EDITORIAL

The Indo-US nuclear ‘deal’ is still very much in the news. But for the wrong reasons, of course from the viewpoint of those dishing out the news. The ebullient euphoria in the mainstream media just in the wake of July 18 2005 Bush-Singh joint statement issued in Washington DC or March 2 2006 Singh-Bush joint statement issued in New Delhi has all but evaporated. Notwithstanding the fact that the Henry J. Hyde Act, a major milestone in the process of clinching the ‘deal’, has already been signed by the US President on December 18 last year after a protracted and nail-biting tussle in the US Congress. The subsequent steps to follow include a bilateral treaty between the US and India, popularly known as the ‘123 Agreement’, laying down the specific terms and scope of cooperation between the two countries along with the specific safeguards ensuring strict separation between the ‘civilian’ and ‘strategic’ plants being properly codified. India will also have to negotiate and finalise the scope and terms of inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as regards the plants designated as ‘civilian’. Then the whole package will go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for its consensual approval. After crossing this hurdle, which appears to be the toughest in the series, it will be again presented to both the houses of the US Congress. On its approval, the President will be authorised to act upon it and the ‘Deal’ will finally come into operation.

The current difficulty in concluding the 123 Agreement is quite real. It is principally about India’s insistence on the right to reprocess spent fuel coming out of the fuel obtained from external sources, as an outcome of the ‘deal’, and to carry out further nuclear tests without suffering any adverse effects on the terms of cooperation and the US reluctance to concede. In fact, on the face of it, this time both the US Administration and the Indian government are in a bind restrained by domestic laws and/or political commitments and compulsions. But that does not mean that we are in a position to write an obit, at least as yet.

Even the last year when the relevant Bill proposed by the Bush Administration was being discussed in the Congress there were moments when it looked nearly doomed. Then the NRI lobby and the US nuclear industry intervened in a big way and could effect a rescue, almost.

What is highly significant is that the government of India has embarked upon an ambitious plan to set up a series of mega nuclear power plants apparently based on the assumption that the ‘deal’ would eventually come through. By 2020 the present installed capacity is to rise to more than five times to 20,000 MWe. In fact the incumbent Indian President is talking of going even far beyond. This will have serious ramifications for Indian people – particularly where the proposed plants are to come up, given the intrinsically hazardous and potentially catastrophic nature of nuclear power. The Chernobyl disaster twenty-one years ago in the then Soviet Russia remains a grim reminder. The current issue, for obvious reasons, has all these as its central focus, while its ambit extends much beyond.
CNDP Condoles
Death of Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Itoh

The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India expresses its profound shock and regret at the news of the sudden demise of the Nagasaki Mayor, Iccho Itoh, who along with Tadatoshi Akiba, the Mayor of Hiroshima, have played an extremely vital, indeed leading, role in the global struggle for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as the pioneering figures of the Mayors for Peace. In recognition of his immense contributions, in 2006 he had been awarded the highly prestigious Sean MacBride Peace Prize, jointly with Mayor Akiba of Hiroshima.

It is all the more shocking and regrettable that Mayor Itoh was felled by an assassin’s bullet in the last days of his campaign for re-election for the fourth term in front of his main campaign office near JR Nagasaki Station on Tuesday evening. He breathed his last in the early hours of Wednesday. The suspect has been apprehended and is reportedly a member of the country’s largest crime syndicate.

The CNDP shares its deepest grief with his immediate family members, the citizens of Nagasaki who had time and again reposed faith in him, the peace-loving people of Japan and the whole world. It takes special note of his active engagement in the recent days with the Japanese government urging it to take a clear and unambiguous stand against the ongoing Indo-US Nuclear Deal when it comes up for discussion and approval before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

It ardently hopes that the new mayor of the city of Nagasaki, to be elected next Sunday, would carry on his glorious and indefatigable fight for global nuclear disarmament with the same unflagging spirit.

The CNDP commits itself to redouble its efforts for a nuclear weapon free world in honour of his revered memory.

Statement Committee

1. Achin Vanaik
2. Praful Bidwai
3. Admiral Ramdas
4. J.Sri Raman
5. Prabir Purkayastha
6. Kamla Mitra Chenoy
7. Christopher Fonseca

New Delhi
19th April 2007
India’s nuclear establishment projects a large expansion of nuclear power in the country by 2020, and many new reactors are under construction. Health and safety have not been foremost among the concerns of the Department of Atomic Energy’s (DAE), whose influence derives from its ability to promise weapons and electricity. However, it does often make claims about its record of safe operation, in addition to emphasizing the safety features of its facilities. The following is illustrative: “We are continuously updating our safety systems and procedures even at the cost of short-term economic benefit. Besides, all our plants are designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and maintained under the strict supervision of the AERB.”

On the contrary, the operation of India’s nuclear facilities suffer from poor practices and numerous accidents of ranging severity, from leaks of oil to complete loss of power in a reactor causing all safety systems to be disabled, have occurred. Although there has not been a severe accident involving core meltdown or large radiation exposures to the public, India’s nuclear facilities perform poorly on measures such as occupational exposures to workers. For example in the 1980s, radiation exposures to power plant workers were twice the world average for each monitored worker.

Regardless of the DAE’s claims that it operates under strict regulatory supervision, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) reports to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which is headed by the secretary of the DAE. The Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) is also a member of the AEC. Thus, both the DAE and the NPC exercise considerable administrative powers over the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. In practice, this means that the AERB sometimes plays down the significance of accidents. For example, in March 1999, there was a leak of heavy water in the second unit of the MAPS reactor near Madras. The AERB dismissed the incident by saying that “the release to the environment is maintained well within the limits specified by the AERB.” However, an independent scientist estimated that the radioactivity released to the environment was several times the permitted 300 curies per day per reactor and perhaps even exceeding the discharge limit of 10 times the daily quota, much higher than the AERB claims.

Unreliable operations in India’s nuclear facilities

The DAE’s claim about safe operations is based on two main premises. First, the safety equipment will operate reliably most of the time. But its record of operations contradicts this. Sometimes, safety systems have been absent; the reactors at Tarapur shared emergency core cooling systems for a long time in violation of safety standards, and the reactors at Madras and Rajasthan were operating for almost two decades without effective high pressure core cooling systems. Other times, backup equipment has been part of the design and physically present during operations but has repeatedly malfunctioned; unavailable backup coolant pumps have on many occasions resulted in extended shutdown when the operating pumps were disabled by disturbances such as grid fluctuation.

By themselves, unreliable components do not make severe accidents inevitable. Multiple failures must simultaneously occur for an accident to escalate. This has happened too: for example in the Narora reactor in Uttar Pradesh in 1993. A fire disabled the electric cables so that safety systems were inoperative and operators had to intervene manually to shut down the reactor. The conditions leading up to the accident were always present. The fire started when turbine blades broke away and ruptured a pipe carrying hydrogen, which then leaked and caught fire. Large turbine
vibrations are common in India’s reactors, but for the first time the hydrogen line was affected. Oil leaks too are common, this time the leaking oil contributed to the fire. Like the main cables, the backup cables also caught fire because they did not meet good design practice and so did not function effectively as backups.

Safety systems might not be enough

The second premise of the DAE’s claims for safety is that reliable equipment and operations are enough to ensure safety. However, there are accidents for which it is difficult if not impossible to design effective barriers. For example, fast breeder reactors, one of which is being built in Kalpakkam, are vulnerable to a reactivity increase that could lead to explosive breakup of the fuel, leading to high energies that are difficult to physically contain. Once the fuel becomes hot enough to melt, the effectiveness of protective barriers cannot be guaranteed. Short of the most severe accidents, the effectiveness of these barriers also depends on reliable design and construction and here the record is not good. The containment building for the Kaiga reactor in Karnataka collapsed during construction due to deficiencies in design.

Reliability is necessary for safety, but it might not be enough. One problem with nuclear reactors is that components and subsystems often interact in unanticipated ways to cause accidents ("interactive complexity"). Two examples from reactors in the United States illustrate this: during the 1979 accident in the Three Mile Island reactor operators did not know the state of the reactor and undertook actions that worsened it. In 1966, at the Fermi fast breeder reactor, a safety device meant to catch the core and prevent it from becoming critical in case it melted caused a meltdown when a part of it broke away and blocked coolant flow. In India, the Kakrapar-1 reactor underwent an unexpected power increase in March 2004 to which many factors contributed; one factor was that operators had disabled one of the reactor regulating systems during the accident, all the while not knowing that the other regulating system had already been disabled by a power loss. In nuclear reactors, accidents can escalate quickly and this underscores the need for well planned and reliable safety actions in case of failures. However, this might not always be achievable in practice. The potential for unanticipated, sometimes hidden, interactions suggests that safety in nuclear reactors is difficult to demonstrate - and achieve.

The importance of safety culture

Despite the challenge to safety posed by complexity, some reactors in other countries have operated relatively reliably. Organization theorists have studied what these plants ("high reliability organizations") have in common. In-depth field studies have revealed a high priority on safety by management; an atmosphere of openness and responsibility throughout the organization; abundant backups in equipment and personnel; and continuous learning from simulations and mistakes, consistent with a persistent belief that present levels of safety are never adequate.

Lacking a culture of reliability

The DAE’s operations does not satisfy these characteristics of high reliability operations. The appropriate lessons are often not learnt by the management. The DAE’s response to the accident in the Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant (KARP) in 2003 is revealing. Here, a valve failure resulted in entry of highly radioactive material into a room containing less radioactive material, and workers entering this latter room to take measurements were exposed to high radiation levels. Even after the leak was made public, the DAE continued to deny its causes but instead blamed the workers for a situation over which they had no control. They were blamed for entering the room, despite the fact that their actions were routinely necessary. They were also blamed for not wearing thermo-luminescent badges while entering the room. But these badges wouldn’t have provided advance or immediate warning of radiation levels; rather they are meant to record total exposure over a period of time. The absence of the badges instead reveals routine neglect of worker exposure levels and
a low priority to safety. After the accident, despite a safety committee’s recommendation that the plant be shut down, the upper management of BARC decided to continue operating the plant. Workers didn’t have control over their environment, and attempts to implement changes in operations at the plant went unheeded. Elsewhere in DAE operations, the DAE has learnt little from prior warnings. The Narora fire could have been avoided if prior warnings about turbine blade problems had been heeded or best practices in cabling design had been followed.

