Peace Now!
The ‘foreign policy’ of a country or State essentially encompasses the formulation of doctrines - to define and shape the relationships of that particular country under the incumbent regime with the outside world in the global and regional contexts, and their actual working out.

The ‘foreign policy’ cannot but be strongly linked to the domestic policy. For one, it is essentially the same larger body of elite consisting of state managers and ‘opinion leaders’ etc. - notwithstanding their specific specialisations and niches, formulates the both. And it is the same range of interests, and ideology, that informs in both the domains.

Nevertheless, one is not the simple extension of the other.

While the domestic policy, particularly in a ‘democratic’ set up, is rather widely and hotly debated and contested; the interest in ‘foreign policy’, except in exceptional times, remains by and large limited to an exclusive body of ‘experts’. It is considered rather esoteric with little immediate bearing on the lives of the masses.

This, however, is a gross misconception. The simplest and the most evident example would be the case of war.

Foreign policy is usually further mystified cloaked in “national interests”.

Independent India, its emergence rooted in the specificities of decades long huge anti-colonial mass struggles and the British colonial rule for about two centuries that it eventually overturned, charted out a specific and well thought out path for itself.

Its foreign policy, from the very beginning but more so since the emergence of the People’s Republic of China at its very doorstep and the US backing up Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir, took a broad anti-colonial and anti-imperialist orientation, notwithstanding its own supremacist designs vis-à-vis the extended neighbourhood. This, however, did not deter it from actively engaging with both the major contesting global camps of the day, while maintaining some, even if fluctuating and asymmetrical, distances from the both. India’s role as an active proponent of the doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence, since 1955 Bandung Conference, and its emergence as a major driver of the Non-Aligned Movement, formally launched in Belgrade in 1961, are just two most tangible manifestations.

However, the self-image and the perception of self-interest of the Indian elite, which itself underwent a very significant metamorphosis on account of the generational changes and, more importantly, the socio-economic developments initiated and engineered by the Indian State under its stewardship, evolved and changed over the decades.

In the outside world, at the same time, the mighty wave of decolonisation, rather paradoxically, came to a virtual close with the final and humiliating defeat of the US imperialism in Vietnam by the mid-seventies. The Soviet Bloc collapsed, virtually overnight, between 89 and 91. Neo-liberalism gained respectability since early eighties and became the reigning economic doctrine on the global scale some time thereafter. India adopted it with evident gusto particularly since 1991.

Consequently the foreign policy, as a tool of promoting "national interest" as perceived and formulated by the ruling elite, also kept on taking a very different hue.
Of late these changes are getting much starker and alarming with the frank jettisoning of old practices and ethical posturing, courting of new friends, and shameless cosying up to the global hegemon in a determined bid, further spurred by the recent economic upswing, to emerge as a mini hegemon.

The overt nuclearisation of South Asia in May '98 and India's role vis-à-vis the ongoing turmoil in West Asia are two very important markers in this unfolding process. So is the yet-to-be-wrapped-up Indo-US nuke deal. Apart from its grave fallout on the nuclear scenario, both globally and regionally, it'd also mark a new breaking ground in the context of the continually evolving Indo-US relationship. Some observers have even compared this development with Nixon's visit to Mao's China in the early seventies. And the intertwining of India's foreign policy and the nuclear policy had never been so salient, with so very menacing proportions. The foreign policy establishment, headed by the Prime Minister himself, has been desperately pressed into service to engineer safe delivery of the nuke 'deal', without any spectacular success though. The anti-nuke peace activists in India are also at the moment grimly engaged with the issue in all its dimensions.

This overwhelming concern of the day is then the central focus of the current issue; its different aspects have been looked into and elaborately examined from a number of different angles and positions including in the context of the overall global scenario.

Just before going to the press, North Korea claimed to have carried out its own first explosive nuclear test. This has sent out ripples of concern all across. Consequently we have devoted pages to this momentous development. Apart from that, a number of other related issues have also been taken up.

