing on the ground. One can only assume that for the moment the two governments would be relying on gravity bombs but may well have made some degree of progress in mating warheads to missiles. Certainly they remain committed to further quantitative and qualitative development of warheads and of related delivery vehicles.

The Indian government reiterates from time to time its commitment to No First Use even as this pledge has now been diluted to exclude non-nuclear allies of nuclear opponents and to allow for possible retaliation against a non-nuclear opponent using other weapons of mass destruction against India. It has called on Pakistan to follow suit with a similar NFU pledge, while Pakistan under Musharraf's

reign has, on a number of occasions declared its willingness to contemplate regional nuclear disarmament as its way of obtaining diplomatic one-upmanship vis-à-vis India. Before coming to the regional perspectives that we need to pursue we do have to say something about the prospect and efforts to pursue global disarmament, to the need to put pressure on other existing longtime nuclear culprits, especially the US. There can be no doubt that regional disarmament is greatly facilitated by progress in respect of global nuclear disarmament and that the latter must mean, above all, changing the behaviour of the US. How is this to be achieved?

There are two strategic directions that a global disarmament movement can take, faced as it is today by the determination of the US government and political establishment to secure an informal global empire. The crucial foundation for this project of Empire-building is, of course, the US's exceptional military power including its expanding nuclear capacities. It is the credibility of this military foundation that must be undermined. One way of trying to do this is to demand that the global anti-war movement recognize the importance of the specifically nuclear dimension and shift some of its resources and some of its focus to precisely the issue of pursuing global nuclear disarmament. The other way is to press the global nuclear disarmament movement to recognize the priority of opposing the US occupation of Iraq and its general imperial ambitions, and therefore for it to shift some of its resources and some of its

focus towards support for this anti-war/anti-imperialist movement, even as it must maintain its distinctive concern with the nuclear issue.

The second way is, to my mind, the better strategic avenue to follow today. West Asia – the illegal occupations of Iraq and Palestine, the attempt to isolate, squeeze and weaken Iran for wider geo-political ambitions that go well beyond concerns about its nuclear weapons capabilities — is the crucible of world politics now and for some time into the future. The best way to undermine the credibility of claims made for the military-political value of nuclear weapons is to help undermine the general credibility of the military-political value of the US's conventional and overall military might. And the best way to do that is to be part of a global movement that will help defeat the US's imperial ambitions in West Asia where Iraqi resistance (and Palestinian resistance to Israel/US) is already undermining the political will and authority of the US-led occupying forces and its local puppets. In short, the best route today towards generating a greater momentum in the future against nuclear weapons is to generate an ever greater and stronger momentum of opposition to the US's imperial ambitions today. A political defeat of the US in West Asia in the coming years will have profoundly positive effects for all progressive movements concerning issues of global scope.

It is sometimes claimed that to build the widest possible nuclear disarmament movement we must not allow this single focus to be diluted by taking

positions on issues, which many actual or potential supporters of nuclear disarmament would disagree with. In today's political context, such an approach would be seriously mistaken. If it is mistaken for the worldwide anti-nuclear movement and for the specifically US branch of this global anti-nuclear movement, it is even more so for the Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear movements. Both the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) and the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), as the two main umbrella bodies opposing regional nuclearisation, must be deeply involved in the development of the wider anti-war/anti-Empire movement in solidarity with Iraq and Palestine and against the squeezing of Iran. We introduce our specific concern with nuclear issues into this broader movement of opposition to US imperial behaviour, a movement whose breadth and strength we are ourselves committed to consolidating and expanding.

South Asian Denuclearization

But if the role of the South Asian nuclear disarmament movement in the anti-war movement is more modest, namely to be a serious participant in it; it still has the responsibility to be the leading spearhead in the more specific struggle against nuclear weapons. In this respect one cannot hope to build a strong campaign and an enduring movement simply by talking about and fighting for global nuclear disarmament or concentrating overwhelmingly on the P-5 or on the US as the biggest culprit, which it is. We have to

focus on the iniquities of our own governments in South Asia, namely the governments of India and Pakistan, and to mobilize against them. The principal regional goal of our nuclear disarmament movement can only be the call and demand for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Since General Musharraf's accession to power in Pakistan, there have been six occasions on which he has officially declared his government's willingness to entertain and move towards such a denuclearised zone provided India is willing to do the same. Obviously, much of the motive for Musharraf making such a declaration is simply embarrassing an Indian government that he knows will not accept this, as well as projecting a more 'responsible' image for himself. But being an official government position it provides anti-nuclearists with a handle it would be extremely foolish not to use.

From a political-tactical point of view this is far superior to alternatives like calling for unilateral disarmament in India or Pakistan. This can, of course, be a demand expressed by individuals and groups within a wider movement united by collective agreement to this particular demand for a regional NWFZ. The merits of such a demand are several: (i) it is much more politically attractive than say, unilateral disarmament, to people in India and Pakistan; (ii) it brings in, as it should, the governments and peoples of the neighbouring countries of South Asia who do not like what happened in 1998 and resent the new danger that is also imposed on them since a nuclear

exchange is not likely to leave their countries unscathed. The wider and deeper is the spread of anti-nuclear sentiment in South Asia, the better. Here, the already existing sentiments against the 'big brother' attitudes of India and Pakistan are an invaluable asset that progressives need to collectively tap into.

Apart from making the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ our central demand, the very concept of an NWFZ lends itself to all kinds of fruitful tactical possibilities. Even though it might seem to go against the idea of a South Asian NWFZ, could not the idea of Nepal as a 'nuclear free-nation' along the lines of existing declarations to this effect by New Zealand and Austria or even Mongolia's self-declared status as a single-state NWFZ, be seen as a useful plank to promote discussion around these possibilities in Nepalese civil society; and one whose achievement is quite compatible with the eventual achievement and declaration of a wider and encompassing regional NWFZ? It could even be seen as a valuable transitional approach towards popularizing the general idea of NWFZs and of introducing the thin end of the wedge to legitimize NWFZs in the South Asian region. Moreover, this is something that, unlike a wider regional NWFZ, would not require agreement between several governments but is something that Nepal can on its own declare under pressure from its own populace. There is something of a political precedent for this in the earlier idea of Nepal declaring itself a 'zone of peace'. This angered the Indian government, which correctly saw this as partly or

largely directed against it, expressing a suspicion of its possible intentions and of its future behaviour. It also suffered from being the proposal of a reactionary monarchist government in Nepal's past. But it was still a good proposal. Nepali anti-militarist groups can begin pushing both the ideas of a wider South Asian NWFZ and that of a Nuclear Free Nepal which in turn can have as its corollary demands not just the call for India and Pakistan to respect such a zone formally, but also to show their respect in a more practical form by 'thinning' their own deployments, i.e., by declaring that they will not deploy nuclear-armed delivery systems near the Nepali border nor overfly Nepal with such delivery systems (don't forget the India-China nuclear face-off). In the light of the revolutionary changes that have now taken place in Nepal with the rise of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) that is itself opposed to nuclear weapons, new possibilities have become feasible. Efforts can and should be made to persuade key political players in Nepal that a future Constitution yet to be drawn up should explicitly declare Nepal to be nuclear free. This is something to work for internationally at both the inter-governmental and the inter-civil society levels.

Also, what about the idea of stretching the existing Southeast Asian NWFZ or Bangkok Treaty to include Bangladesh and/or Sri Lanka? Again, while such demands might seem to go against the idea of fighting for the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ, could they not also be seen as transitional demands towards this goal or as

measures that are not incompatible with the idea of an eventual single regional NWFZ, and perhaps even conducive towards its formation? Again, this is something that the Bangladesh government and civil society organizations, for example, can pursue irrespective of support from neighbouring governments and publics. What in the end can the Indian and Pakistani governments do if in pursuit of its 'national interest' and in exercise of its sovereign independence Bangladesh decides to become a part of a 'stretched' (there is a precedence for this in the stretching of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to include parts of the Caribbean) Bangkok Treaty? They would certainly be unhappy about it and the political value lies of such a measure lies precisely in its being a resounding political slap in the face to the Indian and Pakistani governments and their nuclear postures. At the same time, since it is quite conceivable that the other nuclear weapons states (P-5) and the existing members of the Southeast Asian NWFZ can see the value of such a stretching, there is real space for diplomatic negotiations between Bangladesh and the relevant countries irrespective of India and Pakistan. Once again, Bangladesh civil society can at least begin a public debate on this and the South Asian NWFZ proposal. Bangladesh through its foreign minister is the one country in South Asia that has publicly voiced itself in favour of such an idea.

An NWFZ in Kashmir

There is, again, yet another

possible application of the NWFZ perspective in the South Asian context that, I believe, can prove very fruitful. We should also be consciously promoting the idea of a NWFZ in Kashmir, i.e., a zone covering all of Kashmir on both sides of the border. In what way would this be useful? Consider the following points. Even the Indian and Pakistani governments say they don't like the constant references from other governments and 'outside' bodies about Kashmir being a nuclear flashpoint, suggesting as it does their distinctive irresponsibility in going nuclear as compared to other nuclear powers. Well, declaration of an NWFZ in all of Kashmir, we can argue, is an excellent way of both the governments assuring each other's publics, the governments and publics of neighbouring countries, and the governments and publics of the rest of the world that India and Pakistan are 'responsible' nuclear powers determined not to allow Kashmir to become such a feared flashpoint. What is more, it does not require either government to make any practical adjustments or changes to their nuclear preparations and deployments since neither country has or intends to have nuclear related deployments in their respective occupied parts of Kashmir. The value of such a declaration lies in its political message! It also becomes a form of reassurance on the part of both governments to the people of Kashmir itself! It is, furthermore, a truly creative political initiative whose impact on announcement would be quite dramatic.

Pushing such a proposal allows us, the peace movement in South Asia to say to the two governments—"okay so unlike us, you think you must have nuclear weapons. You also say that you are responsible nuclear powers and that you will not let Kashmir drag the two countries into a nuclear war at least. Well, in that case, why are you afraid to declare Kashmir a NWFZ, especially since it does not hamper your nuclear preparations? Indeed, if you are serious about not letting Kashmir drag the two countries into any kind of war then what about a no-war pact? If on the Indian side you feel this might legitimize cross-border terrorism indirectly supported by the Pakistan establishment, then on this score you can certainly have no objections to declaring a NWFZ in all of Kashmir." Since even substantial sections of pro-nuclear people in both countries, who do not otherwise support the peace movement's call for nuclear disarmament, can be attracted to this idea it becomes on our part a creative initiative to strengthen our movements and to put pressure on our governments. But apart from its already described virtues, it is also of value for two other important reasons. Once you legitimize the existence of a part of South Asia as a NWFZ you are introducing the thin end of the wedge with regard to the general legitimization of the concept and therefore strengthening the prospects of further such applications of the principle of the NWFZ in the region. In this way it would be a tremendous gain in our effort to mobilize support for a South Asian NWFZ. Second, one of the big problems so far in the discussion

by the two governments over Kashmir is how the people of Kashmir are separated from each other and not allowed to propose any 'unified' initiative. An NWFZ for all of Kashmir (including Indian controlled Jammu and Pakistan controlled Northern Territories) would also be the first such measure, if sanctioned, that implicitly, if not explicitly, expresses the unity of the region since its division in 1947-48.

Practical Perspectives and Transitional Measures

On this issue of South Asia and NWFZs, I believe, the respective peace and disarmament movements must now move very seriously towards the following actions and positions. (1) Adopt as its fundamental and unequivocal operational goal the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ. (2) Work towards a more selective workshop comprising legal experts, civil society activists, progressive media people, from all the main countries of South Asia – namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal as well as key advisers/experts/activists from elsewhere that have helped in the promotion of NWFZs of various kinds in their parts of the world – to discuss the various forms of NWFZ projects (including the idea of city and municipal NWFZs not discussed above) and whether and how they should be promoted and pursued collectively and/or nationally. (3) Actually go about preparing a Model South Asian NWFZ Treaty along the lines of the Model Nuclear Weapons (Abolition) Convention, but of

course learning from the already existing NWFZ treaties and making our own Model Treaty even better and stronger in its provisions. We should even spell out possible verification measures and mechanisms for monitoring any such Treaty.

The point is that by undertaking and fulfilling such a task we can take the public debate to a higher level of not just demanding such a regional NWFZ, but actually declaring that there are really no serious technical difficulties in establishing regional de-nuclearisation, only the lack of political will on the part of governments. While you the governments of India and Pakistan and your accompanying 'strategic establishments' pay lip service to eventual nuclear disarmament we in the peace movement are more serious – we actually undertake the task of working out how such a disarmament regime would operate. This becomes another way of pushing the two governments, of embarrassing them, of putting pressure on them and winning over more public support. It is to the credit of civil society groups and activists in India and Pakistan that they prepared in great detail, nuclear risk reduction proposals as a way of reducing current dangers. But these transitional measures are neither seen as, nor proposed as, substitute measures replacing the need for pursuing complete regional and global disarmament. Once again, our pro-nuclear experts have not done anything comparable, though they incessantly talk of the importance of nuclear risk reduction measures, although from their point of view, as a way of eliminating issues of

actual nuclear disarmament from the public agenda. Even so, in the seven years after May 1998, all we have are prior notifications of missile test flights and hot lines for periodic and emergency communications – so much for serious thinking about nuclear risk reduction measures!