Organization theorists point out how highly reliable operations are highly demanding and precarious in systems that are structurally prone to accidents, because of the competing priorities and the difficulty of justifying efforts on safety whose direct outcomes are often unclear. Learning from mistakes is doubly important in systems such as nuclear reactors where problems that can occur are not always known in advance. Openness therefore is needed to achieve high levels of safety, and is also required if safe operations are to be demonstrated. The DAE operations do not demonstrate these characteristics. Instead, overconfidence at the highest levels and the DAE’s practice of secrecy makes it likely that problems are often kept under wraps until a mishap brings them to light.

[Ashwin Kumar is a researcher at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development, in Bangalore.]

Toxic Fallout: Jadugoda’s Nuclear Nightmare

Sunita Dubey

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal may be considered ground-breaking and historic by many in India and the United States, but this euphoria must not shroud the misery of thousands of people suffering the effects of uranium mining in India due to poor technical and management practices in existing mines.

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal may be considered ground-breaking and historic by many in India and the United States, but this euphoria must not shroud the misery of thousands of people suffering the effects of uranium mining in India due to poor technical and management practices in existing mines.

While major newspapers and television stations in India celebrated a major political victory by India as it covered the announcement of the Indo-U.S. deal, contrast this with an incident which happened Dec. 24.

Thousands of litres of radioactive waste spilled in a creek because of a pipe burst at Uranium Corporation of India Limited facility at Jadugoda, India. It neither made newspaper headlines nor did UCIL come to know of the disastrous leak till alerted by the local villagers. Such are the realities of nuclear facilities in India.

Callousness of UCIL

The Dec. 24 accident is the latest example of UCIL’s callousness, which occurred in a small village inhabited largely by displaced families whose lands were acquired to
construct two of the three storage dams, also known as tailings ponds. Based on the experience of similar accidents in other countries, the negative effects on human and environmental health will impact not just Jadugoda, but several communities living downstream, perhaps even hundreds of kilometres away.

UCIL had no alarm mechanism to alert the company in cases of such a disaster. Instead, the villagers who had arrived at the scene of the accident soon after the pipe burst informed the company of the toxic spill.

The toxic sludge spewed into a creek for nine hours before the flow of the radioactive waste was shut off. Consequently, a thick layer of toxic sludge on the surface of the creek killed scores of fish, frogs, and other riparian life. The waste from the leak also reached a creek that feeds into the Subarnarekha river, seriously contaminating the water resources of the communities living hundreds of kilometres along the way. This is not the first such accident. In 1986, a tailing dam had burst open and radioactive water flowed directly into the villages.

A similar disaster in 1979 in the United States at Church Rock, N.M., had also left many people and their environment scarred for years altogether. More than eighteen months after the accident, there were strong indications that the radiation and other pollutants had penetrated 30 feet into the earth. A report by a Cincinnati-based firm brought in as a consultant by the EPA warned that at least two nearby aquifers had been put “at risk. “

According to Don Hancock of the Southwest Research and Information Center in New Mexico, though remediation/ clean-up in Jadugoda will depend upon local conditions, it is essential to monitor the situation very carefully. Some of the immediate steps which need to be taken include immediate sludge removal from the river bed, as river beds are usually very permeable. The communities downstream should also be warned to not use the water till it has been established to be safe. It can take several months for the water to become safe again.

**India’s Navajo Nation**

Since 1967, when UCIL first started uranium mining in Jadugoda, the lives of people have been inflicted with unknown diseases, deaths and poisoned environment. The foundation of these mines has been laid on lies and misinformation by UCIL about the impact of uranium mining, radiation and toxicity in Jadugoda. Till the ’90s the tailing ponds (where uranium mine liquid waste is stored to evaporate) was in close vicinity of areas in the villages used as children's playground, open grazing area and other public use. The radiation levels and related sickness were never revealed by UCIL, even though for years the local population has suffered from the extensive environmental degradation caused by the mining operations which are also responsible for the high frequency of radiation-related sickenesses and developmental disorders found in the area. Even though India’s Atomic Energy Act states that there should be no habitation within five kilometres of a waste site or uranium-tailing pond and even though Jadugoda has been in operation for more than 30 years, seven villages stand within one and a half kilometres of the danger zone. One of them, Dungardihi, begins just 40 meters away.

**Questioning Legitimacy**

It was only in 1996 when a group of people working in the mines and living in close vicinity started questioning the legitimacy UCIL’s free rein to pollute the environment and lives of indigenous people. This led to the formation of a local anti-uranium mining group called Jharkhandis Organization Against Radiation whose mission is to resist further nuclear development, and to educate the local indigenous people about the dangers of radioactivity. JOAR is also a winner of the 2004 Nuclear-
Free Future Resistance Award. Even after the documentation of severe damage caused by uranium mining in Jadugoda in a documentary titled “Buddha Weeps In Jadugoda” by Shri Prakash, UCIL still admits to no wrongdoing, claiming that none of the prevalent congenital diseases in the area are due to the radiation from their uranium mines and milling operations.

**India’s Nuclear History**

Until World War II, uranium was regarded as little more than a substance used to colour ceramics and glass, a byproduct of radium production. However, since the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938, the international nuclear industry has produced more than 1.7 million metric tons of uranium in about 30 countries. The IAEA estimates that about 360,000 metric tons of natural uranium or about 20 percent of the world’s production has been used for military purposes.

India was the first Asian country to develop a nuclear program and the Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948, just one year after independence, followed by the Department of Atomic Energy in August 1954. The Indian nuclear program got a boost with U.S. and Canadian support in 1969, which was for research purposes, but with the same technology, India exploded its first plutonium bomb in 1974. This shows that even though the façade behind the nuclear program might be for power generation or research, at any given time the program can be turned into nuclear weapons.

**India’s Nuclear Ambitions**

India plans to put up a total installed nuclear power capacity of 20,000 MWe by the year 2020. India has 14 reactors in operation and has an installed nuclear capacity of 2720 MWe. [Present capacity is reportedly 3900 MW.] At present eight reactors are under construction and, when completed, will add 3960 MWe to the nuclear installed capacity. [The capacity is expected to reach 7,400 MW by 2010.] With such ambitious plans and thrust on nuclear power as a future source of sustainable “green” energy and fresh impetus from the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, many more uranium mines and nuclear plants are on the horizon. UCIL is engaged in mining and milling of uranium ore at Jadugoda, Bhatin and Narwapahar at Singhbhum district of Jharkand. Techno-commercially viable deposits are reported to have been found at Turamdih, Bagjata and Banduhuran in Jharkhand, Lambapur and Peddagattu in Andhra Pradesh and Domiasiat in Meghalaya.

Struggle Continues.

Though some clean-up effort has been taken up by UCIL, there are no alternatives for villagers to escape this radioactive fallout. Most of these poor villagers are already displaced from their lands more than once. They do not have any access to safe drinking water, and the creek, which got poisoned after the spill, was their only source of water. Even in these circumstances, not much is expected from UCIL to help this poor community. The perseverance and struggle of the Jadugoda community has led to international recognition of their problems. They have connected with other indigenous communities from all over the world, suffering the similar fallout of uranium mining. In December 2006 indigenous peoples from around the world who are victims of uranium mining, nuclear testing, and nuclear dumping came together at the Navajo Nation for the Indigenous World Uranium Summit, which called for a global ban on uranium mining on native lands. Representatives from Jadugoda gave testimony about the alarming number of babies who are stillborn or are born with serious birth defects, and of the high rates of cancer that are claiming the lives of many who live near the uranium mines.

The people of Jadugoda are not alone in this fight, even though the Indian government or UCIL may choose to ignore their plight. The recent spill and its mishandling by UCIL has drawn flak from the global community, and 400 individuals have signed petitions circulated by two U.S.-based groups, the Association for India’s Development and FOSA.

More information on Jadugoda is available at www.jadugoda.net

Nuclear Power Plant in Haripur?

Maureen Nandini Mitra

To reach Hairpur, a remote fishing village along the West Bengal coast, one has got off the main road and walk two-and-a-half kilometers over a broad mud dyke. These days, access to the dyke-road is blocked by a stout log barricade. Outsiders, unless vetted by trusted sources, are not welcome.

Hairpur villagers have been in arms since last September when they first learnt that the Union government intends to set up a 10,000 MW nuclear power plant on their land. In November they, and people from neighbouring villages, turned up in thousands on two consecutive days to block the path of a 12-member site selection panel from the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) that tried to visit the village. If the project comes through it would displace at least 25,000 farmers, fishermen and their families. As far as the villagers are concerned, their homes, livelihoods and health are at stake and they aren’t going to give it all up without a fight.

“If the project comes we will have nowhere to live, nothing to eat, and the fish in the sea will die,” says Sandhya Dalal, who lives in a one room shack by the sea with her fishworker husband and two little sons. “Surely when such decisions are made, the government should first ask us if we want such a project near our homes?”

Why Hairpur?

Coastal East Midnapur is often referred to as West Bengal’s fish basket. The area brings in about Rs. 360 crore in revenue from fishing exports – that’s 60 percent of the state’s total export earning from the fishing industry. The area also boasts a rich agricultural economy. The unbelievably fertile, multi-crop land is used to grow paddy, pulses, potatoes, brinjals, tomatoes, mustard, pumpkins, gourds, betel leaves, chillies and fruits like mangoes, cashew nut and chikoo. Income from this land is high. Even, small-time farmers like the Manna brothers – Biren, Bidhan and Bikas – earn up to Rs. 2.5 lakh and more a year growing tomatoes and brinjals on their half-acre plot of land.

A nuclear power plant, that requires millions of tonnes of fresh water to cool its reactors, will deplete the (sweet) water table and destroy this thriving agrarian life, say anti-nuclear activists. And hot water from the reactors released into the sea would affect marine life from the Bay of Bengal down to the Orissa coast and further south.

Also, the very location of Hairpur — along a highly cyclone-prone coast - makes setting up a nuclear plant here unviable, activists claim. If tidal water enters a reactor (this nearly happened in Kalpakkam during the 2004 tsunami), it could poison large tracts of land.