The issue of denuclearisation of South Asia has been dealt with by two leading figures representing the peace movement in Pakistan. Indo-Pak peace process has been dealt with special reference to the Pak President's just published and much discussed autobiography. The importance of Peace Education in building up an environ of Peace and also an effective peace movement is another important topic taken up.

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**CNDP Press Release on North Korean Nuke Test**

The CNDP condemns the nuclear test by North Korea. This act will only further raise nuclear tensions regionally and globally and help accelerate existing plans of the United States for the construction of Ballistic Missile Defence systems and Theatre Missile Defence systems and entice other countries to take shelter under its "protective umbrella".

The existing nuclear weapons states (including India) have, for very obvious reasons, no moral or political right to criticise North Korea when they themselves have rationalised their own possession of nuclear weapons and thereby promoted the proliferation of such weapons. It is they, and the US in particular, thereby bear the primary responsibility for the failure of the current non-proliferation regime based on the NPT.

At any rate, sanctions which hurt the people of North Korea is not the path to take.

It is well known that North Korea has declared its willingness to abjure such weapons in return for security assurances from the US and full normalisation of political/diplomatic relations between the two countries. It is the US that has opposed this and pressure must be brought on it to return to the negotiating table and take this eminently sensible path and desist from any further brinkmanship and adventurism.
I
Nuclear Threats Today: Global and Local
Thank you for inviting me to this global citizens’ assembly. I am honoured to be here and to share with you my understanding of what has happened on the nuclear weapons front in South Asia and its neighbouring region of West Asia or Middle East. I will divide my presentation into three parts. 1) The India-Pakistan nuclear standoff since the 1998 tests and what civil society organizations (CSOs) concerned about the nuclearisation of South Asia think and propose. 2) The Indo-US Nuclear deal and what it means to both sides. 3) The Issue of Iran.

The India-Pakistan Face-Off

Eight years since the 1998 tests we have witnessed both the dangerous rise of nuclear tensions and their relative decline. There was the 1999 Kargil War - the most significant military conflict ever between two nuclearly equipped rivals outdoing the far more muted China-USSR Ussuri River conflict. Then there was the 10 month long period between 2001 and 2002 when over a million troops were mobilized on the border between the two countries - the largest and longest such active military mobilization between any two countries in peacetime since World War Two. On both occasions, preparations for readying a nuclear attack or retaliation were made on both sides.

If since then, the nuclear fever has subsided with both sides easing political tensions and agreeing to promote more people-to-people contact (the new bus service) across the Kashmir border, this has not resulted in a significant advance towards making South Asia nuclear free or even nuclearly ‘safer’. India, the more powerful country has been the guiltier one in this respect. Since his accession to power, General Musharraf has publicly declared on a number of occasions his willingness to move towards a denuclearized South Asia if India was also willing to do so. No doubt these offers are substantially an exercise in diplomatic one-upmanship - on one occasion Musharraf aimed to counter the Indian suggestion that Pakistan should also adopt like India a No First Use (NFU) policy by saying he was prepared to go much further in accepting a South Asia nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ). But sincere or not, India has never dared to take Musharraf up on these offers.

Meanwhile both countries are moving ahead to extend the range and accuracy of their missile systems and to accumulate higher stocks of bombs and fissile materials. Serious nuclear risk-reduction measures have only been put forward by members of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) and the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC). These include proposals for 1) having an agreed area of equal length on both sides of the border where no short-range missiles are to be deployed. 2) India accepting Pakistan’s proposal for a No War Pact in return for Pakistan, like India, adopting a NFU posture. 3) A joint agreement to de-mate warheads from
delivery systems and the storage of warheads under some form of national monitoring that ensures a substantial and equal time lag as regards possibly recoupling of warheads and delivery systems. 4) A permanent bilateral test ban treaty and the permanent closing of the Indian and Pakistani test sites of Pokharan and Chagai. 5) Kashmir on both sides of the border to become a NWFZ. This would have no practical effect in the sense that neither country deploys nuclear weapons systems in Kashmir. But it would be a major political statement by both governments to the rest of the world that they would not allow Kashmir to become a 'nuclear flashpoint'.