Among the transitional risk reducing measures we in the peace movement should be promoting and demanding are the following: a) In the interests of enhancing nuclear safety there should be de-mating of warheads and delivery vehicles and maximization of the time taken to then put the two components together. There should also be institutionalization of transparent monitoring of this fact of separation and public accountability of what has been done in this regard in both countries. b) There should be a certain no-deployment zone for all nuclear equipped delivery vehicles on both sides of the border between India and Pakistan. c) Both countries should go in for a bilateral nuclear test ban pact

since they are not yet prepared to sign and ratify the CTBT. d) There should be periodic joint teams comprising scientific personnel from both countries to visit those nuclear related facilities that both countries have already identified and listed as the ones they have mutually agreed not to target or attack. e) India has urged Pakistan to declare No First Use which Pakistan has rejected on the grounds that their nuclear arsenal is a counter to India's conventional military superiority since India does not accept Pakistan's proposal for a No War Pact between the two countries. One avenue to explore is to push for a 'compromise' whereby both countries co-jointly and simultaneously accept these two proposals thereby assuaging each other to some extent.

Conclusion

There are always two stages in the process of developing an effective progressive force like the nuclear disarmament movement, whether regionally in South Asia, or globally. In the first phase it cannot hope to

change policy but aims to attack and undermine the popular legitimacy that all governments seek to obtain from their publics for their policies. It is only when such disarmament movements develop on a very large scale and achieve a critical mass that they can then hope to impact on actual policy. The Indian and Pakistani anti-nuclear weapons movements are, and will remain for a considerable period of time, in the first phase. But their activities on this front remain vital and indeed the precondition for generating the kind of public awareness and support that can create a successful transition towards the second stage. There is much, therefore, that we have to do.

** Text of the speech delivered at the "Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: Laying the Practical, Technical and Political Groundwork" to be held in London from Feb. 16 – 17 organised by the Campaign for nuclear Disarmament (CND),*

*** Achin Vanaik is a member of the CNDP NCC.*



IV. Towards Global Nuclear Disarmament:

Significance of Forthcoming NPT Review Conference*

Hiroshi Taka

Secretary General

Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (GENSUIKYO)

It is my great pleasure that I take part in this important event with many prominent leaders and activists of the British CND and the friends from overseas. I thank you for the opportunity to speak. I want to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the 50 years of undaunted efforts

for nuclear disarmament, and announce that we are going to send some 20 people to Aldermaston next month to join you in your march and rally in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 1st Peace March in 1958. Our Peace March, too, will mark the 50th

anniversary this year. Since 1958, we walk every year from May to August along 11 major courses to Hiroshima or Nagasaki. I want to invite you to join us in our march, particularly in early August, when we walk in Hiroshima City.

As you are doing now, we,

too, met last week in our national board meeting to discuss our action plan towards the next NPT Review Conference, which will take place in Spring 2010.

In Spring 2003, the US leaders and their allies challenged worldwide opposition in attacking Iraq, claiming that they would resolve the problem of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. On the same ground they hindered the NPT Review Conference in 2005 from taking any step forward toward the implementation of the previous agreements. They tried to perpetuate the double standard of “Haves and Have-Nots” embedded in NPT and even extend it to nuclear fuel cycle, again by means of black-mailing, including nuclear.

But this has helped to solve nothing. The results of the war against Iraq are heavy casualties, destructions and endless mess. The nuclear problem in Iran found no solution, either.

Again, people around the world are coming to the same point we reached in May 2000, that the only solution is a joint endeavor by all to accomplish total abolition of nuclear weapons. This awareness is evidenced in the recent developments:

The UN General Assembly adopted in December last year a resolution moved by the New Agenda Coalition focusing on the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000 by a wide margin of 156 in favor, as against 5 opposition votes of the US, France, Israel, India and North Korea. Similarly, the resolution calling for a start of negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons was adopted by 127 in favor and 27 against. Contrast

between the wide support for disarmament and the isolation of the United States was striking. As many as 7 resolutions, including the early entry into force of CTBT and the convening of the SSD-IV, were adopted almost unanimously, with only the USA opposing.

The widespread support for the call by Henry Kissinger and three other former US high officials is another proof. Their 2nd article carried on the Wall Street Journal on January 15 announced that their call is now supported by former Advisors to Presidents, Secretaries of State and of Defense from almost all Administrations from the Kennedy era. It is also impressive that following the speech by then UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett in June 25 last year, incumbent Defense Secretary Des Browne expressed his conviction in Geneva on Feb. 8 this year that the “UK is determined to have a world free of nuclear weapons”, though he also stated that it would maintain “minimum deterrence”.

Nevertheless, the road to a nuclear weapon-free world still requires tremendous effort on our part. To overcome all forms of nuclear addiction as well as to arouse those who still believe in nuclear deterrence, the mobilization of worldwide grassroots power, as seen in the anti-Iraq War actions in 2002 to 2003, is essential. We have to use all our might to build such strong waves of popular actions towards the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. To this end, I want to propose three categories of action.

The first is to build up the will of governments to achieve a total ban on nuclear weapons in

international politics. Following the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, we started a new campaign for the “Swift Abolition of Nuclear Weapons”, and urged 192 UN member governments to adopt a resolution by the UN General Assembly mandating a start of negotiations. The call enjoyed support from not only the governments of the New Agenda Coalition and Non-Aligned Movement, but also from some NATO countries. A letter from Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero dated October 26, for example, told us that he agreed with us on the need to bring together the voices of all people in launching negotiations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.”

The record of the past negotiations on nuclear disarmament shows that no negotiation on any specific measure can lead to the total abolition, unless it is unequivocally placed in the explicit context of achieving the total abolition. Forming an agreement on the total abolition of nuclear weapons is a task of top priority. If there is any specific measure which is as important and urgent, that should be only a ban on the actual use of nuclear weapons.

The second suggestion I want to make is to launch a “Global Action Campaign for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World”, culminating at the next NPT Review Conference. Forms of action may vary from country to country, depending on culture. As far as Japan is concerned, we feel we have a responsibility to fulfill as a movement in the only country that has actually witnessed A-bombings. That is to carry forward the experience of

the suffering from the nuclear bombs from generation to generation, and from country to country, with a message of the Hibakusha, the A-bomb survivors that the “humans cannot coexist with nuclear weapons”. We need to build a symbolic action for it, the action that everyone, if he or she wants, can do at any time and at any place.

For this, we have decided on two specific actions: One is an A-bomb photo-exhibition, which we will call on all governments as well as NGOs to plan and organize as part of their actions leading to the NPT Review Conference. More importantly, we will call on all local governments in over 1800 municipalities in Japan to sponsor or co-sponsor with us an A-bomb photo exhibition at their own municipalities. The single aim is to invite citizens in every community to learn and inherit what the Hibakusha experienced, as well as their life-long effort for human survival. We will also launch a new signature campaign at the 2008 World Conference against A and H Bombs in August to build a gigantic support for the abolition campaign and demonstrate the will of the grassroots people at the Review Conference. We hope you will support our effort in August as the CND Chair Kate Hudson did when we launched the “Abolition Now” campaign in August 2003.

The third and last point to be made is our action directed at the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government speaks of the “elimination of nuclear weapons” in its diplomacy, representing the “only A-bombed country”. But the actual policy is to give unconditional support

for the US nuclear strategy, calling it a “nuclear umbrella”. Particularly since George W. Bush came to office, the Japanese Government has further emphasized its “commitment to the common strategic objectives for Japan and the United States”, meaning to send the Self-Defense Forces overseas for the joint military operation with the US forces. The key is to revise the Japanese Constitution, as it proclaims the renunciation of war as means to resolve international conflicts, as well as non-possession of land, sea and air forces. One reason why the abolition of nuclear weapons is not yet achieved in spite of the support of the people worldwide is found in this kind of hypocritical attitude.

Nevertheless, people are learning the lessons. When I was invited to your national convention in September 2004, I reported that the two government parties and the opposition Democrats all stood for the revision of the peace Constitution, but the gap between those parties with the vast majority of people was still wide and deep.

In July last year, the two government parties led by Shinzo Abe, who used to boost that while he was incumbent he would change the Constitution, were defeated in the Upper House election, partly because of its US-subordinated posture and its anachronistic view of history. One opinion poll conducted shortly after the election showed that in the Upper House, the number of the MPs who stood in favor of the revision came down far short of the two thirds, which was needed to revise the Constitution. And where Article 9 was concerned,

50% answered that they were against the revision, as against 31% who still supported the revision. The situation involving the Japanese Constitution is still tense. But it is also true that depending on our own efforts, the people will choose a more independent, peaceful Japan guided by both the peace Constitution and the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”.

Our new campaign for the declaration of a “Nuclear Weapon-Free Japan” launched in April last year has already collected support from 335 mayors and 248 chairpersons of local assemblies, out of the total of some 1800. Some 130 local assemblies have even adopted resolution to urge the national government to issue a nuclear weapon-free declaration. We will further develop this campaign so as to get support from more than 50% of the municipalities in this year, so that Japan will join force with many other countries that truly stand in support of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Before concluding, I express my gratitude to many of you who have sent Pentagon a protest Message against the recent rape case of a 14 year-old student by a Marine in Okinawa. Thank you for your attention.

** Slightly edited text of the speech delivered at the “Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: Laying the Practical, Technical and Political Groundwork” to be held in London from Feb. 16 – 17 organised by the Campaign for nuclear Disarmament (CND),*
 [Source:
<http://www.cnduk.org/images/stories/resources/globalabolition/summit/hiroshataka.pdf>]



V. Nuclear Disarmament and the NPT:

*The Responsibility of the Nuclear-Weapon States**

Sergio Duarte

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations

As many of you may know, I have been working in the field of nuclear disarmament for many years, and have attended many conferences and seminars on this issue. I have noticed that it has become somewhat of a tradition in such gatherings for keynote speakers to focus their remarks on specific policy issues and then, at the end, to pay a brief tribute to the efforts of civil society to advance this great goal.

Today, I would like to reverse this practice, not just as a courtesy to our hosts, but because I really do believe that this diverse combination of individuals and groups that together comprise “civil society” will have – and indeed are having – enormously important roles to play in bringing the process of global nuclear disarmament to a successful conclusion, for the good of all. They deserve full credit for this work, not treatment as an afterthought.

I look at the dedicated work of Rebecca Johnson and Kate Hudson, consider the sacrifices they have made over many years in the face of great obstacles, and can only feel a great sense of respect for their many efforts on behalf of their fellow citizens of this planet. I also know that they are not alone, and that they are part of a global community that shares the same objective. So it continues to disappoint me that many discussions of nuclear dis-

armament continue to treat the subject as a rather elitist political matter, of concern to a few diplomats, government bureaucrats, think tank specialists, and die-hard activists among the general public. It is, of course, far more than this.

In poll after poll, people around the world have registered their strong support for nuclear disarmament – they have a stake in its success. This is a point that UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has made repeatedly in his recent statements. In his message to the annual Pugwash Conference last October, he warned of the potential devastation of weapons of mass destruction and “the very real threat they pose to all of humanity”. Last month, he personally visited the Conference on Disarmament and underscored some of the many ways that progress in disarmament serves to forestall arms races, calm tensions, and free up resources needed to advance the Millennium Development Goals. He also noted how the absence of disarmament can jeopardize many of the most fundamental goals of the UN Charter.

I find it quite significant that the first three words of the Charter are “we the peoples”. This says a lot about who are the intended beneficiaries of the development, disarmament, and collective security provisions of

that great document. Virtually all of our work at the United Nations assumes that nuclear weapons will not be used – for how long could economic development, a clean environment, respect for human rights, social justice, humanitarian relief, and the rule of law be sustained in the midst of a nuclear war? Such a nightmare is not at all unthinkable in our world today, which faces many dangers from the thousands upon thousands of nuclear weapons that remain in existing arsenals, military doctrines that contemplate – even prescribe – their use, the proliferation of such weapons to additional states, and the possible threat of nuclear terrorism.

Because of the horrific effects – both human and environmental – from the use of even one nuclear weapon, I believe that the world community must continue to ensure that nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism efforts receive the high priorities they deserve, both in the policies of governments and in the initiatives launched by civil society.

In this respect, I am also convinced that the states that possess such weapons – in particular the two with the largest holdings – bear a particularly heavy burden of demonstrating to the world what they are doing to fulfil the commitments they have made in the NPT to achieving global nuclear disar-

mament. A few of them have taken pains to demonstrate their record of compliance, while others have remained silent. None, however, has so far openly admitted that its efforts at reduction are actually required by the specific obligations assumed under Article VI of the NPT. There is a big difference between an action that is consistent with the treaty and one that fulfils an obligation.

This is not to ignore that in recent years the NPT nuclear-weapon states have launched various initiatives – ranging from policy statements to specific practical measures – to convey the steps they have taken regarding disarmament. The Government of the United Kingdom has led the way in the area of verification, as reflected both in its published studies and its recent proposal in Geneva for a technical conference on the subject, which I hope will soon be further elaborated. In addition, the UK has announced reductions of its stockpile, halted the production of fissile material for weapons, joined the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and supported other such initiatives that, I might add, have been welcomed throughout the world. The United States and Russian Federation have also declared their own unilateral and bilateral measures of stockpile reductions. For its part, France has undertaken to cut its own production of fissile material for weapons purposes and to limit the size of its arsenal.

And this is not all.

All states possessing such weapons support the goal of global nuclear disarmament. As I noted, almost all appear to be taking at least some steps to limit

the size of their arsenals, or at least to place restrictions on their possible use. All are working to improve the physical security of their stockpiles and fissile materials. And all are seeking to improve controls to

reduce the risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism. All are continuing to refrain from nuclear tests. Some are publishing additional details about the size of their arsenals. Whatever other differences that continue to divide these powers, each has at least done something to advance the goal of global nuclear disarmament.

Understandably, such states desire to be recognized for their achievements in these areas, and I am pleased to do so today. The UN General Assembly has also adopted resolutions that recognize areas where progress has been made, as have many leaders who have spoken in several UN arenas. I strongly urge all who work for disarmament in civil society also to acknowledge progress when it occurs, for there is no reason for the process of disarmament to be adversarial, especially when such an approach only leads to new political or bureaucratic hurdles for disarmament.