Considering all these factors, why Haripur? Says Suvendu Adhikari, the local MLA. “When I asked (Chief Minister) Buddha Babu why Haripur, he told me ‘not too many people live there’.” (According to census figures, the population density in a 5.6 km ring around Haripur is 890 people per sq km.)

Given the Indian nuclear establishment’s penchant for secrecy, not much is known about the proposed Haripur project. Bare outline - it will reportedly have six nuclear reactors each of 1650 MW capacity, three times the size of the country’s largest reactor of 540 MW, and will produce 10,000 MW of power. It will be one of five new nuclear power projects that the Centre reportedly intends to set up in coastal areas. The others are slated for yet unnamed locations in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Orissa. None of the sites have been actually been finalised. Hairpur is the only specific site that has been mentioned publicly.

And that’s more than enough to give villagers here sleepless nights. With the aid of local farmers’ and fishworkers’ bodies, they have mobilised themselves against the proposed plant. The locality today is buzzing with discussions, debates, talks and video shows on the perils of nuclear technology. The mood is at once defiant and dejected. “People are willing to put up an all out resistance, but at the same time, seeing what’s happened in Singur, they wonder how far they can stand up against state power,” says Harekrishna Debnath, of the National Fishworkers Forum, that’s part of the local anti-nuclear coalition.

On the other end, the state government has roped in Jadavpur University to conduct seminars in the district on the benefits of nuclear power and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) is all set to take 30 residents from the “affected” area on a tour to a nuclear plant site so that they can see for themselves how “harmless” nuclear power is.

[As per the latest reports, the move to set up the plant - in view of massive local resistance and the charged up atmosphere in nearby Nandigram in the same district, has been stalled, at least for the time being.—Ed.]
Rearmament opponent and peace activist J. Sri Raman warned politicians, parliamentarians and NGO representatives in Berlin of the dangers of the recent nuclear deal between the USA and India.

Raman pointed to the current situation in the tricky negotiations surrounding the deal: “The ball now lies in the NSG’s court.” The NSG (Nuclear Suppliers’ Group) is a group comprising 45 member-nations, which was formed to prevent nuclear material that can be used for military purposes from falling into wrong hands. All EU members are members of NSG and, therefore, in a position to exercise a clear veto against the nuclear deal, which, among other things, will allow extensive supplies to be exported by the American nuclear industry into India. This, despite the fact that India is not a signatory of NPT, and has tested her own nuclear weapons.

Raman knows what he is talking about. As a founder of the Journalists against Nuclear Weapons, he is a leading member of two large Indian umbrella organizations, the Movement Against Nuclear Weapons and the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace. He came out in 2002 with the book “Flashpoint: How the U.S., India and Pakistan brought us to the Brink of a Nuclear War”.

According to Raman, the deal legitimises nuclear fuel supplies to India, which in turn opens the way for India to utilize its own limited uranium deposits for building up its nuclear weapons arsenal.

The deal, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush agreed upon in July 2005 (without earlier consultation with or with the consent of India’s Parliament, as Raman bitterly points out), can only come into effect based on two conditions: an agreement between New Delhi and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the inspection of the civil nuclear installations and the approval of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

Negotiations with the IAEA are going on, and Raman expects hardly any obstacles to the deal there, even though India would allow only 14 of her 22 nuclear installations to be inspected/supervised.

However, Raman believes that the NSG, which will meet in the coming days to discuss the deal, could prevent this violation of the NPT.

After all, NPT regulations forbid the delivery of weapon-grade nuclear material to countries that ignore the treaty and disallow their facilities to be inspected by the IAEA—and India is one of these countries.

Some of the EU member-states are indeed displeased that the same USA, which brought the group of 45 into being, is now undermining its very basis.

For Raman this is no wonder - the U.S. wants to kill two birds with one stone: bind India to it as counterbalance against China and win massive supply contracts for its own nuclear industry. In Washington, they are already speaking of a cake worth 100 billion dollars.

Up to now, only nuclear powers like France and Britain [and Russia outside the EU] have signalled support for the deal, while traditional nuclear-opponents like Sweden, Austria or Ireland have expressed criticism. Germany has not taken a clear stand although foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier and the SPD have made nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as the guidelines of the German foreign policy. The three opposition parties have taken a position. They have brought a Bill in Parliament, which asks for a nuclear embargo for India and demands that the government insists on India’s agreement to inspections by the 45-nation group.

In his talks in Berlin with the foreign office or with members of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, Raman insisted again and again that the EU States should reject the nuclear deal not only because of its blatant undermining of the NPT agreement, but also because such a rejection would lead to the eventual dismantling of India’s nuclear arsenal.

The deal, said Raman full of hope, is not yet wrapped up.

* From Neues Deutschland, March 28, 2007, Translated by Sarah John
Once again it is missile testing season in South Asia. Hardly a month passes without Pakistan or India testing a “nuclear capable” missile. The latest one (at the time of writing this article) is Agni-3, the newest, longest range version of this missile. Newspaper headlines proudly inform us that this is now capable of reaching Beijing or Shanghai. One could almost read their subconscious desire — perhaps now China might finally be persuaded to enter this race, thereby acknowledging India’s status as a nuclear weapons power. They also inform us that US reaction was “cautious” — yet another mark of India’s shining status, in the eyes of our elite. Since the earlier test of Agni-3 was a failure (or “partial success” if one goes by what the establishment says), there is even more cheering than usual.

The only noticeably silent constituency in the media fanfare has been the armed forces. The likely reason for that is the history of failure that has plagued the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the military’s distrust of their products, not any antipathy to longer range missiles. To military planners, missiles have one key characteristic that makes them attractive. They are fast at delivering nuclear, or, for that matter, conventional weapons. A missile launch from, say, Sargodha towards New Delhi or from Agra to Lahore, a distance of some 600 km, would take only about 5 minutes for Pakistan’s Ghauri and India’s Agni missiles.

This leaves absolutely no time for decision making by political leaders. Some may recall the fictional situation in Stanley Kubrick’s classic film Dr. Strangelove involving a base commander who ordered an air attack on the Soviet Union without authorization by political leaders. In the movie the President of the United States, after being notified of this unauthorized launch, has several hours to recall the aircraft. With the advent of missiles, no such luxury exists.

The case of the United States and the Soviet Union is less demanding than the case of India and Pakistan, which have a common border. A missile launched from the continental U.S.A. would have taken about 30 minutes to reach Russia as compared to the approximately five minutes in South Asia. Further, the United States and Russia spent untold billions of dollars on setting up elaborate early warning systems, comprising satellites, radars, high-speed reliable communication links, and so on, to detect and follow missile and rocket launches. India and Pakistan cannot realistically aspire to this kind of infrastructure. Nor is it desirable.

Fortunately South Asia does not yet need this kind of elaborate infrastructure. At least as far as public information goes, neither India nor Pakistan have mated their nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles and kept them ready for quick launch. Both countries, however, have announced in various ways that they plan to do so.

In August 1999, the Indian National Security Advisory Board released the Draft Nuclear Doctrine, which called for “rapid punitive response” and “aircraft, mobile land-missiles and sea-based assets” to deliver nuclear weapons. Pakistan, for its part, has long claimed the ability to deliver nuclear weapons by aircraft and land-based missiles; in February 2001, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff announced that Pakistan was thinking about equipping its submarines with nuclear missiles.

It is in this context of slow movement towards deployment of nuclear-armed missiles that missile tests must be viewed. The technical rationale for flight-testing of ballistic missiles is to check and improve behavioral characteristics of a ballistic missile system under development and to generate confidence that it will work as intended. Developing accurate missiles, in particular, requires a large number of tests.

But, strange as it may sound, missile accuracy is not something to be desired. Greater accuracy increases confidence on the part of military planners that they can carry out a pre-emptive or a preventive strike on the adversary’s weapons and defence infrastructure. Calls for a pre-emptive strike are likely to

Three Boos

M. V. Ramana
come during moments of crises where one country may fear that the other may launch a first strike. Given the frequency with which military crises have been occurring in South Asia, especially in the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests, this possibility must not be discounted.

Arguments for a preventive attack usually focus on the necessity of precluding a shift in the military balance. In *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, Lawrence Freedman records that during the period when the United States had comparative nuclear advantage, there were many calls for a preventive attack on Soviet nuclear facilities. These reportedly included a discussion at the level of the National Security Council in 1954 – five years after the USSR conducted its first nuclear test. The most prominent public call was from Major General Orvil Anderson who stated: “Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week… And when I went up to Christ – I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization.” South Asia does not lack in people who think similarly.

Missile tests also have other consequences. One is increased public prominence of weapons designers like Abdul Kalam, allowing the organizations they support to obtain larger budgets, and escalating their influence on defence policy. Such events also serve as occasions for photo opportunities for political leaders that wish to be associated publicly with the missile and strong defence in general. (As the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* lampooned in a cartoon many years ago, the primary requirement for politicians is that the missile looks good in parades.)

And finally, each missile test is a milestone that increases the political costs for future leaders to reverse course even if they desire it. The process of testing involves not just scientists and engineers, but also military personnel, strategists, and the odd political leader. With each (successful) test, pro-nuclear sections within the defence establishment can renew their pitch that the tested missile be made operational and handed over to appropriate military regiments. Through this process, the armed services would end up building sections with vested interests in maintaining deployed nuclear weapons arsenals and finding targets to justify greater numbers. As demonstrated during the Cold War, the result of this process will be an ever escalating arms race.

For a variety of reasons, only some of which are detailed above, the recent missile tests merit no cheers. It is up to the peace movement to counter the cheers with boos.

The World Must Unite to Eliminate the Growing Nuclear Threat

**Christopher Weeramantry**
April 23, 2007*

IN THE past week alone, North Korea failed to meet a deadline to halt its nuclear program, and Iran announced it was seeking bids to build two more nuclear power plants, despite international concern that the enriched uranium is destined to fuel weapons.

As the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* declared this year: “We stand at the brink of a second nuclear age. Not since the first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has the world faced such perilous choices.” The significant threats caused by North Korea and Iran’s increasing nuclear ambitions are among a long and terrifying list of reasons driving us closer to disaster. They include unsecured nuclear materials in Russia and elsewhere, the continuing launch-ready status of thousands of American and Russian weapons, escalating terrorism, increasing availability of the materials with which to make a bomb, and a dangerous lowering of the threshold for use in several nuclear weapons states.