In addition, CSOs have raised the issue of a South Asian NWFZ as well as the idea of Bangladesh joining the Bangkok Treaty suitably stretched to accommodate it; and Nepal declaring itself, like Mongolia and Austria, a nuclear-free nation. These measures would not substitute for a South Asian NWFZ but should be seen as transitional measures helping to move towards that goal.

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal

There are three dimensions - the strategic-political, the nuclear weapons, the nuclear energy dimension - to this deal. For the US, the first is the most important. The establishment and consolidation of a strategic partnership and close alliance between India and the US is worth the price of rewriting the rules hitherto existing, domestic and international (the Nuclear Suppliers Group or NSG) against encouraging nuclear weapons proliferation. Giving international legitimacy to India’s status as a nuclear weapons power is not a problem since India promises to be an enduring ally and the US has always had a selective, hypocritical and dishonest attitude towards matters of nuclear proliferation.

India is going some way along with the US in its efforts to squeeze Iran - witness the Sept. 2005 Indian vote at the IAEA governing body - helping the US and the West to shift the Iran issue to the Security Council where it becomes possible in the future to impose international sanctions on Iran. Moreover, India has already declared its willingness to be a part of the US’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) systems, and of its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The former ensures a continuing nuclear arms race with Russia and China as well militarising-nuclearising outer space - hardly the route towards global nuclear disarmament! The PSI is an illegal arrangement in violation of existing laws on behaviour in the high seas aimed at enabling the US and allies to arbitrarily interdict ‘enemy’ ships even merely suspected of carrying nuclear-related materials of any sort. Neither Japan nor India has shown any courage in opposing the nuclearly irresponsible behaviour of the US as embodied in these programmes; indeed they are accomplices.

For India the deal is widely seen as beneficial in all respects. There is much support among the Indian elite and 'middle class' for the strategic alliance with the US. There is delight that India’s nuclear status is now being legitimised internationally. If the deal goes through the US Congress in essentially its original negotiated form and is also accepted by the NSG then India will be able to import all the uranium it needs for expanding its civilian nuclear programme, while reserving its indigenous uranium sources for expanding its unsafeguarded nuclear military programme.

The Iran Issue

For some considerable time but especially after 9/11, the US has decided that certain countries like Iran must not only not have nuclear weapons but must be prevented from even having the capability make them. This means the US must intervene into the civilian programmes of
such countries to make sure they cannot have full control over the nuclear fuel cycle given the inherently dual-use character of civilian nuclear programmes. This intervention is, of course, selective, since a number of non-nuclear powers who like Iran are signatories to the NPT, such as Japan and Germany to name only two, do have full control over their nuclear fuel cycles.

Fear of Iran’s nuclear weapons potential is only a part of the reason why the US wishes to orchestrate Iran’s international isolation and to prepare the grounds for possible sanctions and even a military attack on it. The much larger part of the reason for the US squeeze has nothing to do with its nuclear weapons potential but with its geo-strategic goal of dominating the Middle East or West Asia and in regard to which project Iran stands as a major if not the major obstacle in the American path. Its nuclear behaviour serves as a convenient excuse to justify US pursuit of these larger ambitions. India has with typical hypocrisy justified its stand with the US against Iran by declaring that it does not want a nuclear neighbour and the instability this would create. This is ironic to say the least, coming as it does from an India that was responsible for nuclearising South Asia and declaring that India and Pakistan going nuclear would enhance regional stability!

If India and the US are truly worried about Iran’s potential to go nuclear, they should push strongly for the early and unconditional establishment of a Middle East NWFZ or better still a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ). This is something that Iran and all the members of the League of Arab States have supported for decades. It is Israel that has filibustered any such proposal by insisting that it would only accept this in the context of an “overall peace settlement” which may take decades to arrive, if at all it emerges given Israel’s determination to prevent any just settlement of the Israel-Palestine issue. The US of course backs Israel and India keeps its mouth shut on this issue of a MEWMDFZ for fear of offending its other new ally, Israel.