This brings me to four questions. Are the steps that the nuclear-weapon states have taken sufficient to bring us to a world without nuclear weapons? Are some of these steps likely to take the world away from that goal? What actions are needed now and in next few years for substantial progress to occur? And how can these be implemented?

The first question is easy to answer: no, the existing steps have not been sufficient.

Sufficiency implies long-term sustainability, and that requires, among other things, some significant institutional support and budgets. I am referring to the creation of government organizations with specific legislative mandates, budgets, timetables, benchmarks, and public accountability for achieving disarmament goals. There appears to be a gap between the international commitments to disarmament and the domestic institutional means to implement them, especially relative to the infrastructures and budgets devoted to maintaining or improving existing arsenals. To this institutional deficit I would add an inspirational deficit. To the extent that it is able to achieve its goals in a reliable and credible manner, disarmament has the potential to enjoy massive and durable public support, certainly more so than expenditure of vast sums on behalf of weapons whose basic morality, legality, and utility is widely open to question. Nuclear weapons cannot deter catastrophic terrorist attacks, nor are they likely to serve any function in response to such attacks. Yet their perpetuation generates new types of terrorist risks relating to the loss or theft of a nuclear weapon or related material, or to attacks on nuclear facilities or vehicles transporting such items. Physical security controls can only so far in reducing such risks, but never as far as disarmament.

With respect to my second question, yes there are some steps that are contrary to the cause of disarmament. I would include in this category the following –

- the articulation of long-term plans – at times with time

horizons in multiple decades – to retain or improve existing nuclear arsenals, coupled with the lack of any operational plans whatsoever to implement nuclear disarmament;

- the development of new types of nuclear-weapon delivery systems;
- the promulgation of nuclear doctrines that reserve the right to the first use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear-weapon states, or to preempt a possible future attack involving other weapons of mass destruction or even conventional weapons;
- the repeated re-affirmations of nuclear deterrence as vital to national security; and
- the refusal to negotiate or discuss even the outlines of a nuclear-weapons convention.

In this light, the often-heard claim that nuclear stockpiles are at the “minimum” level needed to sustain deterrence is not reassuring, especially to the extent that it offers a model national security posture for other countries to emulate, as indeed they have. The claim by the

current possessors that they must retain their nuclear capability because they do not know what threats might arise in the future could easily be made by any would-be nuclear state.

Nuclear doctrines, it appears, are somewhat contagious and tend to proliferate right along with the weapons themselves. The prospect of a world of States, each with its own “minimum” nuclear deterrent, could scarcely serve the interest of international peace

and security. And if history teaches us anything, the prospect of perpetually freezing the number states with such a deterrent is not bright, recognizing that nuclear weapons have now spread to some eight or nine states since they were first used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

As for my fourth question concerning what steps are needed for substantial progress in disarmament, any movement away from the previous list of items toward enhancing national security through non-nuclear means would advance this goal. Thus, weapons stewardship programmes would progressively give way to disarmament stewardship initiatives, which would include such activities as developing enhanced means of verifying compliance with disarmament commitments, promptly and reliably detecting possible violations, protecting against the reversibility of disarmament obligations, and ensuring the availability of alternative means (both diplomatic and military) of defending legitimate security interests without using nuclear weapons.

It is also important for the public and the world community to witness the progress of disarmament, through transparency measures involving more than just unilateral national declarations of reductions, but sufficient detail for the world to conclude that un-deployed weapons are in fact being taken apart and destroyed.

My last question, concerning the requisites for implementing such steps, requires that elusive term “political will”, by which I mean sustained political support, especially in the nuclear-

weapon states – including from civil society, from the legislatures, from national leaders, from among the nuclear-weapon-states themselves, and from concerned members of the world diplomatic community. This is one of the reasons why I have welcomed the Hoover Plan – a nuclear disarmament initiative jointly proposed by the former high-level U.S. officials, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. Here in the UK, there is clearly a level of interest in nuclear disarmament at the highest level of government and in Parliament. There is strong support in civil society. There is also diplomatic engagement elsewhere in the world community, including through Britain’s participation in the Norwegian Initiative to explore new avenues for progress in disarmament and nonproliferation.

In my remarks today, I have offered, in bare outline, some of the responsibilities that the nuclear-weapon-states must bear in order to achieve concrete progress in nuclear disarmament. I accept that this progress will also require parallel efforts in nuclear arms control – including de-alerting – as well as new efforts to reduce the risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but I do not agree that progress in disarmament should be held hostage to the prior solution of all these other problems, nor should such progress await the dawn of world peace. Progress in disarmament makes its own independent contribution to both peace and security, and I believe that contribution has been highly underestimated.

Reflecting back on the out-

break of World War I, Sir Edward Grey once wrote:

The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them — it was these that made war inevitable. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history, and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interest of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who come after us.

Today, we are witnessing in the world another enormous growth in armaments, with global military spending now well over \$1 trillion and continuing to grow. This is an extraordinary development in the post-Cold War world and in stark contrast to a goal found in Article 26 of the UN Charter, namely “the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.” While nuclear disarmament will not alone guarantee a major reduction in this spending, it will help to reduce the motivation for states to seek such weapons, it will advance

both nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorist efforts, and it will alleviate some of the mistrust and lack of confidence that has inspired arms races in the past.

Almost fifty years ago, the UN General Assembly adopted the goal of “general and complete disarmament”, which aims at the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and the limitation of conventional arms to levels sufficient to maintain national security and international peace keeping operations. The States parties to the NPT agreed in their 2000 Review Conference that this was their “ultimate goal”. While nuclear disarmament should still be the most urgent priority, a parallel complementary effort is also needed to limit the production, trade, and use of conventional arms. The British proposal of an Arms Trade Treaty – which has long been advocated by groups in civil society – is a clearly a step in the right direction.

Writing from the UK before the signature of the NPT, Leonard Beaton stated that “The greatest incentive to a wide

spread of these weapons is the conviction that it is inevitable.”

Today, I would like to propose a corollary: The greatest incentive to a wide spread of these weapons is the conviction that disarmament is unachievable. I believe that it is indeed possible to achieve, thanks to cooperative actions by enlightened governments and sustained support and pressure from civil society. To all the groups and government officials in attendance today, I urge you to continue your efforts to advance nuclear disarmament. It is a worthy cause indeed, and not one to be borne by the nuclear-weapon states alone.

** Text of the speech delivered at the “Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: Laying the Practical, Technical and Political Groundwork” to be held in London from Feb. 16 – 17 organised by the Campaign for nuclear Disarmament (CND),*

*[Source:
<http://www.cnduk.org/images/stories/resources/globalabolition/summit/duarte.pdf>]* 

Section C: US-India Nuclear Agreement: Bad for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Bad for Nuclear Disarmament

Philip White

Coordinator, Abolition 2000 US-India Deal Working Group

The US-India nuclear has attracted a great deal of attention and concern since it was announced in 2005 by President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Many believe that given the implications of the agree-

ment for the non-proliferation regime, it should be on the official agenda of this year’s NPT Prepcom (28 April – 9 May) and that any final decision should wait for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The most authoritative and

credible statement about the implications of the agreement for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was a letter sent in January this year to more than four-dozen governments by a prestigious and broad array of more than 130

experts and nongovernmental organizations from 23 countries. Among the experts who signed the letter was Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and President of the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Nongovernmental organizations from South Asia, East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Europe, Africa, and North America endorsed the letter, which was organized by the Abolition 2000 network's US-India Deal Working Group and the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

The letter will form the basis of the NGO presentation on the US-India nuclear agreement delivered at this year's NPT PrepCom. It provides a litmus test against which proposals for allowing India to participate in nuclear trade should be measured.

The letter said the U.S. proposal to exempt India from longstanding global nuclear trade standards "would damage the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation system and set back efforts to achieve universal nuclear disarmament." The signatories wrote that "the proposed arrangement fails to bring India into conformity with the non-proliferation behavior expected of other states. India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international non-proliferation rules and norms."

What is at issue here are the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ban on providing direct or indirect assistance for another state's nuclear weapons program and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines that severely restrict trade with states, such as India, that do not allow comprehensive international safeguards over all nuclear facilities and material in their territory. The United States seeks to exempt India from these restrictions even though India detonated a nuclear test in 1974 made with plutonium harvested from a Canadian and U.S.-supplied reactor in violation of peace nuclear use agreements, has not joined the NPT, continues to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

As part of the agreement with the US, the Indian government has finalized with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) secretariat the text of a safeguards agreement to cover those reactors that India chooses to be civilian, leaving its military nuclear program and its fast breeder reactor program outside safeguards. This safeguards agreement has not been made public. Meanwhile, obstructions by some political parties on whose support the ruling coalition in Delhi depends, in addition to opposition from the opposition parties, has so far prevented India from submitting the text to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval.

If the IAEA and India sign

a safeguards agreement, the matter will then go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). By virtue of their veto power, each NSG member state has a pivotal role to play. It is not clear when the NSG will be asked to make a decision. The matter then goes to the US Congress for final approval of a US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

At the time of writing this article, it was looking unlikely that all these steps would be concluded within this year. However, negotiation of the agreement has been characterized by last minute fixes and sudden changes of tactics, so a sudden unexpected development should come as no surprise.

Given the damage the US-India agreement would do to the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation system, there is much at stake for all NPT states and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. Indeed, by rights the matter should not be decided by the NSG at all. It should be fully debated within the context of the NPT.

Several countries made references to the US-India agreement, either directly or indirectly, during the 2007 NPT PrepCom, but the issue was not given the attention it deserves. Delegates at this year's PrepCom should thoroughly debate the issues raised by the US-India agreement, and any proposal to allow the agreement to proceed should be submitted as a recommendation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

II. Go! Throwing Up Hands in Despair?

[The following is an excerpt from a very recent interview by Shyam Saran, former Foreign Secretary of India and the Prime Minister's Special Envoy deputed to clinch the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Hence this is an assessment of the prospects of the deal from the horse's mouth, so to say. And it also appears to be pretty candid and comprehensive.

On the one hand, it is openly talking of the "successor governments" pursuing the "deal".

On the other, it brings out the fact that the domestic opposition in India is essentially based on the objection that the deal would make further testing and thereby graduating to H-Bomb stage more difficult.

The interview also debunks the notion that sans the "deal" being taken to its conclusion, India can access similar facilities, as are to be obtained through the "deal", from any other sources bypassing the "deal". That's pretty absurd.

The successful clinching of the deal, implying a unique and grossly unjustified exception for India would be a significant setback for the prospects of global nuclear disarmament.

The failure of the deal would mean India joining the CTBT or FMCT regime, two critical steps towards global nuclear disarmament, any time soon all the more improbable and difficult.]

'No rush... But in NSG time won't stand still'

Q&A | Shyam Saran

Q: Is the India-United States nuclear deal dead? Or is it comatose, still-born? What is its status today?

A. No ... none of these adjectives apply. It is not true that it has been put into cold storage or indefinitely deferred. The government remains committed to the civil nuclear cooperation agreement and will make every effort to bring about its early conclusion. We believe that it is in the best interest of the country. However, it is important that in taking this forward there should be a political consensus and that is what the government is engaged in trying to bring about. How long this process may take is not for us to predict, but the government remains fully engaged in the process of evolving a political consensus on taking the next steps. The UPA-Left committee is currently looking at the elements of the India-IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards agreement and one meeting has already been held of the committee.

Q. Looking ahead, what are the possible scenarios? If the deal is alive, how soon can it be operationalised and is it going to happen

in the life of the governments here and in Washington?

A. We are conscious of the timelines. It is obvious that the level of political uncertainty will increase as time goes on. However, there is a domestic political process that has to be gone through and we cannot say when that process, which is aimed at evolving a political consensus on taking the next steps, will be concluded. We are confident that we can convince both political opinion as well as public opinion in this country.

Even after the safeguards agreement has been concluded, there will still be challenges ahead at the NSG and at the US Congress which will have to vote to approve the 123 agreement. There will be uncertainties at each of these stages.

So it is not that this is something which is going to be a very simple, straight and forward process but by taking one step at a time, we have managed to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, that is a very important step forward. We have been working on the NSG countries. In the US Congress, too, we expect that the bipartisan consensus that was evident when the Hyde Act was passed, would continue to operate when the 123 agreement is put to vote.

Q. Is the survival of the nuclear deal linked to the life of the governments here or in Washington?

A. Agreements are of course negotiated by governments but these are agreements between countries, so a certain agreement has been arrived at between India and the US. Even if the initiative does not go through during the life of the current US administration and/or the current government in India, nothing precludes successor governments in both countries from continuing to pursue it to its logical conclusion. The legislation in the US has been amended, and the 123 agreement has been finalised. The safeguards agreement, too, may soon be concluded.

Therefore, **successor governments in both countries could take the next steps if they so decide.** It is not possible to predict whether there may be demands in either or both countries for revisions. Even concluded agreements are sometimes amended. We should not prejudge or speculate on what could happen.

Q. Critics of the nuclear deal say if it is indeed good, it should survive changes in government here and in Washington. So why rush with this deal?

A. In the NSG itself time is not going to stand still. There are political changes taking place in NSG countries as well, so this is a dynamic situation. That is

why we say other things being equal, the sooner we can conclude these processes, the better it would be but having said that, we know there is no alternative to being able to get that political consensus behind taking the next steps.

Q. Do we have a draft of IAEA agreement and if so, why is it not being made public?

A. The main parameters of the India-IAEA safeguards agreement have been finalised, but the agreement has not yet been concluded.

Q. Does the text meet or satisfy our conditions or demands of assured fuel supply, strategic fuel reserve, and corrective measures in the event of disruption of supply?