The main reason we are held hostage by the most destructive technology on earth is simple: the complete lack of international resolve to ban nuclear weapons and banish them from the arsenals of the world.

Today, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons will be launched in...
Melbourne. Former Australian prime minister Malcolm Fraser will speak, joined by former foreign minister Gareth Evans via video, some of Australia’s leading medical experts and community leaders in a plea for action. The campaign’s demand is simple. It calls for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, similar to those already achieved for chemical and biological weapons and for landmines.

Such is the seriousness of the nuclear threat that high-profile and bipartisan leaders in Australia have joined to urge action to create a nuclear weapons-free world. Australia has a key role. For decades Australia has provided uranium to several nuclear weapons states, with a misplaced faith that safeguards will keep that uranium out of weapons. Australia, as a provider of a raw material that has such catastrophic potential, has a responsibility to help eliminate the ultimate weapons of terror.

The bomb also clearly stands categorically condemned by at least a dozen basic principles of international law. I was one of 14 judges on the panel of the International Court of Justice that unanimously held in the Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

But elimination will only happen if all countries — nuclear and non-nuclear states — genuinely work towards this result. Nuclear states must abolish their arsenals, as was indicated by the unanimous opinion of the international Court of Justice, the highest international tribunal. The five nuclear states seem to expect others to refrain from obtaining bombs while at the same time maintaining their own caches of deadly weapons.

In particular, Russia and the United States — far from making a serious effort to disarm — still possess 26,000 of the world’s 27,000 nuclear weapons. According to the board of directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the two countries combined have more than 1000 warheads ready to be activated within tens of minutes. Each of these weapons has a potential destructive force up to 40 times that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima that killed 100,000 people. Fifty of today’s nuclear weapons could kill 200 million people.

The creation of a nuclear weapons convention is not only achievable, it is imperative if civilisation is to survive. The international campaign to ban the landmine was successful. In 1997, governments finally listened to millions of people demanding action. One decade later, the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention must be made even more loudly. So compellingly that all states including Australia will have no choice but to end any form of support, direct or indirect, to the nuclear menace which threatens us all.

* Judge Christopher Weeramantry is a former vice-president of the International Court of Justice. This is the text of the speech delivered at the launch of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons at the State Parliament of Australia.

David Albright, a well-known expert on Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, says although Iran is making some progress toward developing a uranium-enrichment program, it has achieved “a lot less than what it’s trying to get people to believe it’s accomplished.” Albright says he believes Iran is seeking a nuclear-weapons capability, but any military effort to stop it would be disastrous.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran is now a nuclear industrial country, and following that, Reza Aghazadeh, the head of the Atomic Energy Commission in Iran said that they hope to have fifty thousand centrifuges in place pretty soon. What do you make of all this? Are they really going full blast ahead now?

No, I don’t think so. They’re certainly not a nuclear nation in the sense of being able to run thousands or tens of thousands of centrifuges to enrich uranium. Iran defines “industrial scale” in its own way.

Which is?

In the past it’s been three thousand centrifuges enriching uranium in what’s called a module, and that module is in the underground cascade halls of Natanz. The assumption is that centrifuges are going to be working continuously at enriching uranium in significant quantity, but that hasn’t happened yet. In fact, Ahmadinejad seems to have lowered the bar on what is “industrial scale” because Iran only has about one thousand centrifuges installed underground, and from what I understand, they’re not enriching. They are spinning, in the sense that the centrifuges have been turned on and they’re operating under what’s called vacuum.

But I would be surprised if Iran was even enriching uranium in those thousand machines. I think Iran lowered the bar of what is industrial scale, even by its own definition, and then declared victory. In the West, operation of three thousand centrifuges with uranium gas would not be seen as industrial scale. Iran from the very beginning has lowered the standard, and now has lowered it even further. It’s accomplished a lot less than what it’s trying to get people to believe it’s accomplished.

Where did this fifty thousand figure come from?

Well at the Natanz site the cascade halls underground are big enough to hold fifty thousand. And they would fit the fifty thousand by building these modules of three thousand centrifuges, but the date when Iran can have fifty thousand centrifuges functioning is far in the future, at least a decade away. If sanctions continue on Iran, it probably will never reach that point. Iran needs to buy a tremendous amount of equipment, such as valves, pumps, piping, from overseas. And it’s having to do that essentially illicitly because it’s not legal to sell Iran that kind of equipment. It can succeed at a certain level to buy things illicitly, but it’s going to have a very hard time succeeding to the point where it could ever build fifty thousand centrifuges.

You would think at this point if Iran was really interested in a civilian program the Iranian leaders would agree to the Security Council demands to suspend enrichment for a while. The Council has promised to help Iran develop peaceful nuclear programs, if it allows inspections to prevent a nuclear weapons program, right?

If Iran only intended to produce enriched uranium for civil purposes, or if it just intended to produce nuclear electricity and power reactors, it would probably not have been so tough about demanding that it be allowed to move forward and produce thousands of centrifuges. But that doesn’t mean Iran wants nuclear weapons.

In a ‘best case’ scenario for Iran, it would have enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in 2009. The only thing you can draw from that is that it appears Iran wants to have a nuclear-weapons capability, wants to have some set of facilities, such as an enrichment plant, so it can look like it can build nuclear weapons if it wants. If it made the decision to build nuclear weapons, then it would have a good chance of succeeding before the world could stop it.

Well, under your calculations, how far are they away from that capability?
In a best case scenario for Iran, it would have enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in 2009. And I want to emphasize it’s a best case. It could take longer. But a nuclear weapons capability would probably be defined as having three thousand centrifuges enriching uranium. And that date could happen in 2008, leading up to 2009.

I see.

But they still haven’t made any highly enriched uranium. And if they did decide to make highly enriched uranium, it may take six months to a year to make enough for a bomb. So Iran could reach a nuclear-weapons capability in 2008, even though it wouldn’t have enough material for a nuclear weapon and may not even be trying at that point to produce material for a nuclear weapon. We’re entering the time when it’s very important to watch what Iran is accomplishing and sort through the facts and find the real situation. To do that, the most important information comes from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Are inspectors back in Natanz now?

They should be there Tuesday or Wednesday. They’ll know if indeed any enrichment took place in the underground halls. Iran could enrich any day. That’s been the state of play for several weeks now. There’s an IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] seal on the tank that holds the uranium hexafluoride. Iran would have to cut the seal before it started enriching. And if the seal’s cut, the IAEA will certainly know enrichment happened, and from the kind of measurements they can do, they’ll know how much. So the world will know if Iran did indeed enrich. It would be a surprise, if they did on Monday, however. Iran sent out signals last week to the IAEA and to other governments not to expect a big surprise on Monday.

So if there was enrichment, you’d be surprised?

Certainly enrichment would be a surprise. But it’s also been well known that Iran has been installing centrifuges at a pretty brisk rate for the last couple of months. The actual rate is about one cascade per week or two. A cascade contains 164 machines. Iran could end up installing all three thousand machines in this module by the end of May or sometime in June. But getting them all to enrich uranium is another thing. That’s a pretty big step, and Iran’s had trouble with that. So far it’s only enriched in two cascades that are in the pilot plant that is above ground at Natanz.

A military campaign against Iran … would devastate the civil nuclear program and many nuclear facilities, but it’s not going to stop the centrifuge program.

Using IAEA data, we’ve calculated that these two cascades have only operated about 20 percent of the time enriching uranium. To go from that state to suddenly enriching in one thousand centrifuges obviously is a huge jump. I would expect that the enrichment will just creep up slowly even though the number of machines installed is increasing dramatically.

The Russian press is quoting Russian atomic officials as doubting there’s been any breakthroughs in Iran. They don’t think Iran’s technology is up to it yet.

Iran is learning how to do things and they’re moving forward. Iran is making slow but steady progress on learning how to enrich uranium in a larger number of centrifuges. They’re never going to be as good as the centrifuge experts in Europe or in Russia. They’ll probably break more often than they ever would in Russia or Europe. There’ll be control problems. The system won’t work efficiently. I don’t think Iran expects to be able to do it like Europeans.

Why is that?

It’s standards are lower. We have to be careful not to judge them by our standards and then miss something important—namely that Iran will muddle through and learn to enrich significant quantities of uranium, and we’ll miss that because we’re thinking, “Well, they’re not meeting our benchmarks, they’re not as good as us, in a sense they’re not mastering centrifuge operation like we could.” They may never master it like we can. They may just have a program that looks to us not very good, but in fact is good enough to produce enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, just it’ll happen on a slower schedule and they’ll get less than they could.

You’ve been very strong in urging that no military force be used to stop this program. But the diplomacy doesn’t seem to be catching on either. Do you think the West should drop its insistence on a suspension?

No, I don’t think so. I mean that’s a long-held policy. There was a suspension for a couple years. As a transition stage, it may make sense to find a way to negotiate with Iran where maybe the full suspension doesn’t happen, but rather a temporary one. But it could get negotiations started and then there’d be an opportunity to try to work something out that would lead to a full suspension. But military options still aren’t any good, and their exercise would
create a much more dangerous world and come back to haunt us just like the invasion or Iraq has. Perhaps even worse, because Iran isn’t going to just disintegrate. It could become intensely nationalistic and in essence would go to war against us.

A military campaign against Iran, as envisioned, would have to attack all of Iran with missiles and bombs and multiple sorties. I don’t think it would even destroy the nuclear program. It would devastate the civil nuclear program and many nuclear facilities, but it’s not going to stop the centrifuge program. Iran can reconstitute fairly quickly. Its program is becoming so dispersed that it’s very likely many centrifuge placements wouldn’t even be hit. And if Iran has any warning at all, it could empty out a lot of equipment in the bomb site, and in the centrifuges, and then reconstitute in a secret site. Centrifuge plants don’t use much electricity, they don’t emit much radiation, if any, and they’re very easy to hide, so if Iran wants to build a secret centrifuge plant it would have no trouble and it would be unlikely that we’d find it. It’s unlikely we even know where they’re making centrifuge components now.

Experts preparing draft treaty to ban uranium, plutonium production for nuclear weapons

UNITED NATIONS – Independent arms control experts from 15 countries are drafting a treaty to ban production of uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons that could rival a U.S. text under consideration by the U.N.’s top disarmament body.