As for the inherent problem of securing transparency in the civilian nuclear programmes of countries, here the proposal to push forward is the establishment of an updated version of what the Nobel Peace Prize winner Alva Myrdal of Sweden once demanded of the NPT but never got. This updated version of her idea would be the call for establishing a new multilateral treaty demanding complete transparency in the civilian nuclear programmes of all countries, whether nuclear weapons states (NWSs) or non-NWSs. The NWSs would still be able to retain and develop their nuclear weapons even via their civilian programmes. But they would have to provide complete information about their civilian programmes and of such diversions. Instead of singling out countries like Iran, this would be a universal and impartial treaty to be monitored and verified by an independent agency established for this very purpose by the treaty and would be a body other than the IAEA that has shown itself, for example in cases like Iran and Iraq, to be biased and manipulated by powerful countries like the US.
“Dialogue between Governmental Representatives and NGOs for a Nuclear-Free, Peaceful and Just World”

Presentation at Panel Discussion on 8 August 2006, Nagasaki

Sukla Sen
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, India

Respected Members of the Chair, Other Distinguished Dignitaries on the Panel and Dear Friends and Comrades,

I now propose to make only a brief initial presentation on the theme of quick abolition of nuclear weapons from a specific angle which I’ll elaborate as I go along. The essential points made now will be enlarged upon later during the interactive session.

My presentation will have three sections: first, I’ll very briefly touch upon the uniqueness of nuclear weapons as an instrument of deliberate and indiscriminate mass murder on a mind boggling scale; then I’ll try to present a bird’s eye view of the developments on the nuclear front in the global arena during the last decade; and finally, as the representative of the anti-nuke peace movement in India, I’ll deliberate the Indo-US nuke ‘deal’, which, if eventually implemented, will have a serious bearing on the course of events in the coming days.

As regards the question why it is at all necessary to work wholeheartedly and with single-minded determination towards quick abolition of the nuclear weapon, we have to investigate and underscore its uniqueness as a weapon of deliberate mass murder.

The nuclear weapon is unique just not in terms of its instant destructive effects caused by terrible blast and heat - way beyond the limits of conventional explosives, but it’s also unique as it keeps on killing and maiming silently and invisibly through nuclear radiation emitted for decades and decades punishing cruelly even unborn generations, and at times, in faraway lands beyond national boundaries. Not only the hapless targets of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, but also the unintended victims of the Chernobyl disaster twenty years back - mostly in Belarus and Ukraine but also elsewhere in Europe in this regard provide the most tragic and graphic evidences. It is precisely this that makes the weapon a unique and absolute evil regardless of the holder.

Now I come to the second part.

Just over a decade back, in 1995, the NPT was indefinitely extended without any concrete commitment from the five recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) as regards a time-bound disarmament programme. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that, however, came up in the process as a sort of inadequate but nevertheless a positive move towards global disarmament most unfortunately failed to
be born in any meaningful sense. The major impediments were firstly Indian intransigence and subsequently the refusal of the US Senate to grant the mandatory ratification. This development had a profoundly negative impact and seriously undermined the mood of tentative optimism that had been generated in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The 2000 NPT Review Conference was, however, a modest success. The NWSs renewed their commitment to nuclear disarmament and, even more importantly, thirteen practical steps were laid out to commence a purposeful journey in that direction. The change in regime in the US soon after with George Bush grabbing the Presidential throne in January 2001 however changed all that. It inaugurated an almost uninterrupted journey downhill. Since then gross and brazen unilateralism has emerged as the most significant marker of the policies of the Bush regime propelled by its relentless drive for unfettered global dominance nicknamed as the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Towards this goal the regime has unashamedly foregrounded its awesome military might, including the nuclear firepower, to make up for the deficiencies of its otherwise huge economic muscles and political/diplomatic clout. It soon reactivated its nuclear arsenal development programme including tactical and earth-penetrating nukes and launched the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Programme unilaterally scrapping the 1972 ABM Treaty. But the most significant development was unarguably its savage War on Iraq launched in March 2003 to gain control over its oil and in turn the lifeline of the global economy. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the 2005 NPT Review Conference ended in a stalemate. The positive hopes generated by the previous Conference were all but lost. The ongoing highpitched campaigns of the US, together with its allies, to cap the nuclear capabilities of Iran and North Korea have emerged as two major recent flashpoints. Moreover, tensions and conflicts are at the moment indeed boiling over in West Asia. This has all the potentialities of turning into a full-scale nuclear holocaust.