A. The elements of the agreement fully reflect the fuel supply assurances that are contained in the 123 agreement. The question of IAEA itself guaranteeing fuel supplies does not arise, since the agency does not supply fuel.

Q. What is the mood or overwhelming sentiment in the NSG?

A. After interacting with a number of NSG countries over the past year, our assessment is that opinion has moved in favour of India being given an exemption. We have conveyed that such exemption must be a clear one, without conditionalities or even expectations concerning India's future actions . We

have been working with the members of the NSG, explaining to them why it is legitimate for us to expect that a similar exemption should be made for India as has been made by the US. While it would be difficult to really predict which country will do what but overall I can say that over the past year or so, thanks to the kind of diplomatic effort which has been put in by us with various NSG countries, definitely there's been a change in mood for the better. There is a more positive sentiment in the NSG today with regard to giving India this exemption than was the case say about a year ago.

.....

Q. What will be the status of the MoUs with Russia and France?

A. It is clear that such cooperation cannot become a reality unless NSG guidelines are adjusted.

Q. Will an IAEA safeguards agreement be enough for operationalising those MoUs? For instance, we have finalised negotiations with Russia for building four new nuclear power stations.

A. No. If the Russians are willing to say that, we would very much welcome that, but that's not the case. If you look at the MoU it is very clear that this is conditional upon the NSG guidelines. Whatever is there in the MoU can actually be operationalised only after the NSG guidelines have been adjusted.

Q. What about the 123 agreement with the US? Is that a precondition to operationalising the MoUs with Russia or France?

A. That (123 agreement) is for the United States of America...

Q. So the 123 agreement is not a must for the other countries?

A. For Russia and France, because they are members of the NSG, what is important is that the NSG guidelines, by consensus, which includes the US, must be adjusted.

Q. Doesn't the Hyde Act pose problems for India?

A. What is important for us is that in terms of a bilateral agreement between India and the US, the manner in which we cooperate with the US will be governed as far as we are concerned by whatever we have committed ourselves to legally in the 123 agreement. So there are of course elements which we have said in the Hyde Act which we do not agree with. But it is important to also appreciate that the most important objective of the Hyde Act was to give that exemption to India. So the Act has a certain significance in that respect.

But yes, it contains various extraneous elements which we don't like and which we made it very clear that it is something that we don't agree with. If the 123 agreement goes before the US Congress and if the Congress says this 123 agreement is not in conso-

nance with what we think the Hyde Act says, that is the end of the matter. If however the 123 agreement is passed by the US Congress, then as far as we are concerned, the Congress has endorsed that this is, as far as they are concerned, not violative of their understanding of the Hyde Act. That is how we should look at it.

Q. The BJP has talked of a domestic law to prevail over the Hyde Act. Is that a viable alternative?

A. It has been proposed that we could try and overcome some of the negative aspects of the Hyde Act by adopting some counter-vailing legislation on our side. It is not possible to comment on this unless one knows what kind of legislative provisions are being proposed and what their legal implication would be. We have not looked at this possibility. It remains the government's position that it is the bilateral 123 agreement that would govern civil nuclear cooperation between India and the US.

.....

Q. Does the government appreciate the concern that the deal would hurt our strategic programme and nuclear deterrent?

A. Those who allege that the proposed agreement may compromise our strategic programme have not spelt out why they have this apprehension. If anybody feels that our deterrence is being compromised perhaps they could tell us why,

in what way? As far as testing is concerned, we have ensured that our commitment is only to continuing our voluntary moratorium. If in the light of changes in our security environment, our political leadership decides to undertake further tests, we will not be violating any international commitment or legal undertaking. There will perhaps be consequences just as there were after the May 1998 tests. It should also be noted that 43 of the 45 members of the NSG have signed and ratified the CTBT. Two - China and the US - have signed but not ratified it. While the NSG may not impose adherence to the CTBT as a conditionality in giving us exemption, it is unrealistic to expect the group to convey any assurance that there will be no consequences for India if it decides to test. Having given up their own right to test, how can they be expected to give India that right in any explicit manner?

.....

Q. Why doesn't the government explore the possibility of accessing uranium from non-NSG countries?

A. There may be supplies which may be available for example in some African countries but in many cases those supplies are in fact either being mined or traded by in fact Western companies. So merely the fact that some uranium supplies may be available in

this or that country does not necessarily mean even if that country is not member of the NSG that therefore it is available to you. Our experience indicates that these countries, while not being NSG members, are reluctant to go outside those norms, set by an influential group of countries. Recently you were appoint-

ed the PM's special envoy for climate change. Does it mean you would be focusing more of your energies on tackling climate change issues than the nuclear deal?

A. I have been appointed Prime Minister's special envoy for climate change, in addition to my continuing responsibilities concerning nuclear issues. These additional duties do not in any way detract from my

original responsibilities nor do they imply a downgrading of the nuclear agreement in government's priorities.

.....

[Source:
<http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/asian-age-plus/news-plus/%E2%80%98no-rush-but-in-nsg-time-won%E2%80%99t-stand-still%E2%80%99.aspx>]

Section D:

How safe and desirable is nuclear power?

Santanu Chacraverti

Place the above query in a Google window and press the search button. You will generate about a thousand hits - mostly pertinent, whatever the information quality. The reason is simple. Nuclear power is presently a hotly debated topic and a lot of articulate people hold strong views on the subject.

Nuclear power raises a host of issues. We shall look at quite a few of them.

Some important objections to nuclear power

- Reactor safety has increased since Chernobyl. But the very fact that billions of dollars and a lot of headache go into increasing the safety of reactors shows that the technology is innately dangerous.
- Even a technically 'safe' reactor lets out a stream of low level ionizing radiation into the environment. And as regards ionizing radiation there are no safe lev-

els.

- The issue is not that there has always been some background ionizing radiation in the earth's environment. The issue is that the levels of radiation have increased due to atomic weapons testing, emissions from nuclear power stations, uranium mining and so on. There is no reason to subject humans and the biosphere to any additional doses of ionizing radiation from anthropogenic sources except those absolutely necessary for medical purposes.
- There is no solution to the problem of high level radioactive waste.
- Uranium mining is a devastatingly environment destroying activity creating immediate and long term health hazards.
- Nuclear power is dreadfully costly, and if all the costs and externalities are taken

into account then it is the most expensive source of energy.

- Therefore every euro, dollar or rupee invested in nuclear power or nuclear research is that money taken away from possible investment in renewable energy sources and research and in improving energy efficiency.
- Nuclear plants take long to build. From the inception of construction to going into commercial operation plants easily take from 8 to 10 years.
- Therefore investing in nuclear leads to massive funds getting tied down for a long time.
- Nuclear energy, unlike what its proponents tell us, is not emission free. Once you take into account the entire fuel cycle from mining and milling onwards, a lot of carbon dioxide is emitted. And once high

- grade ores are exhausted and substituted by low grade ores, this emission is going to increase and become comparable to those emitted from fossil fuel powered plants.
- Nuclear energy is also costly in terms of energy input. If one measures the energy input from mining through milling down through the entire fuel cycle then it becomes questionable how far nuclear power can be seen as economic, even in the narrow sense of the term.
 - For all these reasons, nuclear is not really a means to tackling climate change.
 - Nuclear power is historically and technologically tied to the production of nuclear weapons. You cannot stop nuclear weapons proliferation in a scenario of nuclear energy expansion.
- The proponents of nuclear power have arguments against all the above objections. And

The Cancer Trail of Chernobyl

On 26 April 1986, explosions at reactor number four of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in Ukraine, a Republic of the former Soviet Union, led to huge releases of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. These materials were deposited mainly over countries in Europe, but especially over large areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

An estimated 350 000 clean-up workers or "liquidators" from the army, power plant staff, local police and fire services were initially involved in containing and cleaning up the radioactive debris during 1986-1987. About 240 000 liquidators received the highest radiation doses while conducting major mitigation activities within the 30 km zone around the reactor. Later, the number of registered liquidators rose to 600 000...

According to UNSCEAR (2000), 134 liquidators received radiation doses high enough to be diagnosed with acute radiation sickness (ARS). Among them, 28 persons died in 1986 due to ARS. Other liquidators have since died but their deaths could not necessarily be attributed to radiation exposure. Recent investigations suggest a doubling of the incidence of leukaemia among the most highly exposed Chernobyl liquidators.

Currently about five million people live in areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine with levels of radioactive caesium deposition more than 37 kBq/m². Predictions, generally based on the LNT model, suggest that up to 5 000 additional cancer deaths may occur in this population from radiation exposure, or about 0.6% of the cancer deaths expected in this population due to other causes.

A large increase in the incidence of thyroid cancer has occurred among people who were young children and adolescents at the time of the accident and lived in the most contaminated areas of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This was due to the high levels of radioactive iodine released from the Chernobyl reactor in the early days after the accident. Radioactive iodine was deposited in pastures eaten by cows who then concentrated it in their milk which was subsequently drunk by children. In Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine nearly 5000 cases of thyroid cancer have now been diagnosed to date among children who were aged up to 18 years at the time of the accident.

An increased number of cancer deaths can be expected during the lifetime of persons exposed to radiation from the accident. The WHO Expert Group concluded that there may be up to 4 000 additional cancer deaths among the three highest exposed groups over their lifetime (240 000 liquidators; 116 000 evacuees and the 270 000 residents of the SCZs).

Chernobyl may also cause cancers in Europe outside Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

[Source: WHO assessment of Health Impacts of the Chernobyl disaster at <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs303/en/index.html>]

this is the point where I, the author, must clearly state my own position. I am against nuclear power and do not consider it to be either a safe or a desirable means of tackling climate change. In what follows I shall try to share some of my ideas, hoping that any shortcomings will trigger response and exchange.

Our nearest cosmic power plant

The energy that bathes the solar system and sustains the entire biosphere on this planet has its origin in the nuclear processes in the Sun. The sun's energy, unlike in our present nuclear reactors, owes its origin not to nuclear fission but to fusion. But the point here is that the energy in the sun and the stars owes its origin to nuclear mass energy conversion. Indeed if you are thinking of unleashing large chunks of energy rapidly, nuclear mass energy conversion would be your best bet. And that, we are told, is the argument in favour of nuclear power.

The sun however is placed almost 150 million kilometers away and therefore the density of electromagnetic and particle radiation that reaches the earth is rather low. And even at that enormous distance the sun's bounty would have been deadly had it not been for the ozone layer, the atmosphere in general and the earth's magnetic field. The ozone layer protects us from that particular spectrum of nasty ultraviolet rays (UVB: with wavelengths in the range 280-320 nm) and the earth's magnetic field and the

atmosphere take care of the bulk of particle radiation. So, even from its incredible distance, the sun would have succeeded in scorching all life, as we know it, had it not been for the natural shielding that we are lucky to have.

This is the thing to remember when we discuss nuclear reactors right on the earth.

The designers of nuclear power reactors know that nuclear energy is intrinsically dangerous. That is the reason for the billions spent in trying to make nuclear power plants safe. Does this apply to any renewable energy source? The question is almost silly. For nobody argues that these sources are innately unsafe.

But aren't fossil fuels dangerous too. Of course they are. They have been a source of numerous toxins in our environment; to say nothing of the massive damage they are causing by bringing about climate change. In a certain sense the fossil fuels, though very different in the nature of their energy release, are very similar to nuclear. Why we shall see later.

Uranium Mining

The reactors today, as in the foreseeable future, depend on mined uranium.

So let us begin with uranium mining.

Who has not heard of the miseries of Jadugoda? But although the UCIL's crimes are horrifying, Jadugoda is not exactly *sui generis*. Uranium mining the world over has been callously destructive of environment and human health.

Uranium is widely distributed in the earth's crust but only in tiny proportions. Exceptions are a few places where it has accumulated in concentrations rich enough to be used as ore. The main deposits of ore, in order of size (as per 2005 data) are in Australia, Kazakhstan, Canada, the USA, South Africa, Namibia, Brazil, Niger, the Russian Federation, and Uzbekistan. There are some very rich ores; concentrations as high as 1 percent have been found, but 0.1 percent (one part per thousand) or less is usual and even much poorer ores are mined.

After it has been mined, the ore is grinded ("milled") to extract the uranium oxide. If the ore has a concentration of 0.1 percent, approximately 1,000 tonnes of rock must be grinded up to extract just one tonne of the bright yellow uranium oxide, called "yellow-cake".

Both the oxide and the "tailings" (this means the 999 tonnes of rock that remain) are kept indefinitely radioactive by, for instance, uranium-238, and they contain all thirteen of its radioactive decay products, each one decaying into the next, and together forming a cascade of deadly elements, with amazingly varied half-lives.

The following table shows the decay sequence of Uranium-238 giving the half-lives and principal radiations of each of the radionuclides formed:

Nuclide	Half-Life	Major Radiations
Uranium-238	4.47 billion years	alpha, x-rays
Thorium-234	24.1 days	Beta, gamma, x-rays
Protactinium-234	1.17 minutes	Beta, gamma
Uranium-234	245,000 years	alpha, x-rays
Thorium-230	77,000 years	alpha, x-rays
Radium-226	1600 years	alpha, gamma
Radon-222	3.83 days	Alpha
Polonium-218	3.05 minutes	Alpha
Lead-214	26.8 minutes	Beta, gamma, x-rays
Bismuth-214	19.7 minutes	Beta, gamma
Polonium-214	164 microseconds	Alpha
Lead-210	22.3 years	Beta, gamma, x-rays
Bismuth-210	5.01 days	Beta
Polonium-210	138 days	Alpha
Lead-206	Stable	

Once these radioactive rocks have been disturbed they stay around to make trouble. They are now more widely dispersed than they were in their undisturbed state, and their radioactive products are free to be washed and blown about by rain and wind. "These tailings ought therefore to be treated - the acids should be neutralised with limestone and made insoluble with phosphates; the mine floor should be sealed with clay before the treated tailings are put back into it; the overburden should be replaced and the area should be replanted with indigenous vegetation."¹ However, all this is hardly ever done. It is expensive and would raise the price of uranium, and it also requires many times the energy that was needed to

extract the ore in the first place.