Frank von Hippel, a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University, said Wednesday the International Panel on Fissile Materials is not only developing a draft treaty, “but more importantly, an in-depth analysis of the verification issues associated with the treaty.”

The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty submitted by the U.S. last May omits verification measures, leaving it up to individual governments to detect and report violations by other nations.

The U.S. says it wants to improve the world’s leverage against nuclear states such as Iran and North Korea while avoiding protracted negotiations over issues such as verification.

But von Hippel said verifying compliance with such a treaty shouldn’t be much harder than doing so for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970 and is aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

“And we think this can be done with reasonable cost,” he told diplomats, U.N. staff and disarmament activists who gathered Wednesday on the sidelines of the U.N. Disarmament Commission’s three-week meeting.

The nuclear physicist served in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1994-95 and is now the panel’s co-chairman.

Stephen G. Rademaker, acting U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, urged the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament to conclude work on a new treaty by September. The U.S. proposal is still under review in the conference, the U.N.’s top arms control body.

During Wednesday’s discussion, differences emerged on whether to consider a step-by-step or a wide-ranging treaty, with or without verification.

An Egyptian diplomat insisted that the nuclear powers should be subject to the same rule as non-nuclear states, and that the treaty’s aim should be disarmament, not legalizing the retention of weapons by the nuclear powers.

Princeton research scientist Zia Mian, who works with the panel, said a key issue is the lack of information on the quantities of highly enriched uranium in some major countries – first and foremost Russia, but also France and China. The U.S. and Britain have declared their stockpiles, he said.

The five nuclear weapon states have all stopped producing highly-enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons, but have set aside large quantities for future military and civilian use, he said.

“We need to get a better handle on who has how much fissile material in the world,” he said.

The U.S., Britain and Russia all use highly enriched uranium for nuclear propulsion for submarines. The U.S. also uses it for aircraft carriers and Russia for ice-breakers.

If the U.S. and Russia reduced the number of nuclear warheads in their stockpiles to 1,000, a lot less highly enriched uranium would be needed, but Mian said the continued naval
demands would create problems and probably require “extra conditions” in a treaty.

France has moved to fuel its submarines with low-enriched uranium, he said, suggesting that Russia, the U.S. and Britain could do the same.

As for plutonium, Mian said, there are about 150 tons in weapons today, “but there’s about 100 tons that the U.S. and Russia have declared as excess to their military needs ... and there’s a very large civilian stock in the world.”

A minimal treaty should subject all civilian nuclear activities by stages to international safeguards, put excess fissile material under safeguards, and ensure that highly enriched uranium for naval reactors is not diverted to weapon use, he said.

Von Hippel said a verification program would have to ensure that production facilities for highly enriched uranium and plutonium are shut down or converted to civilian use, that civilian nuclear material is not converted to weapons, that there is no clandestine or undeclared production or diversion, and that excess fissile material is not returned to weapons use, he said.

No verification is perfect, von Hippel said, but “in my view it’s much better than nothing.”

The panel, founded in January 2006 and funded with a five-year grant to Princeton by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, includes nuclear experts from Brazil, Britain, China, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden and the United States.


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CNDP in Action

A. Koodankulam Struggle Update

[I] Hunger Strike at Koodankulam

The one-day hunger strike on February 15, 2007 was a great success. Some 7,000 men and women and children from 175 fishing and farming villages from Tirunelveli, Thoothukudi and Kanyakumari district fasted together. This event was also treated as the “public hearing” organised by the public themselves. Scores of people - fishworkers, farmers, women, social activists, doctors, teachers, lawyers, scientists, priests and youth - expressed their opposition to the Koodankulam plants. They all demanded immediate closure of the ongoing projects (I and II) and the planned projects (III, IV, V and VI). The whole day people made passionate speeches and the audience gave undivided attention to all of them.

Earlier in the day, when Medha Patkar accompanied by S P Udayakumar and other local leaders arrived at the venue of the strike at around 9 am. Many had been prevented by the police from reaching the strike venue and many vehicles had been diverted in the name of crowd management. Vehicles were even being searched ostensibly for weapons! Rumours had been spread in some fishing villages that there could be police firing. Despite all these, people kept streaming in and by 11 am the place was full.

Medha Patkar delivered a powerful and passionate speech detailing the plight of nuclear victims in different parts of the country such as Jadugoda, Tarapur, Kalpakkam, Kakrapar, Kota etc. As in these places, the government provided no information, no knowledge and no public debate was held about the nuclear reactors in Koodankulam or about the India-US and India-Russia nuclear deals. She categorically asserted that the people of India did not need any foreign advice on how to take care of our fisherpeople, sea and fish, and farmers, land and crops. She further asserted that the nuclear power and bomb were two sides of the same coin and said that she would be with the people as long as they fought the nuclear menace. Referring to the Tirunelveli collector’s announcement that the next public hearing would be conducted on March 31st under the chairmanship of the Tamil Nadu Electricity minister Arcot Veerasami, she said that this was unacceptable as per the environmental notification of 1994 (again modified in September 2006). She said we must oppose this. While the local communities would lead the Koodankulam fight, the national leadership would provide every support. She also explained the Action 2007 program that would be launched on March 19, 2007.

Concluding the hunger strike later in the day, she gave a call to shun the caste and religious divides and fight unitedly against the atomic power and bomb projects. She further suggested that the CNDP should organise its next convention in Koodankulam followed by a convention of various people’s movements from all corners of the country. She advised all the Gram Sabhas of all the villages in the Koodankulam area to pass a resolution against the Koodankulam nuclear power projects. She also stressed the need for involving women and youth in the struggle and suggested a small group of people travelling to all the different nuclear sites across the country and doing a detailed study of the nuclear menace.

Y. David, a leader of the People’s Movement Against Nuclear
Energy, spoke about the history of the Koodankulam struggle and its future course of action. Gabrielle Dietrich, Lal Mohan, Anton Gomes, Mano Thakkaraj, Balaprajapathi Adigalar, Tamil Manthan, Dhanraj, Alankaram Bharathar, Peter Dhas, Kavitha, Rosammal, Fatima Babu, Ganesan, Dinesh, Murugesan, Frederick, Gilbert Rodreigo, Jeromios, Jayakumar and parish priests Panneerselvam, Venis Kumar, Jesuraj, Suseelan, Arul Raj, Jagdish, Clarence and many others spoke.

After concluding the hunger strike at 5:30, the struggle committee and Medha ji had a quick meeting to plan the future course of action. The committee decided to meet again on February 24, 2007 at Valliyoor.

**[II] Recent Events**

The Koodankulam struggle is picking up momentum. Most coastal villages in Tirunelveli, Thoothukudi and Kanyakumari districts and several farming villages in these districts have set up struggle committees. The people of Koodankulam took out a massive rally on March 17, 2007 demanding a CBI enquiry into the quality of the nuclear power plants construction.

The struggle committees of many farming and fishing villages held a consultation meeting on March 19, 2007 at Koodankulam and discussed the strategies for the March 31, 2007 public hearing at Tirunelveli collectorate.

The protest campaigns are spreading to neighbouring Kerala as well.

**[III] Idinthakarai Fast**

On March 24, 2007 some 6000 to 7000 people came together for a daylong fast and protest against the Koodankulam nuclear power project at Idinthakarai village near Koodankulam. The fasting demonstration began exactly at 10 am with a minute-long silence to remember the victims of recent Nandigram police firing. Following the felicitations of several parish priests, many anti-nuclear activists, women’s movement leaders, panchayat office-bearers, farmers, fishermen and youth spoke about the impending dangers of the Koodankulam nuclear power project and called for its immediate closure. There were street plays, music, songs, dance and slogan shouting in between passionate speeches.

At the end of the day, several resolutions were passed unanimously to oppose the project and reinforce the struggle.

**[IV] People’s Public Hearing in Thoothukudi**

The Anti-Nuclear Confederation organised “People’s Public Hearing” on March 30, 2007 at Thoothukudi. People of the area, retired judges, academics, economists, lawyers, nuclear, agricultural and fishery scientists participated in the programme. Victims of nuclear power plants and nuclear establishments from various parts of India presented their cases before the public hearing panel. On hearing the victims’ cases and stories and the experts’ comments and recommendations, the judges pronounced in their interim judgment that the Koodankulam nuclear plants were not in the best interests of the local people and called for immediate cessation of construction activities. The judges would give their final judgment later.

**[V] The people of Perumanal, Koothankuzhi and Chettikulam villages also are planning to organise daylong hunger strikes in their villages.**

Compiled by S. P. Udayakumar

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**B. Programmes in Delhi**

I. **One day Interactive Teacher’s Workshop on April 11 2007 at the India International Centre, New Delhi**

Teachers from sixteen schools from all over Delhi attended the workshop.

The session started with an introduction of resource persons and teachers followed by a briefing on the CNDP and its various activities.

Then Ms. Shalini Advani conducted the highly engaging inaugural session on learning methods and the ways to inculcate the habit of “thinking”.

Then Praful Bidwai took up the issue of radiation hazards on human health and environment. This was graphically illustrated in terms of international and Indian experiences. A short video clipping on Jadugoda was shown. This was followed by discussion.

The next session was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and its contemporary relevance led by Achin Vanaik. While delving into various aspects he specifically highlighted to the moral issue involved and the need to conscientise the students.

Post tea break, Ms. Anuradha Sen conducted the session on the importance of ‘Peace Education’ in schools. She brought out how the current methods of education inculcate aggression and violence by promoting competition. Hence the need to consciously focus on peace as a value. She also highlighted the need to facilitate critical thinking and suggested setting up of peace clubs in schools.

Satyajit Rath took the next session on “Science, Ethic and Education by questioning why we teach and what we are supposed to teach? He explained that we teach in order to gain an understanding of the world around us, to be self reliant, independent and autonomous. He further elaborated on the notion of just war. How the Geneva Convention made a distinction between
a combatant and non-combatant even in a war and the absolute criminal character of nuclear weapon in that context which makes no such distinction.

This was followed by a Strategy Session led by Anil Chaudhury. He highlighted the need to form networks of teachers to minimise dependence on specific individuals.

He also suggested formation of Peace Clubs of students and the desirability of bringing out news bulletins where activities have already picked up.

The following teachers signed up for volunteering:
Harpreet Kaur Ahuja, The Srijan School; Rahul Singhal, Salwan Public School; Mrs. Tharna Basu, The Srijan School; Ms. Sangeeta kadian Basava International School; Ms. Mangala Madhavan, Basava International School; Ms. Rakkhi Sharma, G.D. Goenka School; Ms. Savita Bibra, G.D. Goenka School; Vinita Sohanlal, DPS Mathura Road; Mrs. Chanchal Gurwan, DPS Mathura Road; Mrs. Sangeeta Narang, DPS Mathura Road; Ms. Richa Singh, Uttam School for Girls; Ms. Gurleen, Uttam School for Girls; Ms. Palavi Rawat, Salwan Public School.

II. The CNDP actively participated in the Action 2007 programme in Delhi launched on March 19 and which continued for more than a month.

This was a national programme where various peoples’ movements came together and raised their voices on various issues demanding redressal. It provided a unique opportunity to conscientise a large cross-section of social activists on the issue of nuclear disarmament and peace and also share their experiences and problems and fight together.

Achin Vanaik, Praful Bidwai, Anil Chaudhary et al actively participated on behalf of the CNDP.

C. Programme in Kolkata

On February 14 CNDP in collaboration with Anti-Nuclear Forum held a daylong national convention in central Kolkata against nuclear power with special focus on the proposed power plant in Haripur in East Medinipur district in West Bengal and the facilitating role to be played by the Indo-US nuclear deal under negotiation.

Gautam Sen introduced the convention. Prof. Sujay Basu delivered the welcome address. Samar Bagchi, Shyamali Khatstagir, Pranab Ghosh chaired the convention.

The speakers included Sukla Sen, Praful Bidwai, Surendra Gadekar, Sanghamitra Gadekar, Sandeep Pandey, V T Padmanabhan, K Nandini, K. Ramachandran, N.P. Samy Balakrishnan, Fr. Thomas Kocherry, Pradip Datta, Harekrishna Debnath and many others.

The local luminaries who spoke included Mahashweta Devi, Saoli Mitra, Debabrata Bandopadhyaya and Meher Engineer.

The convention resolved to provide all possible helps to the people struggling against the proposed Haripur power plant and also elsewhere.

A group of delegates from outside the state undertook the next day a trip to Haripur led by the local activists. Two well-attended public meetings were held – one in Kanthi and the other in Haripur.

On Feb. 16 a press conference was held back in Kolkata. Those who addressed included Gautam Sen, Pradip Datta, Sujay Basu, Sanghamitra Gadekar, Harekrishna Debnath, Meher Engineer, Praful Bidwai and Sukla Sen.

D. Action in Mumbai

CNDP in collaboration with the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), headquartered in Cairo and many other local organisations including the Vikas Adhyaya Kendra (VAK) to begin with held an International Seminar on Indo-US Nuclear ‘Deal’ on March 10-11 at the St. Pius College, Goregaon. Prof. Hari Sharma from SANSAD, Canada played a pivotal role. He unfortunately could not personally make it to the Seminar.

Sukla Sen introduced the Seminar. The welcome address was delivered by Admiral (Rtd.) Ramdas. Other speakers included Achin Vanaik, Ashim Roy, Praful Bidwai, Surendra Gadekar, M V Ramana, Sandeep Pandey, V T Padmanabhan, John Hallam (Australia), Theodore Orlin (USA), Eric Toussaint (Belgium), Ms. Hamsa Abd El-Hamid Genedy (Egypt), E A Vidyasekera (Sri Lanka) and A A M Marleen (Sri Lanka). A presentation by Prof. Hari Sharma was read out in absentia. Those who chaired various sessions included Fr. Allwyn D’Silva, Vijay Darp, Leslie Rodrigues, Sukla Sen and Sushovan Dhar.

A film by K P Sasi on the effects radiation on human health was also shown.

A resolution was unanimously passed opposing the ‘Deal’ to be sent to the Indian and global leaders. (Included elsewhere in the issue.)

A press conference was held on March 12. Those who addressed included: Ms. Hamsa Genedy (AAPSO), John Hallam (Friends of the Earth, Australia), Surendra Gadekar (CNDP), K P Sasi (filmmaker), Sukla Sen (CNDP), Simpreet Singh (NAPM).

E. The CNDP has brought out a four-page information-rich dossier on the India-US nuclear deal for the Indian parliamentarians and also public in general.
Two Open Letters

A. An Open Letter to the Indian PM and UPA Chairperson with Copies to UN Secretary General and Current Chair of the NAM

To:
The Prime minister of India, Sri Manmohan Singh, New Delhi
The Chairperson of the UPA, Smt. Sonia Gandhi, New Delhi

CC:
The UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, New York
The Incumbent Chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement
The President of Cuba, Mr. Raul Castro, Havana

Dear Sir / Madam,

Please find attached herewith the Resolution adopted, along with a short report on, at an “International Seminar” held in Mumbai, India on 10-11 March on the Indo-US nuclear deal, which is self explanatory.

The seminar was held at the initiative of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation headquartered in Cairo in collaboration with the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), India and a number of other local/international organisations (the list is included in the short report [not included here]). Friends of the Earth Australia is another prominent international organisation, which participated. The international organisations endorsing the seminar include, amongst others, the Mayors for Peace.

The demands raised are as under:

Quote

The government of India, given the grave multifaceted negative implications of this ongoing deal, must forthwith withdraw from all further negotiations with the US in this regard.

It must strive to regain its old prestige and influence, both moral and political, by opting to again play a meaningful leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement and other international alliances geared against imperialism, militarism and oriented towards a nuclear weapons free South Asia and the world.

The government of India is further urged to make global abolition of nuclear weapons its diplomatic priority and take up and pursue the issue vigorously with the NAM, UNGA and other international fora.

Unquote

A copy of the resolution and report in plain text is also reproduced below.

Hope, given the highly informed inputs from a number of Indian and international experts and activists of great acclaim, you will seriously consider the points made in the Resolution and readily accede to the demands made.

Thanking you.

Yours sincerely

Sukla Sen
CNDP, Mumbai
Resolution

The International Seminar on “Indo-US Nuclear ‘Deal’ - India, South Asia, NAM and the Global Order” held in Mumbai, on March 10-11 was organised by a number of local organisations, as per the attached list ‘A’, and endorsed/participated by the international organisations, as per the attached list ‘B’.

After due and in-depth deliberations in which a number of international and national experts and activists took part, the Seminar has resolved as under:

I. What the Deal Is All About?

The content of the ‘Deal’, which is currently being negotiated between India and the US, was first laid out the joint statement issued by the Indian Prime minister and the US President on July 18 2005 from Washington DC and then further reiterated on March 2 2006 in another joint statement by them issued from New Delhi incorporating the major elements of agreements between the countries reached till then. The signing of the Henry Hyde Act on December 18 2006, after protracted and nerve-wracking deliberations in the US Congress, by the US President towards amending its own Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to make the ‘Deal’ possible is a major step forward towards bringing the ‘Deal’ into force.

The ‘Deal’, in its essence, is meant to enable India, a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), henceforth to have ‘civilian’ nuclear trade – in terms of nuclear fuel, technology, plants, spares etc., with the US, and also other nations so desirous, by making a unique exception in case of India. India in return will have to designate, at its own options, its nuclear reactors into two categories – ‘civilian’ (for power production) and ‘strategic’ (for Bomb making), and ensure separation between the two. The ‘civilian’ reactors/plants only will be opened up for international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The nuclear trade will accordingly be limited to the ‘civilian’ reactors only. In case of the ‘strategic’ ones, there will be neither any inspection nor any trade.

II. When and How the ‘Deal’ Comes into Operation?

In order to bring the ‘Deal’ into force, India will have to further finalise the “123 agreement” with the US, laying down the specific scope and terms of cooperation and codifying the modes of separation between the ‘civilian’ and ‘strategic’ plants - and perhaps diluting some of the conditions incorporated in the Henry Hyde Act at the instance of the US Congress to which India is objecting; and conclude a treaty with the IAEA on the specific scope and terms of inspection.

Then the proposal will go to the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group so that it unanimously amends its rules, which as of now prohibits nuclear trade with India – being a non-signatory to the NPT, to accommodate the above two agreements reached between India, on the one hand, and the US and the IAEA on the other.

On succeeding in obtaining a green signal from the NSG, the whole package will go back to the two houses of the US Congress, which stands reconfigured since, for its final nod.

In the event of obtaining such, the US President would put his signature and the ‘Deal’ will eventually come into operation.

The Indian government, unlike its US counterpart, is not obligated to obtain any parliamentary approval.

III. Why the ‘Deal’ Must Be Opposed?

The ‘Deal’ as and when, and if at all, comes through will grievously undermine the current global regime of nuclear non-proliferation, as it is meant to make a unique exception in case India, in gross violation of the underlying principles of the NPT, and thereby also the prospects of global nuclear disarmament. The fact that Pakistan has been brusquely refused a similar deal by the US in spite of persistent clamouring and Iran is being demonstratively coerced to desist from developing its own nuclear fuel cycle technology, integral to nuclear power production allowed and encouraged under the Article IV of the NPT, further brings out graphically the abominable discriminatory nature of the ‘Deal’. Moreover, the lesson that one would tend to learn is that if one can weather the initial storms of international censures after breaking the non-proliferation taboo, things would normalise in a while. One
may even get rewarded in the process. This is sure to trigger off stepped up vertical and horizontal proliferations.

Moreover, by enabling India to import fuel, natural or enriched uranium, from abroad, the ‘Deal’ would make it possible for India to use the indigenously produced uranium exclusively for Bomb-making. This possible escalation in its fissile material production capacity is, in all likelihood, push Pakistan further to nuclearise even at a great cost, and thereby aggravate tensions and accelerate arms race in the region with spine-chilling consequences.

It’d also further cement the growing (unequal) strategic ties between the US and India and thereby would add momentum to the US project for unfettered global dominance and Indian craze to emerge as a global power basking in the reflected glory of the global headman. It’d just not only undermine India’s position as a founding and leading member of the NAM, it’d also pose a very serious challenge to the NAM and its objectives in terms of radically raised level of US domination on the global scene.