So the environment bears the cost. Fatal lung disease has always been associated with the mining of uranium-bearing ores, and from the 19th century onwards the prevalence of lung diseases was marked in uranium miners in many parts of Europe.

In one US uranium mining operation about 4,000 lung cancer deaths per annum were recorded in the surrounding communities.²

Uranium mines pose risks to community members even when they don't work in the mines. One study showed that Navajo women living near tailings or mine dumps were significantly more likely to have miscarriages. Studies of community members near uranium

mines in Texas revealed subtle changes in their DNA. Higher rates of chromosomal aberrations and abnormal DNA repair mechanisms were seen in residents living near the mines, when compared to residents in non-mining communities.³

Estimates made by US EPA for an individual living next to some of the inactive tailings piles in the US showed a lifetime excess lung cancer risk of 40 chances in 1000. Since the radon gas released from the tailings piles is dispersed over large areas, many people receive small additional radiation doses.⁴

Similar estimates have been made of uranium mining operations in the former East Germany.⁵

Jadugoda is an old story.

Yet revelations continue. According to a recent survey conducted in the villages close to the tailing pond, "more children - about 9.5 per cent of the newborns - are dying each year due to extreme physical deformity" and higher rates of cancer and sterility prevail.⁶

Nuclear Power Plants

Illnesses and deaths due to radiation from Nuclear Power Plants have been hotly contested by the nuclear establishment. Actually tracing illnesses and casualties to specific factors can be scientifically difficult, for cancer, leukemia and genetic aberrations in general can have various triggering factors, and pinpointing a particular causative agent can be tricky.

Notwithstanding difficult

ties researchers have been able to definitively relate illnesses near nuclear facilities to radioactive emissions. The horrifying thing is that children appear to be the most susceptible to radiation impact.

Studies on childhood cancer near various nuclear plants in the United Kingdom have found higher than expected rates and elevated childhood cancer incidence rates proximate to nuclear facilities have been reported in Canada, France, Germany, and the former Soviet Union.⁷ A 2003 study found a consistent pattern of increased childhood cancer incidence in all study areas 48 km from nuclear plants in the eastern United States.⁸

Further, Germany has very

high nuclear safety norms. Nevertheless studies have shown higher than normal incidence of childhood leukemia near Krümmel nuclear power plant (near Hamburg) in Germany.⁹

No wonder Germans have publicly declared phasing out of nuclear power.

Phasing Out: Some Examples

While the Government of India and its nuclear establishment seem obstinately determined about nuclear expansion, a very different attitude emerges in countries with stronger environmental sensitivity among the citizenry. See the following table.¹⁰

Look at France. With 78% of its electricity from nuclear France is the poster boy for the nuclear campaign. Five of France's reactors are of thirty years of age and above and are expected to shut down in the next ten years. Another 10 are expected to shut down in the five years that follow. Yet France has only one reactor under construction. None has been planned and only one has been proposed. When one recalls that nuclear reactors easily take between 8 and 10 years to build,

Ionising Radiation

There is an opinion that very low doses of ionizing radiation are not harmful to health, and may even be beneficial! But this claim has been rubbished by several scientific studies (e.g. those by JW Gofman and Rosalie Bertell), which have shown that no dose of ionizing radiation is too low to be safe. An important recent study by the US National Research Council (2005) has reconfirmed this assessment. Chair of the Council's research panel, Professor Richard Monson, concluded: "The scientific research base shows that there is no threshold of exposure below which low levels of ionizing radiation can be demonstrated to be harmless or beneficial."

Country	Percentage of Electricity from Nuclear	No. of Reactors Operating	No. of Reactors under Construction	No. of Reactors Planned	No. of Reactors Proposed
United Kingdom	18	19	0	0	0
Germany	32	17	0	0	0
Sweden	48	10	0	0	0
Spain	20	8	0	0	0
Switzerland	37	5	0	0	1
France	78	59	1	0	1

and that from proposal to planning and from planning to construction things take very long indeed, the above data indicates a lack of nuclear determination.

And what about other Western countries?

Denmark decided not to generate nuclear power in 1985; Italy decided to close down its four reactors, one by one, in 1986. The last was closed down in 1990. Netherlands decided to phase out its nuclear power in 1994 and has no plans or proposals for any new nuclear power plant. The United States has plans and proposals for quite a number of nuclear power plants, but the last plant that was constructed went into commercial operation in 1996. Thereafter there is not a single instance where the construction of a new plant has begun. No wonder US energy companies are keen to get orders from other countries, for example India.

The Indian nuclear establishment however remains arrogantly deaf to claims of radiation hazards from Indian nuclear power plants, although careful studies have found significantly increased incidences in stillbirths and congenital malformations in children in villages close to the RAPS plant compared with those in villages remote from the plant.¹¹

The Cost of Nuclear Power

Why do so many countries with a nuclear past shy away from a nuclear future? Is it wholly the fault of the green activists? No. The pains of nuclear industry have deeper, albeit more mundane, origins. A close analytical study of the

High Level Radioactive Waste

A typical nuclear reactor produces 25-30 tonnes of spent fuel annually. Annually, power reactors worldwide produce about 14,000 tonnes of spent fuel. This spent fuel is High Level radioactive waste. Much of this nuclear waste will remain hazardous for hundreds of thousands of years, leaving a poisonous inheritance for future generations.

Decommissioning nuclear facilities will also create large amounts of radioactive wastes. Many of the world's nuclear sites will require monitoring and protection for centuries after they are closed down.

As of today there is no satisfactory method for dealing with high-level radioactive waste.

Most of the current proposals for dealing with highly radioactive nuclear waste involve burying it in deep underground sites or 'geological repositories'. But not a single such repository exists anywhere in the world.

An example of where industry plans have been exposed as flawed is the proposed dumpsite at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, US. After nearly 20 years of research and billions of dollars of investment, not one gram of spent fuel has so far been shipped to the site from nuclear reactors across the US.

prospects of nuclear power by Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt shows that costs (always escalating beyond anticipation), construction delays, technological problems and consequent reluctance of financiers makes nuclear power uncompetitive.¹² That is why nuclear power all over the world has been pushed along by state initiative and support. Since the article is getting lengthy I shall not multiply details, but only add that nuclear power, all over the world, is a heavily subsidised industry.

The Opportunity Cost of Nuclear Power

A total of 50% of the energy research budget in the OECD countries goes into nuclear energy research. On the other hand only 8% goes into

research in renewable energy sources.¹³

This is the case not only for OECD countries but for the world as a whole.

Therefore the true cost of nuclear power has to be measured in its opportunity cost - how every unit of money or man hour resource (mis)spent in nuclear, is that unit taken away from worthwhile energy research or endeavour.

Notwithstanding such massive support, nuclear power, during the last fifty years of its existence, has grown to only about 6% of the fuel share of marketed energy. At the end of 2002, world nuclear capacity was 357,000 Mw. In early 2008 it was 371,989 Mw. That is, it has grown 4.20% in five years, an average rate of growth around 0.8% per annum.

Of Renewables etc.

What has been the per-

formance of renewables in the meantime? Take wind power. At the end of 2002 the total world wind power production was about 35000 MW. At the end of 2007 the world total reached 94100 MW, an almost 169% percent increase in 5 years, and an average rate of growth of more than 12% per annum. In 2007, world wind power capacity increased by a record-breaking 20,000 megawatts, i.e. during that year wind power registered 27% growth.¹⁴

Where is India in all this? Its total installed power reached 8000 MW at the end of 2007.¹⁵

How much nuclear power does India produce? As of 20 March 2008 India produced 3779 MW, less than half of what it does from wind.¹⁶ This after more than 40 years of sustained effort and who knows how many thousands of billions of rupees flowing in as grants and subsidies! And as India dreams of going nuclear, its glorious record in wind power is set to be overtaken by China. A report says,

"But due to the lack of a national renewable energy law that establishes cohesive goals and provides economic incentives for Indian wind energy projects, China will likely overtake India in total installed wind power capacity in late 2008 or early 2009."¹⁷

And what about solar?

Growing by an impressive average of 48 percent each year since 2002, photovoltaic production has been doubling every two years, making it the world's fastest-growing energy source. Production of photovoltaics jumped to 3,800

megawatts worldwide in 2007, up an estimated 50 percent over 2006.¹⁸

Ausra Inc., the developer of utility-scale solar thermal power technology, has published a peer-reviewed study showing that over 90 percent of the U.S. electric grid and auto fleet's energy needs could be met by solar thermal power.¹⁹

Lots of other renewables, such as biogas, tidal, mini-hydro etc. are being researched and put into effective use and often cogeneration, rather than mono-generation, is presenting itself as a more viable option.

It has been shown time and again that renewables combined with decentralized energy, microgeneration, cogeneration and end use energy efficiency is far less costly and far more effective than nuclear in bringing about greenhouse gas reduction.²⁰ Nevertheless, the frightful fascination with nuclear does not seem to come to an end.

Emission Free?

Contrary to what is normally supposed, nuclear power is not emission free in terms of Greenhouse Gas Emission.

Nuclear fission does not produce greenhouse gases. But nuclear fission is only one part of the whole nuclear fuel cycle. There is a massive increase in greenhouse pollution from earlier parts of the fuel cycle. Mining, milling, fuel transportation, reactor construction and indeed each and every step involved in creating nuclear energy, except for the fission, takes in large inputs of energy, and in the present stage of technology the bulk of this

energy is derived from fossils fuels. Nuclear power is therefore a massive user of fossil fuels and a very substantial source of greenhouse gases. It has been shown that if all the energy costs connected with nuclear power plants are taken into account, the delivery of electricity into the grid from nuclear power produces, on average, roughly one third as much carbon dioxide as the delivery of the same quantity of electricity from gas. And this is only the case for the relatively richer ores. As van Leeuwen and Philip Smith's study has shown, if one were to think of using nuclear power on a large-scale, say to producing about 40% of the world's electricity, the richer uranium ores would become exhausted in about 20 years. As the leaner ores come into the picture nuclear power's CO₂ emission starts to rise and with use of uranium ores of less than 0.1% potency, nuclear power would become responsible for more CO₂ emission than if the same amount of energy were to be had from burning fossil fuels directly.²¹

And remember, nuclear power is generally only good for producing electricity. But electricity is responsible for less than a third of global greenhouse gas emissions. The main culprits are vehicles, which not only produce CO₂ but also NO₂, another extremely potent greenhouse gas. There is no known way in which nuclear power could aid in reducing such greenhouse gas emission.

Nuclear Proliferation

The very birth of nuclear power was in the act of creat-

ing a weapon of fantastic destructive potential. Notwithstanding the 'atom for peace' that pro-nuclear exponents eagerly try to sell, nuclear power remains inescapably tainted by its origins.

Global expansion of nuclear power could contribute to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states - as it has in the past. Supposedly 'peaceful' nuclear facilities and materials have been used in various ways in secret weapons programmes, including the production of highly enriched uranium (used in the Hiroshima bomb) and plutonium (used in the Nagasaki bomb). It would probably lead to an increase in the number of 'threshold' or 'breakout' nuclear states, who could, when they chose, quickly produce weapons drawing on expertise, facilities and materials from their 'civil' nuclear program. Nuclear expansion would also increase the availability of nuclear materials for use in nuclear weapons or radioactive 'dirty bombs' by terrorist groups.

Of the countries that have built nuclear power or research reactors, over 20 are known to have used their 'peaceful' nuclear facilities for covert weapons research and/or production.²²

A nuclear weapon powerful enough to destroy a city requires a mere 10 kg of plutonium. A 2004 report tells us that the 'peaceful' nuclear power industry has produced 1,600 tonnes of plutonium - enough to build about 160,000 nuclear weapons. If 99% of this plutonium is indefinitely protected from military use, the

remaining 1% would suffice for 1,600 nuclear weapons.

Nuclear smuggling - much of it from civil nuclear programs - presents a significant challenge. The IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database records over 650 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials since 1993. In 2004 alone, almost 100 such incidents occurred. Smuggling can potentially provide fissile material for nuclear weapons and a wider range of radioactive materials for use in 'dirty bombs'.²³

A Different Energy Vision

Fossil fuel is a general term for buried geologic deposits of organic materials, formed from decayed plants and animals that have been converted to combustibles - crude oil, coal, natural gas, or heavy oils - by exposure to heat and pressure in the earth's crust over hundreds of millions of years.

With the industrial revolution, humans learned to mine and utilise fossil fuels at a rapid rate. As a result, during the last two hundred years, we succeeded in consuming energy (from fossil fuels) that had taken tens of thousands of years to accumulate. It has been estimated that "the amount of plants that went into the fossil fuels we burned since the Industrial Revolution began [in 1751] is equal to all the plants grown on Earth over 13,300 years."

This estimate is found in a study, fittingly entitled 'Burning Buried Sunshine'.²⁴ For the energy derived from fossil fuels is essentially the energy, in a highly concentrated form, that

had been tapped by plants eons ago from the free showers of sunlight. So by burning fossil fuels at the present rate we are in fact rapidly depleting an energy capital slowly accumulated over mahayugas of time.

By doing this we are going a path opposite to what any sapient being should take. Instead of accumulating energy capital, we are eating into it. This is what makes the present mode of economy, technology and lifestyle unsustainable.

Life on earth, due to its self-organising ability, was able to create a closed life cycle where all work was done and waste was recycled by using energy from the sun, which is essentially non-hazardous (thanks to the sun's distance and our natural shielding). In the process there never rose a need to break down vast reserves of energy stored on the earth over a short span of time.

With the industrial revolution all this changed. As fossil fuels got burned at drastically high rates not only were vast reserves of energy unleashed in a short spell of time but wastes, gases and chemicals, were let loose into the atmosphere at a rate which the earth and her inhabitants had not learned to recycle or manage.

The same thing takes place in the case of nuclear power. Here nuclei lying shielded within the earth's crust are dug out and energy trapped therein released into the environment at high rates. Radiation from both cosmic and geological sources is not foreign to the biosphere. But letting loose copious amounts of artificially created radiation (including

heat) is a phenomenon that is certainly alien to the life-system on this planet. This is why nuclear is not a desirable substitute of fossil fuels, for they are both unclean and high impact energy sources. (The complex geological-atmospheric-ecological mesh that we call the earth is surprisingly resilient in many ways. But life and human civilization as we know them are dependent on conditions, which may not be altered at will. This is what the IPCC reports are all about.)

Neither fossil fuels nor nuclear power can provide the energy needed to clean up the mess created in producing energy from them. They cannot create the energy that is needed to make the environment totally, even mostly, safe from their effects.

Any energy source or mode that is unable to clean up the mess it creates is to be shunned. Sane energy and materials policy should be able to identify, and steer clear of, power that is poison and wealth that is woe.

** Santanu Chacraverti is a prominent environmental activist and works with the Society for Direct Initiative for Social Health and Action (DISHA), Kolkata.

References

1. <http://www.theleaneconomyconnection.net/nuclear/Nuclear.pdf>, pp. 4-5
2. http://www.animatedsoftware.com/cassini/cass2004/MRS_CASSINI_ADD ENDA.htm
3. http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/MiningHealthReport_WVE.pdf, p. 13
4. WISE: Health Impacts for Uranium Mine and Mill Residents - Science Issues (last updated 9 April 2008)
5. <http://www.wise-uranium.org/uwis.html>
6. <http://www.wise-uranium.org/umopjdg.html#SURV08>. See also Koide, H., Radioactive contamination around Jadugoda uranium mine in India.
7. Plenty of UK studies e.g. Sharp L, McKinney PA, Black RJ. Incidence of childhood brain and other non-haematopoietic neoplasms near nuclear sites in Scotland, 1975-94, *Occupational and Environmental Medicine*, 1999; 56(5):308-14, Busby C, Cato M.S., Death rates from leukaemia are higher than expected in areas around nuclear sites in Berkshire and Oxfordshire, *British Medical Journal* 1997 (2 Aug); 315(7103):309, *Journal of Epidemiological Community Health* 1994; 48(3):232-36, Draper GJ, Stiller CA, Cartwright RA, et al. Cancer in Cumbria and in the vicinity of the Sellafield nuclear installation, 1963-90. *British Medical Journal* 1993 (9 Jan); 306(6870):89-94; Urquhart JD, et al. Childhood leukemia in northern Scotland. *Lancet* 1986 (1 Feb); 1 (8475):266; For other countries see e.g. McLaughlin JR, Clarke EA, Nishri E.D. et al. Childhood leukemia in the vicinity of Canadian nuclear facilities, *Cancer Causes Control* 1993; 4(1):51-58; Viel JF, Pobel D, Carre A. Incidence of leukaemia in young people around the La Hague nuclear waste reprocessing plant: a sensitivity analysis, *Stat Med* 1995; 14(21-22):2459-72, Hoffmann W, Dieckmann H, Schmitz-Feuerhake I.; Zaridze DG, Li N, Men T, et al. Childhood cancer incidence in relation to distance from the former nuclear testing site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan; *Int. J. Cancer* 1994; 59(4):471-75.
8. Mangano J.J., Sherman J., Chang C., Dave A.E., Feinberg E., Frimer M., Elevated childhood cancer incidence proximate to U.S. nuclear power plants, *Archives of Environmental Health*, 01 February, 2003.
9. Hoffmann W,g, Dieckmann H., Dieckmann H., Schmitz-Feuerhake I., A cluster of childhood leukemia near a nuclear reactor in Northern Germany, *Archives of Environmental Health*, July-August, 1997.
10. Data drawn from latest figures from IAEA and WNA at <http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/> and <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html> respectively.
11. See for example Gadekar S. and Gadekar S., Health Survey Around an Indian Nuclear Power Plant, in <http://www.friendsof-bruce.ca/Print%20Press%20Files/IndianCanduHealthSurvey.pdf>

12. Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, *The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2004*, Brussels, December 2004, pp. 07-08.
13. *ibid.*
14. <http://www.earth-policy.org/Indicators/Wind/2008.htm>
15. http://www.earth-policy.org/Indicators/Wind/2008_data.htm#
16. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html>
17. <http://www.earth-policy.org/Indicators/Wind/2008.htm>
18. <http://www.earth-policy.org/Indicators/Solar/2007.htm>
19. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Solar_Thermal_Power_Could_Supply_Over_90_percent_Of_US_Grid_Plus_Auto_Fleet_999.html
20. See http://www.rmi.org/images/other/Climate/C06-10_FixTheClimateProb.pdf, http://www.rmi.org/images/PDFs/Energy/E06-04_NucPwrEconomics.pdf and http://www.masstech.org/renewableenergy/public_policy/DG/resources/2005-12_Lovins_mightymice_Nuclear-Engineering-Int.pdf.
21. Storm van Leeuwen, Jan Willem and Philip Smith (2005), *Nuclear Power: The Energy Balance*, at <http://www.stormsmith.nl/>. This is being revised and replaced by Storm van Leeuwen (2007), but the original is still available on this site. See also David Fleming, *The Lean Guide to Nuclear Energy: A Life-Cycle in Trouble*.
22. <http://www.melbourne.foe.org.au/images/nukesdoc/summaryweb.pdf>, p. 4.
23. *ibid.*
24. Dukes, J.S., *Burning Buried Sunshine: Human Consumption of Ancient Solar Energy*, in http://globalecology.stanford.edu/DGE/Dukes/Dukes_ClimChange1.pdf

Section E: CNDP Third National Convention in Nagpur (1 -3 Feb. 2008)

I. Brief Report

Third National Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP)

The third National convention of the CNDP was recently held in Nagpur from Feb. 1 – Feb. 3 2008 amidst much fervour and enthusiasm. It was attended by around 350 delegates. The CNDP had come into being in November 2000 through the first national convention in Delhi, primarily in response to and in protest against India going openly nuclear in May 1998.

The second convention was held in Jaipur in November 2000. The third national convention consisted of two major plenaries on the day one with a number of parallel workshop following. The closing session

was another plenary to chart out the road ahead and organisational structure.

At the opening, the delegates were welcomed by Advocate Prakash Meghe and also eminent trade union leader Jammu Anand – both from Nagpur.

The opening plenary, on “Nuclear Disarmament – The State of the World”, was chaired by Admiral (Rtd.) L Ramdas. The speakers included: J. Sri Raman, N D Jayaprakash, Karamat Ali (Pakistan), John Hallam (Australia) and Achin Vanaik. Bernie Meyer from the US, who is popularly known as American Gandhi, also delivered

a short speech.

The second, post-lunch, plenary, on the “Indo-US Nuclear Deal” was chaired by Ilina Sen. The speakers were Sukla Sen, Sandeep Pandey, G Subramaniam and Praful Bidwai. Both the sessions had intense and lively interactions between the audience and the main speakers at the end.

The second day had a number of parallel workshops, on “West Asia”, “Militarisation/ Nuclearisation of South Asia”, “Terrorism Issue and Its Misuse for US Imperial Purpose” – in the first half, and on “Nuclear Power” and “Peace Education” in the second half. The main

speakers included Feroze Mithiborwala, Qamar Agha, N D Jayaprakash and Mazher Hussain (on “West Asia”); A S Verma, Kavita Srivastava and Karamat Ali (on “Militarisation/ Nuclearisation ...”); Achin Vanaik (on “Terrorism ..”); Dumka Murmu, Shri Prakash, Dr. Shakeel Ur Rahman, Channa Vasavaiah and Praful Bidwai (on “Nuclear Power”); Sandeep Sethi and Sangeeta Krishnan (on “Peace Education”).

The third and last day’s plenary, among other things, adopted the Nagpur Declaration and also a number of other resolutions including one asking for immediate release of Dr. Binayak Sen, a leading CNDP activist, from Chhattishgarh jail. It also laid down the procedure for forming the next National Coordination Committee

(NCC). The major areas of works in the coming days were identified as under:

Disarmament - South Asian denuclearisation and Promotion of India–Pakistan people-to-people activities; Global nuclear disarmament efforts and Peace education.

Nuclear Energy (Issues of health, safety, transparency, compensation, accountability, democratic assent) - Uranium Mining and Plants and Reactors.

Militarism / Imperialism - West Asian Solidarity and Indian Foreign Policy and Conventional arms reduction.

Indian state’s militarism/ repression (in tandem with CNDP mandate).

The final session was alternately conducted by Prakash Meghe and Anil Chaudhary with active assistance from Achin

Vanaik, Sukla Sen and Garimella Subramaniam. Yugal Rayalu acted as the translator in the plenaries. Interesting cultural programmes were held on the second evening led by Shoma Sen.

A lively and colourful morcha was taken out on the first evening which marched through the streets of Nagpur raising slogans in favour of peace and a nuclear weapon free South Asia and world.

The main points made by the Nagpur Declaration are:

- Resist Indo-US Nuclear Deal!
- Free South Asia Of Nuclear Danger!
- Abolish Nuclear Weapons Worldwide Now!
- Resist Mindless Drive for Nuclear Power!

The Convention ended on a high note of optimism.

Resolutions Adopted

Nagpur Declaration

The Third National Convention of Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace

- Resist Indo-US Nuclear Deal!
- Abolish Nuclear Weapons Worldwide Now!
- Free South Asia of Nuclear Danger!
- Resist Mindless Drive for Nuclear Power!

The Third National Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India is held from 1st to 3rd February 2008 in Nagpur, which has a glorious tradition of mobilising for peace and justice. The two earlier conventions were held in Jaipur in 2004 November and in Delhi four years earlier. It bears reiteration that the CNDP was founded to consolidate the nationwide protests conducted in response to the May 1998 nuclear weapon

tests by India, and then Pakistan. The CNDP opposes these tests and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any country including India. It may be recalled that the era of nuclear threat began with the mindless atomic bombings of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the USA on 6th and 9th August 1945.

We, the assembled delegates at the Convention representing the peace movements in India and coming from various corners of the country, most

emphatically reaffirm our firm conviction in reaffirmation of the Jaipur Declaration and our foundational Charter 2000: "Nuclear weapons are means of mass destruction regardless of who wields them. They are weapons of genocide. They can impose horrendous suffering on victims across generations. They destroy the ecosystem. The damage they do is lasting and incurable. The sheer scale and character of the devastation they can cause makes them a pro-

found and distinctive evil. For this and other reasons, the possession, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons is absolutely immoral." We also with equal emphasis reemphasise "that the use, threat of use, or possession of, and even preparation for making, nuclear weapons is immoral, illegal, and politically unacceptable under "any circumstances"." Not only that, "nuclear deterrence" is absolutely "abhorrent to human sentiment since it implies that a state if required to defend its own existence will act with pitiless disregard for the consequences to its own and its adversary's people."

We again note with great concern the profoundly destabilising effects of the nuclear blasts in May 98. These have been most graphically and irrefutably demonstrated through an extremely dangerous (undeclared) border war in less than a year followed by a ten month long eyeball to eyeball massive confrontation all along the international border and the LoC. These confrontations were laden with the very real threats of nuclear exchange. Despite this experience and much opposition from the peace movements and civil society, the rulers of these two resource-starved countries persist with their pernicious nuclear weapons programmes, which are a tragic diversion from addressing vital social needs. Though there have been no further blasts since 1998, in the teeth of massive waves of international censure, the continuing flight tests of the Agni and Hatf missiles show that the race for developing nuclear warhead carrying missiles goes on unabated.

The recent political turmoil in Pakistan has graphically underscored the horrifying possibilities of nuclearisation of South Asia spearheaded by India's ugly ambitions. Nevertheless, the most dangerous development since the last CNDP convention has been the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, which is (still) in the process of operationalisation. Starting with the July 18 2005 joint statement issued by George Bush - Manmohan Singh in Washington DC, the process of trying to fashion and complete a deal has aggravated the nuclear danger both globally and also regionally. It, on the one hand, severely undermines the prospects of global nuclear disarmament by (selectively and arbitrarily) legitimising India's nuclear status and, in the process, the possession of nuclear weapons by the existing Nuclear Weapon States - both recognised and unrecognised - and also the aspirations of other actual and potential aspirants. On the other, it would also further intensify the arms race between India and Pakistan - both nuclear and conventional. Pakistan, in fact, made a strong plea for a similar deal. And the brusque refusal by the US, instead of dissuading it, would only further inflame its passions and thereby turn the dangerous nuclear mess in South Asia all the more dangerous. Furthermore, the consequent shift in focus in favour of highly expensive nuclear power, as and when and if at all the deal comes into operation, will significantly distort India's energy options at the cost of efforts to develop environmentally benign and renewable sources of energy.

This deal is also an utterly reprehensible move to bring India closer to the US orbit as a regional ally to facilitate the execution of its global imperial ambitions. The CNDP remains unwavering in its consistent and high-pitched opposition to this deal.

With this deeply disturbing background in mind, the Convention further resolves as under:

I. Nuclear Weapons Free Region in South Asia

The CNDP, in active collaboration with other peace movements in the South Asian region and the Pakistan Peace Coalition in particular, will work towards a Nuclear Weapons Free Region in South Asia. It will also try to promote the idea of Nepal as a 'nuclear weapon-free-nation' on the lines of Mongolia and Austria to initiate and reinforce move in that direction. CNDP will also similarly work towards declaration of the whole of erstwhile state of Kashmir, both under Indian and Pakistani control, as a zone of peace.