India’s rather meek submission to highly deplorable and dangerous threats issued and postures adopted by the Bush regime in relation to Iran and its nuclear programme instead of trying to find a just and fair solution in terms of having a Weapons of Mass Destruction free Middle-East including Israel is a clear and extremely worrisome pointer. India’s keenness to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) initiated by the US to interdict any vessel in international waters suspected of carrying (unauthorised!) nuclear materials, in gross violation of all international laws and also the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme of the US are another two highly disturbing indicators.

India’s growing closeness with Israel, the frontline state of the US in the Middle East, would also pick up further pace in the process.

This ‘Deal’ would obviously distort India’s energy options by diverting scarce resources to developments of resource-guzzling, intrinsically hazardous and potentially catastrophic, nuclear power at the cost of ecologically benign renewable sources of energy.

This would, furthermore, provide a strong boost to the nuclear industry worldwide, particularly the potential suppliers from the US. And that’s precisely why the business lobby in the US is working overtime to get the ‘Deal’ clinched.

The recent visit by the Russian President Vladimir Putin to India as the guest of honour at the Republic Day event and his public commitment to supply additional nuclear reactors to India and work for the safe passage of the ‘Deal’ through the NSG underscores the convergence of interests of the nuclear power lobbies worldwide as regards the ‘Deal’ and the new market that it is promising to open up.

IV. We Demand

The government of India, given the grave multifaceted negative implications of this ongoing deal, must forthwith withdraw from all further negotiations with the US in this regard.

It must strive to regain its old prestige and influence, both moral and political, by opting to again play a meaningful leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement and other international alliances geared against imperialism, militarism and oriented towards a nuclear weapons free South Asia and the world.

The government of India is further urged to make global abolition of nuclear weapons its diplomatic priority and take up and pursue the issue vigorously with the NAM, UNGA and other international fora.

V. The Seminar also decides to send a copy of this Resolution to the Prime Minister of India, the Chairperson of the ruling UPA – Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the incumbent chair of the NAM – the Cuban government, and also the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon.

It also urges the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to turn down the proposal to amend its rule to accommodate the ‘Deal’, as and when it come sup for discussions.
The first Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review will meet in Vienna from 30 April – 11 May 2007. This meeting takes place against the background of increased international tension around nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, proliferation and disarmament, and against an increased need to make real progress in a balanced manner on both disarmament and non-proliferation.

Continued failure to progress on either nuclear disarmament or on non-proliferation is likely to lead to a non-proliferation breakout in which an increasing number of nations have fingers on nuclear triggers, and in which nuclear doctrines are adopted by the established nuclear weapons powers that also make the actual use of nuclear weapons more and more likely. The continuance of this process without a change in direction will lead inexorably to the actual use of nuclear weapons by madness, malice, miscalculation or malfunction. The rumours, justified or otherwise that nuclear weapons might possibly be used by the US against Iran is in this context, most disturbing.

Article VI of the NPT mandates real progress toward the elimination of nuclear arsenals by the existing NWS. Progress on article VI obligations is essential of the world is not to slide toward an abyss in which the actual use of nuclear weapons becomes more and more likely. The lowering of operating status is a vital first step that must be taken in conjunction with other measures on both the disarmament and the nonproliferation side to achieve real progress toward the fulfilment of article VI of the NPT and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

TO:
NPT PREPCOM DELEGATES, AMBASSADORS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS
RE: NPT PREPCOM

Dear Foreign Minister, Ambassador, or NPT Prepcom Delegate:

The urgency of progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons was recently pointed to by the previous Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a speech at Princeton University on 28 Nov, by the World Summit of Nobel Peace-Prize winners on 30 Nov (The ‘Rome Declaration’), by Mohamed El Baradei on 9 Jan 2007, by the turning forward of the hands of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ‘Doomsday Clock’ on 17 Jan 2007, and by Op-Ed pieces in the Wall street Journal by Henry Kissinger, Schultz, Perry and Nunn, and by Mikhail Gorbachev. The European Parliament on 14 March passed a resolution in which it stressed the urgency of
making real progress toward nuclear disarmament.

**According to the Rome Declaration:**

“We, Nobel Peace Laureates and Laureate Organizations, gathered in Rome, Italy, have for years been deeply disturbed by the lack of public attention and political will at the highest levels of state paid to the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. There are over 27,000 of these devices threatening civilisation, with over 95% in the hands of Russia and the US. This danger threatens everyone and thus every person must work to eliminate this risk before it eliminates us.”

**Kofi Annan noted that:**

“ I said earlier this year that we are “sleepwalking towards disaster”. In truth, it is worse than that - We are asleep at the controls of a fast-moving aircraft. Unless we wake up and take control, the outcome is all too predictable.”

While according to El Baradei:

“In addition to non-proliferation, it is also important to make progress on the second leg of the NPT - namely, the commitment by the nuclear weapon States to proceed in good faith towards complete nuclear disarmament. We should always remember that the goal of the NPT is a world free of nuclear weapons. But over 35 years after its entry into force, we still have nine countries that possess nuclear weapons, we still have 27,000 warheads in existence, and we still have more than 30 countries that are members of alliances that rely on nuclear weapons as part of their security structure. It is becoming more and more clear that a continuation of the status quo will render the nuclear non-proliferation regime dysfunctional.”

Annan, the Rome Declaration, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Advisory Board of 18 nobel prize - winners, Kissinger, Schultz et al in the Op Ed, and Mikhail Gorbachev all emphasised, as either a first step or a very high priority step, the need to revise strategic doctrines to lessen dependence on nuclear weapons and to remove nuclear weapons from high-alert status, as a first step in a comprehensive nuclear disarmament/nonproliferation menu in which other high priority items were the universal signature and ratification of the CTBT, negotiation of a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty, negative security assurances, and a tightening of IAEA safeguards. The need for a balanced approach incorporating progress on both disarmament and nonproliferation was also stressed.

We call on participants in the Prepcom and the 2010 review Conference to press for the following priority measures to be taken:

- The lowering of nuclear weapons alert status, particularly but not only, between the US and Russia.
- The review of strategic doctrines to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in those doctrines
- Full ratification and entry-into-force of the nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT)
- Immediate negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (FMCT)
- Legal assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states
- Strengthening systems for the verified and irreversible reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals, notably US and Russian arsenals.

We call on all participants in the 2007 NPT Prepcom and the 2010 NPT Review to commit to making real progress toward the fulfilment of commitments to the elimination of nuclear weapons that have been in place since the treaty was signed and that have been reiterated by the 1995 Review Conference, the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, and the Year 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

We call on participants in the Prepcom and the Review Conference to advance on, and not to retreat from or go back on, the commitments entered into in 1995 and 2000, in particular the 13 steps.

We call for real progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons at the 2007 NPT Prepcom and the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Signed:

John Hallam
Nuclear Weapons Campaigner **Friends of the Earth Australia**

Joint Coordinator, Appeal by 44 Nobels and 362 NGOs/Parliamentarians on Nuclear Weapons Operating Status

Doug Mattern, President, **Association of World Citizens**, San Francisco

Irene Gale, **Australian Peace Committee**

Alyn Ware, Vice-President, **International Peace Bureau**, Geneva

Ak Malten, **Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance**, The Hague,

Alfred L. Marder, **International Association of Peace Messenger Cities**.
A Document

Nuclear Weapons Today

The Problem is 27,000 nuclear weapons

Nuclear weapons are not like other weapons - there is no other weapon that can kill hundreds of millions of people in a few hours and bring about the end of human civilisation. According to the Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in January 2007, 50 of today’s nuclear weapons could kill 200 million people.

The 27,000 nuclear weapons in existence are illegal, immoral and genocidal; they can destroy our cities, health, water catchments and our food chain, and they routinely deplete funds and attention from achieving human security. Nuclear weapons have no legitimate purpose. To possess them and thereby threaten their use is utterly immoral. They are the ultimate weapons of terror.

Nuclear weapons are futile against any of today’s real security threats. Nuclear weapon cannot address climate change, depletion of water and environmental degradation, poverty, hunger, overpopulation, pandemics such as AIDS or avian flu, failing states, non-state armed groups or terrorists, organised crime, or trafficking in drugs, people and arms.

In fact, nuclear weapons budgets and policies make most of these problems much worse because they divert enormous financial and technical resources from where they are really needed. In addition, the development of nuclear weapons directly adds to environmental degradation, and breed mistrust rather than cooperation between nations:

Estimating the Risk
Who has the Weapons?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>16,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>120-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>30-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>75 - 200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Legally Binding Legal Disarmament Obligations Violated

In 1970 the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force. Today all but four countries in the world are parties to this treaty, which binds nuclear weapons states to an obligation to disarmament through Article VI of the Treaty.

The International Court of Justice reaffirmed the legal obligation to disarm in 1996. Despite these binding international agreements, we see no signs that the nuclear weapon states intend to eliminate their nuclear weapons. On the contrary, some nuclear weapon states now talk openly about battlefield uses for their weapons. This threat drives more countries to seek to acquire their own nuclear weapons as a route to prestige and power.

The United States

US budgets for nuclear-weapon work have soared. Millions are being spent at the Nevada nuclear-test site to ensure it is ready to resume nuclear testing within 18 months of any political decision being taken. In order to maintain expertise, non-nuclear or subcritical tests are being conducted, which simulate all parts of a nuclear weapon except the explosion itself. The Department of Energy plans to spend almost $90m in fiscal year 2008, and $300m over the next few years to develop the first of the Reliable Replacement Warhead group of warheads. This new weapon would replace the W-76 Trident warhead in service with the US Navy.

Russia

For the past several years, Russia has advocated an agreement reducing U.S. and Russian strategic warheads to 1,500 warheads or fewer. However, in September 2005 President Putin said that Russia was developing “new strategic high-precision systems” that can alter “course and height.” The purpose behind such
capabilities is to make a warhead a more elusive target for anti-missile systems, such as those the United States is pursuing, a point Russian officials repeatedly emphasize. In 2006 Russia conducted its first flight test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and reportedly a successful test of a new warhead.