This move is expected to provide a clear focus and strong momentum to the peace movements in the region and reinforce the forces of peace and radically bring down the nuclear danger by working on a concrete and workable action plan. This is also expected to deeply affect the global mindset and provide a strong, if not decisive, push towards universal nuclear disarmament - our central and abiding goal

A regional convention of the peace activists from the

region will be convened in the near future to work out a collective charter.

II. Global Convention on Nuclear Disarmament

The CNDP, in tandem with the essence of Rajiv Gandhi action plan for "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons" - which was submitted to the United Nations on June 9 1988, will work towards a global disarmament convention, under the auspices of the UN, in collaboration with global peace movements towards this objective. The CNDP, in this context, notes with serious concern the total eclipse from the agenda of the UN of the McCloy-Zorin accord on general and complete Disarmament, which had been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 20 1961. The CNDP urges the UN to forthwith reinitiate action on the same.

The projected global disarmament convention would chart out a clear and unambiguous road-map towards universal, complete and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament within a defined time-frame. This would also enforce, in the run up to the final goal, all nuclear weapon states - declared and undeclared, immediately commence on progressively lowering down the operating statuses of their nuclear weapons, continue with the moratorium on explosive nuclear tests, freeze the programmes for developments of upgraded nuclear warheads and delivery/interception systems, freeze production of fissile materials, provide negative secu-

rity assurance to all non-nuclear states outside of any "nuclear umbrella", credibly commit to "no-first-strike" and such other measures in consonance with the goal of nuclear disarmament.

The CNDP will proactively coordinate with various sections of global anti-nuke peace movements and unwaveringly work towards this goal.

III. Intensification of Struggles against Ignoring Safety and Hazardous Impact of Nuclear Power

The, yet to be operationalised, Indo-US nuclear deal has radically fired up the fantasies of the Indian nuclear establishment. Undeterred by its appalling past performance in terms of power production and also safety records, it is all set to embark upon a very ambitious plan of setting up mega nuclear plants dotting the entire coastal belt criminally unmindful of severely traumatic social and potentially disastrous ecological impacts. The CNDP, in keeping with its consistent track record and the mandates of its founding Charter, will actively collaborate with the grassroots people's movements, many of whom are its constituent members, to resist such mindless moves - singularly lacking in transparency and accountability, and provide all necessary and possible assistances in this regard.

IV. Demand for End of US Occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan,

Just Resolution of the Palestine Issue to Ensure Global Peace and Facilitate Nuclear Disarmament

The ugly ambitions of the US ruling elite to establish its unilateral dominance over the whole of the globe by foregrounding its awesome military might, including its nuclear arsenal, to compensate for the increasing inadequacies of its otherwise huge diplomatic/political clout and economic muscles has emerged as the most major threat to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament. The wars on and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan are vital components of this grand project, also known as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The continuing US support for the apartheid Zionist regime of Israel and its inhuman oppression of the Palestinian people is just another facet of this ugly venture.

Consistent with the goal of global nuclear disarmament, the CNDP demands immediate withdrawal of occupation forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. The CNDP also solidarises with the legitimate struggles of the Palestinian people. The CNDP consequently commits itself to actively associate, in all possible manners, with all global, regional and local moves in these directions.

V. Other Related Issues

The CNDP clearly recognises that the spurts in nation-

al-chauvinist, majoritarian and militarist ideologies and political practices under whatever political banner, and the state at times playing a role of an active facilitator, by their very nature pose a major threat to anti-nuclear peace movements in India.

The CNDP hence rededi-

cates itself to fight all these pernicious tendencies in all its manifestations in collaboration with other forces fighting for a just, peaceful and harmonious order.

Consistent with its core values, the CNDP reiterates its demand that Indo-Pak peace process be accelerated. It also demands visa-free travel facilities

all over the SAARC region towards this goal. It furthermore demands 10% progressive cuts in the so-called "defence" budgets of all the countries in the region. The CNDP commits itself to ally itself with all regional efforts towards these goals.

Solidarity Resolutions:

I.

The Third National Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India, held in Nagpur from Feb. 1 – 3, wishes a roaring success to the “Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: Laying the Practical, Technical and Political Groundwork” to be held in London from Feb. 16 – 17 organised by the Campaign for nuclear Disarmament (CND), UK.

The CNDP, on this occasion, would like to place on record its great appreciation of the initiative taken by the CND, with which it has strong historical bonds flowing from shared values and commitments to universal nuclear disarmament. It'd also like to recall that the CND had been amongst the most prominent international organizations present in its inaugural convention in Delhi back in November 2000.

The CNDP also seriously commits itself to collaborating with the CND, and all others, to realise the goal of attaining a “Nuclear Weapon-Free World” in the foreseeable future.

II.

The Third National

Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India, held in Nagpur from Feb. 1 – 3, wishes a roaring success to the fiftieth anniversary of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization on 26-28 February, 2008 in Cairo, Egypt.

The CNDP puts on record its great appreciation of the role played by the AAPSO over the last half century in reinforcing the non-aligned movement (NAM) to ensure a more equitable world order free from the menace of imperialist depredations and the scourge of war. It has also consistently campaigned for a nuclear weapon-free world. The CNDP very much shares this goal. The CNDP also, on this occasion, fondly recalls its collaboration with the AAPSO in the recent past – in March 2007, in organizing an international seminar on the Indo-US nuclear deal. The CNDP would keenly look forward to more such collaborative efforts in the future as well.

III.

The Third National Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and

Peace (CNDP), India, held in Nagpur from Feb. 1 – 3, wishes a roaring success to the 18th World Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) to be held in Delhi, India from 9 - 11 March 2008 - being held first time ever in South Asia, organised jointly by the Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD) – a constituent of the CNDP, and the IPPNW. The CNDP puts on record its great appreciation of the role played by the IPPNW - its consistent and powerful campaign for a nuclear weapon-free world. The CNDP, it goes without saying, very much shares this goal.

The CNDP seriously commits itself to collaborating with the IPPNW, and all others, to realise the goal of attaining a “Nuclear Weapon-Free World” in the foreseeable future.

Resolution on Uranium Mining

Stop Undertaking Uranium Mining in New Areas and Conduct Public Hearing on Jadugoda Mining

Uranium mining is the first stage of nuclear cycle. Thus halting uranium mining

becomes the first step towards nuclear disarmament. Despite the ill effects of uranium mining in Jadugoda in terms of adverse impacts on public health and radioactive pollution, the nuclear establishment of India is bent upon opening new mines in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya. In fact, a new mine is started in Kadapa in A.P. just a month ago. All these attempts are made in an undemocratic manner violating statutory provisions as regards environment and public opinion. Undertaking mining in new areas means spreading all the ills associated with radioactivity to more regions of the country, threatening peace and livelihood security of the people who inhabit these areas. Taking note of the ill effects of uranium mining, committing to halt nuclear weapons development and respecting the democratic will of the people, the Third National Convention of the CNDP calls for the halt on uranium mining in new areas and undertaking public hearing on the existing mines in Jadugoda. It further demands that in this respect, the example set by the Navajo Nations, and New Mexico in the US in particular, be followed. New compensation laws be framed so as to pay appropriate compensations to miners as well as people living in the vicinity. Cleaning operations of existing mines be undertaken in line with international norms and practices.

#

Resolution on Nuclear Weapon Free South Asia

The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) fully supports and endorses the long standing proposal of the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) for the establishment of a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Region and will join hands with all peace loving people of South Asia and the world to help bring this about.

#

Resolution on Negative Security Assurance to Non-Nuclear Weapon States and No First Use Assurance by NWSs to Each Other

The Third National Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) resolves as follows:

- That the CNDP expresses its deep anguish at the prospect that any deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons would unleash unprecedented death and destruction;
- That the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would constitute a heinous crime against humanity;
- That, in the light of the impending threat posed by the huge stockpile of nuclear weapons across the world (with enormous number of nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert), prevention of nuclear war under any circumstances is

the most urgent tasks confronting humanity today;

- That the immediate and crucial first steps to prevent a nuclear holocaust is the guaranteeing of unqualified negative security assurance to the non-nuclear weapon states by the nuclear weapon states, on the one hand, and a no-first-use assurance by the nuclear weapon states to each other, on the other;
- That unqualified negative security assurance and no-first-use assurance are non-verifiable unilateral guarantees that assume the role of confidence building measures, which act as invaluable catalysts for initiating the process of global nuclear disarmament – the first phase in the goal towards general & complete disarmament;
- That the CNDP, hereby, calls upon the nuclear weapon states to forthwith accede to the demand for unilaterally guaranteeing unqualified negative security assurance to the non-nuclear weapon states and no-first-use assurance to each other so as to enable the initiation and acceleration of the process of global nuclear disarmament without any further delay;
- That the CNDP also calls upon all fraternal peace movements the world over to lend their wholehearted support to the demands for negative security assurance to non-nuclear weapon states by the nuclear weapon states and no-first-use assurance by

the nuclear weapon states to each other and to actively campaign to achieve the above demands by raising the same before all international fora.

#

Resolution Seeking Immediate Release of Dr. Binayak Sen from Detention

The Third National Convention of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace expresses its deep sense of anguish and outrage at the continued detention of Dr. Binayak Sen by the State of Chhattisgarh under draconian laws, which deprive its victims of the basic rights enshrined in the Constitution of India. Dr. Sen is the General Secretary of Peoples' Union for Civil Rights, Chhattisgarh, a member of the Medico Friends Circle, and one of those who has played a leading role in founding the CNDP. Dr. Sen, a medical doctor by profession, has not only dedicated his professional life to serve the medical needs of the poor and the needy in one of the most backward areas of the country but also is one with inexhaustible energy and enthusiasm for all the other causes to which he has expressed his commitment. Dr. Sen has been an unrelenting champion of human rights, a crusader against economic and social exploitation of the tribal population, a steadfast campaigner against bureaucratic corruption, and a staunch opponent of communalism.

Above all, Dr. Sen is an unswerving activist for the cause of disarmament and peace.

Dr. Sen graduated with distinction from the prestigious Christian Medical College (CMC), Vellore, and later completed his MD there in 1974. In recognition of his outstanding contribution to society, in 2004, Dr. Sen received the Paul Harrison award for lifetime work of medical care in the service of humanity, an award given annually by the CMC to one of its alumni. It is this medical professional and social activist, who has been recognised as "a role model for the students and staff of CMC", who was arrested on 14 May 2007 allegedly for "unlawful activities", which were supposedly "threatening public security". Dr. Sen has been detained since then on utterly unfounded charges. In wilful violation of the basic rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, the State of Chhattisgarh is hell bent on detaining Dr. Sen by hook or by crook because it is terribly fearful of Dr. Sen's persistent activities, which would have totally exposed the misdeeds and misdemeanours of the State Government and its hangers-on.

It is a crying shame that one of India's most dedicated and committed medical practitioner and social activist should be languishing in jail in solitary confinement for the past several months and denied basic rights that are otherwise available to political prisoners. Dr. Sen has not only been

denied the opportunity to use his professional expertise to treat other co-prisoners in the overcrowded jail – who have little access to adequate medical needs – but also he has no way of preventing deterioration of his professional skills due to prolonged disuse. What is equally worse is the fact that Dr. Sen has been denied adequate access to everyday news and information, which are vital to an intellectual of his stature and calibre in this age of information.

The Third National Convention of the CNDP, hereby, calls upon all concerned citizens of this country to join us in seeking the immediate release of Dr. Binayak Sen, who is a victim of gross injustice. If we fail to vehemently contest and vociferously oppose the arbitrary violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and fail to put an end to such blatant violations without further delay, we would be guilty of slowly and surely aiding and abetting the destruction of democracy in this country.

The CNDP wishes to take this opportunity to express its wholehearted solidarity and support to Dr. Sen's partner, Dr. Ilina Sen – a member of the National Co-ordination Committee, CNDP – and their two daughters in this hour of trial and pledges to do all it can to rally wider support to ensure the immediate release of the honourable and respected Dr. Binayak Sen.

Glimpses of "CNDP Activities





Section F: Documents

I. Keynote address to the 2008 Oslo Conference on Nuclear Disarmament

by Jonas Gahr Støre, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Oslo, 26 February 2008

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

We are gathered here largely because there is no compelling answer to these simple, compelling questions: Why do we need thousands of nuclear weapons? Do they make the world safer? Is anybody out there prepared to do anything about them?

This is not the first time we have raised these questions. When I was a university student in Paris in the first half of the 1980s, these questions were mobilising a whole generation. I remember the heated debates over how NATO should respond to the Soviet SS-20. I recall the long shadow of an arms race that seemed to have no end. And I remember how we asked ourselves where we could find leaders who would turn the tide and reject the logic that demands ever more nuclear weapons and missiles?

I remember being a pessimist. But then came the redemptive promise of Reykjavik. At the height of the Cold War, the “warriors-in-chief” spoke openly and sincerely, I believe, about a world without nuclear weapons. The Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) and successive agreements kindled great optimism.

The arms control roller coaster of the 1980s, with its dips of despair and ascents of hope, was formative for me. It

propelled my interest in international relations and inspired my personal commitment to advancing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. And the bold and surprising move by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan convinced me that real leadership might be found, even from expected quarters.

So it is not only an honour, but it is deeply fulfilling personally for me to welcome all of you to Oslo. I hope this gathering will add momentum to a new global effort towards fulfilling the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

It is a particular pleasure – as always – to welcome the Director-General of the IAEA and 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate, Dr ElBaradei.