The United Kingdom

The UK is contemplating replacement of the Trident submarine-based nuclear weapon system, which the Parliament supported in March 2007 in a strongly contested vote. The UK has extended its nuclear-weapon cooperation agreement with the United States for another ten years. The UK announced in 2006 its intent to spend just over £1,000 million over the next three years on refurbishing key facilities at its nuclear-weapons complex. This includes new facilities for assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons and the handling of high explosives and weapons-grade uranium, as well as a new high-energy laser facility. It also plans to recruit over 1,000 new staff over three years.

France

In January 2006, President Chirac stated that France would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in response to terrorism. Laboratory-based expansion of French nuclear-weapon design, development and production capacities has been under way for a number of years. For example, over US$ 3,000 million is being spent on a new high-energy laser facility. France is expected to start testing a new missile for its submarine-launched nuclear warheads, which will have an increased range, and it is also working on improving the capabilities of its air-launched nuclear delivery vehicle along with a more “robust” warhead, the tête nucléaire aeroportée.

China

China is engaged in a nuclear weapons modernisation programme.

Initially China was interested in replacing older missile systems for more modern designs but increasingly China has predictably become concerned with US plans to construct a ballistic missile defence system and to place other weapons in space, and is likely to increase is nuclear arsenal in response. Recently the US military drew up formal plans for a major military conflict with China that would include the use of nuclear weapons. Zhu Chenghu, a senior Chinese general responded to this development by warning that Beijing is ready to use nuclear weapons in response.

The Case Against Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons are acutely dangerous:

♦ The presence of nuclear weapons poses an unnecessary danger to citizens because nuclear weapons are themselves targets.
♦ Due to human or technical error nuclear weapons could be fired accidentally or in response to faulty intelligence or misinterpreted signals. This particularly applies to the thousands of US and Russian nuclear weapons that are kept on high alert.
♦ Nuclear weapons are an invitation for theft and attack by potential rogue, terrorist and non-state networks. Terrorist networks have already identified such possibilities.
♦ Specifically Al-Qaeda has plotted attacks against NATO nuclear weapons bases in both Belgium and Turkey.

Information is lacking about the extent of potential safety and security dangers resulting from the presence of nuclear weapons. However, it can be concluded that contingency planning (including making available information about what to do in the event of a nuclear weapons-related accident) is inadequate.

The existence of nuclear weapons fuels proliferation:

♦ Repeatedly, high-level reports, including most recently the report “Weapons of Terror” from the UN Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix, have affirmed the inextricable links between non-proliferation and disarmament, as have former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and former senior US officials Robert McNamara, George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn. They recognise that it is only when nuclear weapons are seen to
have reduced security utility and symbolic power that others will not seek them. The Canberra Commission stated, “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to others to acquire them”.

♦ Chinese nuclear weapons were a significant factor in India’s decision to build the bomb, and Pakistan similarly felt threatened by India’s weapons.
♦ The continued presence of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe reinforces the status attached to these weapons.
♦ The presence of US nuclear weapons in Korean Peninsula waters is repeatedly stated as the pretext for the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are too expensive:
♦ Nuclear weapons drain enormous human and economic resources. According to the Brookings Institution, the US alone spent $5.8 trillion on nuclear weapons from the early 1940s – 1996.
♦ No one knows how much it will cost to clean up leaking waste sites or store weapons-related nuclear wastes for many thousands of years.
♦ In late 2004, the Natural Resources Defense Council estimated, “Approximately $40 billion, or about 10% of the annual military budget is spent on US nuclear weapons.”
♦ In 2004/2005, China (62.5 billion), Russia (61.9 billion), the UK (51.1 billion), Japan (44.7 billion) and France (41.6 billion) spent more than $40 billion in total on their militaries.
♦ The opportunity cost of this expenditure is staggering. In all the nuclear weapons states, weapons programmes divert scarce funds away from health care, education and other essential services.
♦ What else could $40 billion be used for? According to the 1998 UN Human Development Report, the additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal access to basic education for all, basic health care, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food and clean water and safe sewers would amount to roughly $40 billion a year.

Nuclear weapons are undemocratic – the majority want disarmament:
♦ Every major decision taken by governments that developed nuclear weapons was done in the absence of full cabinet knowledge, let alone approval of the population. Therefore, the decision to develop nuclear weapons was in each case undemocratic, and led to the establishment of secret institutions, policies and practices which erode trust and undermine security.
♦ Nuclear disarmament is the democratic wish of the majority of the world’s countries and citizens. The vast majority of countries (182) do not have and do not want nuclear weapons, with only a handful (9 countries) possessing them. Poll results reveal that the vast majority of citizens want nuclear disarmament. See www.ICANw.org for poll results.

Nuclear weapons do not keep the peace:
♦ 27,000 nuclear weapons are deployed [or stored] on land, sea and air, threatening cities, water, and people, posing a constant threat of nuclear annihilation and radioactive contamination. This cannot be called peace. Nuclear weapons states have been involved in more wars than non-nuclear weapons states. Between 1945 and 1997, nuclear weapons states have fought in an average of 5.2 wars, while non-nuclear weapons states averaged about 0.67 wars. Nuclear weapons did not prevent wars involving nuclear weapons states in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Falklands or Iraq.
♦ Nuclear weapons in fact intensify mistrust, often where it is already in short supply. The fear created by the mere suspicion of nuclear weapons in Iraq was used to unleash a catastrophic war in that country in 2003. The issue of nuclear weapons greatly heightens tension between Iran and Western nations.
♦ A further example of nuclear weapons representing an impediment to peace can be found in the case of past US nuclear deployments in Taiwan.
♦ Following US President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972 and a secret pledge, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from Taiwan in order to improve relations with China.
Nuclear weapons are unusable:
♦ Nuclear weapons are futile against any of today’s real security threats.
♦ Nuclear weapons cannot address climate change, depletion of water & environmental degradation, poverty, hunger, overpopulation, pandemics such as AIDS or avian flu, failing states, non state armed groups or terrorists, organised crime, or trafficking in drugs, people and arms.
♦ Nuclear weapons have no value tactically because they have no battlefield utility. They have no value in the long term since nuclear disarmament is an affirmed universal goal, nor in the near term since they intensify mistrust precisely where building trust is most needed.
♦ Military commanders in both Europe and the US believe that they do not have any utility. The US Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces recommended that the nuclear capability of “forward-based, tactical, dual-capable aircraft should be eliminated because there is ‘no obvious military need for these systems’.” Seymour Hersh noted that in the case of Iran, US generals concluded that the nuclear option was politically untenable.
♦ In particular, nuclear weapons are worse than useless against terrorists.
♦ Terrorists cannot be targeted with nuclear weapons or deterred by them. As noted above, however, the weapons may be a target for terrorist activity.

Nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and illegal:
♦ Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive capacity. A single weapon can devastate a city, or even a nation, in an instant. They do not discriminate between civilians and combatants.
♦ The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the judicial branch of the UN, and the highest court in the world on general questions of international law. In its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons, the ICJ concluded that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” In making their cases, the nuclear weapon states failed to demonstrate to the Court that any use of nuclear weapons, including a “clean” use involving “low yield” weapons, could comply with legal requirements or avoid catastrophic escalation.
♦ The Court stated, a “fundamental” and “intransgressible” rule under humanitarian law is that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” It is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or aggravating their suffering. Under humanitarian law, the ICJ also stated, “methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, … the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for such requirements”. Self-defence warrants “only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it”.

In the event of a nuclear attack, there will be no effective medical response
♦ Nuclear weapons cause intense firestorms, hurricane force winds and irradiation. Victims suffer burns, melting or vaporisation of body parts, multiple fractures and other blast injuries, blindness and radiation sickness. Any medical services that survived an attack would be overwhelmed by the scale of human suffering. Most of the injured survivors would not even receive pain relief, let alone treatment. Many of the survivors would subsequently develop cancers.
♦ The effects of radiation sickness include blood component changes, fatigue, diarrhoea, nausea and death. These effects will develop within hours, days or weeks, depending on the size of the dose. The larger the dose, the sooner a given effect will occur.
If the damage to the DNA code occurs in a reproductive cell (egg or sperm) the coding error may be passed onto offspring, resulting potentially in birth defects and cancers in the children.

Uranium miners are exposed to radioactive radon gas, and consistently suffer increased rates of lung cancer. Uranium mining is the most ecologically damaging phase of the production of nuclear power. Mine tailings (waste) contain 85% of the radioactivity of the original ore. One of the major isotopes in uranium mine tailings is thorium-230, whose half-life is 75,000 years. While tailings ponds can be lined to try to prevent leaching into the surrounding soil, time frames of this order make a mockery of assurances about long-term safety.

**Nuclear disarmament is reasonable and achievable:**
- Reductions of nuclear weapons to date prove that elimination of the remaining weapons is physically and practically achievable.
- Negotiations and treaties have dealt with other weapons systems, such as chemical and biological weapons.
- The failure to take full advantage of the immediate post-cold war opportunity for nuclear disarmament is seriously regrettable, but the window of opportunity to rid the world of nuclear weapons remains wide open in light of the complete lack of utility of nuclear weapons, prevailing public opinion against their use and threat, the simplicity of the solution of removal, and the great potential benefits.
- Removal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe would facilitate global nuclear disarmament. It is an element of the 13 steps towards complete nuclear disarmament identified in 2000 by the 187 countries party to the NPT. For the US, withdrawing its B-61 bombs from Europe is something it can offer to address its own poor disarmament record.

[Source: http://www.icanw.org/nuclear-weapons-today/]

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### Membership Form

**Annual Membership Fee:** Students Rs. 20,

Name:

Organisation:

Address:

Please mail your Draft/Cheque, drawn in favour of “PEACE-CNDP”, payable at New Delhi, to CNDP

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### CNDP

The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) is India’s national network of over 200 organisations, including grassroots groups, mass movements and advocacy organisations, as well as individuals. Formed in November 2000, CNDP demands that India and Pakistan roll back their nuclear weapons programmes. Our emphasis:

- No to further nuclear testing
- No to induction and deployment of nuclear weapons
- Yes to global and regional nuclear disarmament

CNDP works to raise mass awareness through schools and colleges programmes, publications, audio and visual materials, and campaigning and lobbying at various levels.

CNDP membership is open to both individuals and organisations. So if you believe nuclear weapons are evil and peace is important, fill in the Membership Form!