And it is an honour to be joined by Secretary Shultz, America’s top diplomat during the ‘turmoil and triumph’ of my student days, and by Senator Nunn, who is not only an American hero, but a Norwegian one, too, for his Herculean efforts to curb the nuclear threat.

The willingness of Secretary Shultz and Senator Nunn to co-host this event is a testament to their distinguished brand of leadership – one of vision, of action, of persuasion and of principle. They recognise that our vision must be a joint enterprise – among states,

among scholars, among civil society actors, and among peoples. I sincerely thank them for being here and for helping to organise this event.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In the light of the growing threats of proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and of the persistent threats of nuclear war or accidents, we are compelled today to ask again not only: Why so many? but also: Why any at all?

A world free of nuclear weapons has been a longstanding aspiration of my country’s foreign policy, even during the Cold War. Indeed, it has been a core foreign policy priority for many nations for decades. As you all know, it has also been the shared goal of numerous civil society groups in nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states alike.

But I believe we are now at a turning point. Today the old calls of the faithful are being joined by a chorus of new voices, especially in nuclear-weapon states. Last summer, Margaret Beckett strongly reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Earlier this month, UK Defence Secretary Des Browne announced the intention to host a meeting of nuclear-weapon states with a view to improving technologies for verifiable disarmament. And as

all of you are well aware, a growing number of US leaders, led by Secretary Shultz and Senator Nunn, are calling on Washington to recommit itself to leading the world towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Achieving our vision will require a powerful coalition, and today we see its outlines. Coming together are realists who comprehend the power of idealism and idealists who understand the force of facts and realities.

Ladies and gentlemen,

A vision is not the same thing as a dream. Vision has been fundamental for human progress, even when it has invited scepticism, even when it has not been fulfilled.

Our visions of human rights, equality, social justice and protection of the vulnerable, as set out in national declarations or in international agreements, have often been articulated in situations of great adversity. This made them all the more vital.

The story of our vision is not so different.

The failure of the Baruch Plan in 1946 put a stop to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons for more than two decades. But this changed in 1968, when the NPT was signed. The NPT sets out an alternative path to the serious nuclear threats of the 1960s – the Cuban Missile Crisis, the accelerating arms race and the fears of rapid, uncontrollable nuclear proliferation.

The NPT did not make anyone believe that nuclear disarmament could be achieved

immediately. It did not provide for exactly it would be accomplished. But it did contain a solemn commitment not just to contain, but to roll back the nuclear peril. It enshrined a bold vision: a world free of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear threat did not disappear. Mutually Assured Destruction persisted. Moreover, nuclear restraint relied in part on a nuclear umbrella. If it were not for NATO, many more states in Europe probably would have sought to develop nuclear weapons.

But the vision of the NPT reframed the nuclear landscape. States could foresee a future in which their neighbours, their foes, their partners might decide against going nuclear. They inferred that the prestige previously associated with nuclear weapons might be declining rather than increasing. They could consider options for achieving security by other means.

At the end of the Cold War, there was dramatic progress. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty transformed European security. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties initiated deep cuts in US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. A Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was negotiated. Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and South Africa gave up nuclear weapons. Argentina and Brazil agreed that their security was better ensured by a continent free of nuclear weapons.

This momentum contributed to the landmark indefinite extension of the NPT in

1995 and to agreement on the ‘13 steps’ in 2000.

That momentum, however, has foundered on a number of challenges. We are seeing nuclear ambitions in North Korea and Iran, and a darker spectre of nuclear terrorism and competing demands for energy security and non-proliferation. We have seen the ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty falter, the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty stalled and key commitments made in 2000 broken.

The grim subtext has been a creeping abandonment of our vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Combined with the short-sighted assumption that, because we have been spared nuclear war to date, because no acts of nuclear terrorism have yet been perpetrated, the status quo is somehow secure.

That, my friends, is our Achilles heel: the false assumption that status quo is less risky than change.

So this should be the purpose of our endeavour: to review and revive our vision; to mobilize the political will needed to move forward; and to arouse those who fallen into pessimism.

At Reykjavik, US and Soviet leaders paved an optimistic way forward. Such political resolve can be mobilised again. We must make this pathway attractive for a new generation of US and Russian leaders – just as we must engage China’s leaders.

I believe we have a powerful case.

Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, much has

been said about the difficulty of addressing low-probability yet highly destructive terrorist attacks. This threat certainly compels us to take urgent action to prevent nuclear terrorism. But why should we not work with equal urgency to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents or inadvertent nuclear war?

Consensus behind our vision is vital if we are to address gaps in the non-proliferation regime. Just consider the challenge created by the expanding use of nuclear energy. I commend the efforts of Dr ElBaradei as well as Senator Nunn and Warren Buffett to establish an international fuel bank, and we should encourage contributions to it.

But at the same time, we must recognise that many states today are facing a critical choice. They have – or are rapidly accumulating – the technology, know-how and infrastructure to develop domestic nuclear fuel cycle capability. Whether they choose to take part in multilateral fuel arrangements, or whether they choose to hedge their bets, will depend not only on economic factors but also on another basic question. Are we facing a future security environment in which nuclear weapons are deemed essential, or one in which their role is diminishing?

It is only the elimination of nuclear weapons that can tip the balance in this equation.

The vision of elimination is equally relevant to the threat of nuclear terrorism. This is a concern for all of us. Regardless of where such an attack might occur, we would all be affected. In addition to

reducing the quantity of vulnerable fissile materials, disarmament and elimination will also secure the sustained international cooperation required to address the threat – from UN Security Council resolution 1540 to the minimisation of Highly Enriched Uranium. A viable agenda of disarmament and elimination will spur our effort to strengthen the institutions needed to sustain the vision.

As Senator Nunn put it, our vision might not inspire every determined proliferator to ‘see the light’. But it will inspire more nations to join in concerted global efforts to halt proliferation, to build a sustainable nuclear future, and to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Let us be clear. Very few, if any, non-nuclear-weapon states believe that full nuclear disarmament is possible, or even desirable, overnight. Realists and idealists can agree that nuclear weapon technology cannot be disinvented. International security as we know it is dependent on deterrence postures in which nuclear weapons maintain a pivotal role.

But these postures are neither inevitable nor immutable. Secretary Shultz, Senator Nunn and their colleagues have come to the same conclusion. They have argued that US security interests would be best served by working towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

This also holds true for my own country and for the world.

The path ahead is clear:

- We must consolidate the ban on nuclear testing, securing the entry into force of the CTBT and

maintaining support for the CTBTO.

- We must negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty to help prevent nuclear arms races in the 21st century.
- We must continue to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons.
- We should consider carefully how to move from a world with thousands of nuclear weapons, to a world with hundreds, and eventually to zero nuclear weapons. It will not happen overnight, but the course needs to be set. Confidence in the credibility of the non-proliferation regime is essential.
- We must find the strength, unity and resolve needed to discourage and punish proliferation.
- It is not enough for we who are non-nuclear weapon states to call on nuclear-weapon states to fulfil the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Progress will require all states to play an active and constructive role. My Government, for instance, has developed, together with the UK Ministry of Defence, ways to enhance confidence in verified disarmament – particularly as regards the verification of warhead dismantlement.
- We must also responsibly address the challenges of moving toward zero. This means answering questions about the stability of low numbers of nuclear weapons – not with a Cold War mindset, but with one appropriate for the world of today. It means devel-

oping confidence in an international security architecture without a nuclear umbrella. It means ensuring that disarmament defuses rather than inflames regional conflicts.

My list is far from complete, and each of these goals and challenges demands its own roadmap. That is why we have invited you to Oslo.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Too often we are presented with false choices: between non-proliferation and disarmament; between non-proliferation and counter-proliferation; between expanded use of nuclear energy and rampant proliferation; between the arguments of ‘realists’ and the arguments of ‘abolitionists’.

We cannot consolidate and maintain the non-proliferation regime while neglecting the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. We will delay and undermine nuclear disarmament unless we demand

robust and credible non-proliferation. Abolitionists can be realists, and realists, abolitionists.

In 2005, Norway initiated the seven-nation initiative on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to show support for precisely this approach. The initiative’s diverse membership – Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom – demonstrates the need to challenge previous conventional wisdom, and to reach out across Cold War divining lines to create new alliances for change.

Together, these seven nations are calling for ‘practical, systematic and progressive efforts...towards a world free of nuclear weapons’. At the same time, we are calling for tougher IAEA safeguards, for recognition that ‘states may choose to fully enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without developing a domestic fuel cycle capability’.

We insist that there is com-

mon ground for a wide-ranging agenda that is consistent with the vision of eliminating nuclear weapons. And we hope to contribute to a renewed consensus and a renewed vision at the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Once again, welcome to all of you to Oslo. I hope you will actively take part in this opportunity for creative and bold thinking.

I would like thank all of you for joining us here today. Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is no less than a historic challenge which involves safeguarding our human future. Future generations will either condemn us for our failure or – as I hope – revere us for our success in achieving this goal.

I wish you a fruitful and rewarding conference and look forward to our discussions.

[Source: <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/About-the-Ministry/Minister-of-Foreign-Affairs-Jonas-Gabr-S/Speeches-and-articles/2008/keynote-address-to-the-2008-oslo-confere.html?id=501740>]

II. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

18th World Congress Delhi, India DELHI DECLARATION March 9, 2008

As we convene in Delhi for the 18th World Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, we have never been more hopeful that a world without nuclear weapons is within reach. Across the political spectrum, even within the nuclear weapon states themselves, nuclear abolition is being openly discussed as desirable, practical, and

absolutely necessary if humanity is to survive the 21st century. While we know that those with a vested interest in keeping nuclear weapons will continue to mount intense resistance to negotiating their elimination, such resistance is increasingly outdated, irrational, and hypocritical.

IPPNW launched the International Campaign to

Abolish Nuclear Weapons — ICAN — following our 17th World Congress in Helsinki. The focal point of the campaign — a Nuclear Weapons Convention — is the means by which abolition will be achieved and enforced under international law. We urge the nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States, whose leadership is essential, to com-

mence negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention without further delay. The candidates for US President should pledge now that they will make the global elimination of nuclear weapons a top priority of their administration.

India has a pivotal role in achieving a world without nuclear weapons. We regret India's decision in 1998 to test nuclear weapons and to declare itself a nuclear weapon state — actions immediately duplicated by Pakistan. A nuclear war that would devastate all of South Asia, killing tens of millions of people and leaving much of the subcontinent uninhabitable for decades, is now a constant danger. Moreover, new research suggests that a regional nuclear war using the arsenals currently available to India and Pakistan would have profound impacts on the Earth's climate, which could lead to the collapse of agricultural production and famine on a global scale.

Over the course of the nuclear age, India has championed no first-use, non-use, and dealerting policies; it has called for the prohibition of fissile

materials production and has long supported timebound negotiations for the universal elimination of nuclear weapons. Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 Action Plan for a nuclear-weapons-free world resonates with today's call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In 1995, India told the International Court of Justice that possession, production, or use of nuclear weapons was illegal, under any circumstances, under international law—a bold and principled position irreconcilable with its subsequent acquisition of nuclear weapons. During the most recent session of the UN General Assembly, India voted with a majority of nations in favor of disarmament resolutions that, if implemented, would move us closer to a world without nuclear weapons. We urge India to assert its global leadership for nuclear disarmament from now until that goal is achieved.

If the political leadership of the United States is indispensable to the achievement of a nuclear-weapons-free world, India's moral and political lead-

ership will be no less indispensable.

As one of the world's emerging economic powers, with a rich tradition of non-violence marred by decades of armed conflict, India's struggle to forge a more peaceful, equitable, and sustainable social order is the world's struggle. Every one of our greatest challenges—global warming, poverty, resource depletion, population growth, economic development, human rights, food security, ensuring health for all—touches India and requires India's full participation in its solution.

Ending the scourge of war is one of the most important of those challenges. Preventing the worst of all conceivable forms of war—nuclear war—by ridding the world of nuclear weapons remains our most urgent goal and our highest priority as doctors and as

[Source:

<http://www.ipprw.de/stepone/data/downloads/f8/00/00/DelhiDeclaration.pdf>]

III. The Promises of the 2000 NPT Review Conference

At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament were agreed to by all governments signed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1. Signing the CTBT

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. Stopping Testing

A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. Negotiation

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on

Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. Negotiation

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. No Going Back

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. Abolishing Nukes

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. Upholding Existing Treaties

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. Implementing Existing Treaties

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Step by Step...

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear

weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Excess fissile materials under IAEA control

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. General and Complete Disarmament

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Reporting

Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. Verifying

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide

assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

[Source: <http://www.reaching-criticalwill.org/legal/npt/13point.html>]

Membership Form

**Annual Membership Fee:
Students Rs. 20, Individuals Rs. 100,
Organisations Rs. 500**

Name:

Organisation:

Address:

Phone:

e-mail:

CNDP

The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) is India's national network of over 200 organisations, including grassroots groups, mass movements and advocacy organisations, as well as individuals. Formed in November 2000, CNDP demands that India and Pakistan roll back their nuclear weapons programmes. Our emphasis:

- No to further nuclear testing
- No to induction and deployment of nuclear weapons
- Yes to global and regional nuclear disarmament

CNDP works to raise mass awareness through schools and colleges programmes, publications, audio and visual materials, and campaigning and lobbying at various levels.

CNDP membership is open to both individuals and organisations. So if you believe nuclear weapons are evil and peace is important, fill in the Membership Form!

**Please mail your Draft/Cheque, drawn in favour of "peace-cndp", payable at New Delhi, to
CNDP A-124/6, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi
110 016**

For Private Circulation Only

Published from CNDP, A-124/6, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi - 110 016, Telefax: 26517814

E-mail: cndpindia@gmail.com, Website: www.cndpindia.org

Editors: Ilina Sen, Anil Chaudhary, Sukla Sen