Now I take up the third and last part.

The proposed Indo-US nuke deal, the first outlines of which were given out on July 18 last year, is yet another profoundly negative development in the making demanding all our immediate attention. This has to be viewed in the context of the utterly disturbing global scenario, as we’ve just discussed in brief, and the overt nuclearisation of South Asia in May 1998.

This would-be ‘deal’, which has already crossed a number of milestones, would enable India - a non-signatory to the NPT, as are Pakistan and Israel - in gross contravention of its underlying principles and the current norms of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG), to have civilian nuclear trade with the US and also the rest of the world. In return India is to designate and separate its civilian and ‘strategic’ nuclear power plants and negotiate with the IAEA the special and specific terms of its inspections of the plants designated ‘civilian’ by India at its own option. The nuclear trade - understandably consisting of fuel, plants, spares, technologies etc., would, however, be restricted to the plants under IAEA inspection only.

This ongoing act of unique exceptionalism is a severe frontal assault on whatever credibility of the NPT - the only multilateral commitment, however vague, of the five NWSs to global nuclear disarmament. The virtual legitimisation of India’s nuclear status, as and when the ‘deal’ comes through would deal a severe blow to the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation and thereby disarmament. Further cementing of the strategic ties between the US and India, as its junior regional ally, through this ‘deal’ would provide an added fillip to the aggressive
ambitions of the Bush administration. This asymmetric ‘favour’ to India would also go to further aggravate the simmering tensions and spiralling arms race in South Asia.

This would also distort India’s energy options by diverting scarce resources to developments of resource-guzzling, intrinsically hazardous and potentially catastrophic, nuclear power at the cost of ecologically benign renewable sources of energy.

The ‘deal’ mercifully, however, calls for the US Congressional assent, as it’d impact the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 1978, and primarily the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954. Two Congressional committees, from both the houses, have already given green signals to the Bill proposed by the Bush administration in this regard albeit with a few (thorny) riders. Subsequently the House of Representatives has passed the ‘US India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006’. In the process, however, the assent has become a two-stage affair instead of one, that too in advance, as originally envisaged. So, while even the ongoing first stage remains to be completed with the approval by the Senate still pending; when the full details of the separation plan and nuclear cooperation are worked out between India and the Bush administration, the terms of inspections by the IAEA are finalised and, most significantly, the NSG discusses and (consensually) clears the ‘deal’, the ‘deal’ would again go back to the Congress for its final nod.

The Indian peace movement as spearheaded by the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) is seriously engaged with raising public awareness and mobilising opinion against the ‘deal’. This, we must keep in mind, is very different from the Rightwing and hawkish opposition on the false pretext that the ‘deal’ would delimit India’s capacity to produce as many Bombs as it likes. In fact the ‘deal’ would do just the opposite by allowing India to use its indigenously mined uranium exclusively for Bomb production. The ‘deal’, in any case, doesn’t call for any parliamentary ratification in India.

Under the circumstances, while it’s extremely important to carry out vigorous campaigns against this pernicious move all over the world including India and, more importantly, the US; there is an urgent need to focus our attention on the NSG members who’re not too enamoured by the commercial prospects of the ‘deal’. We must do whatever we can to encourage and further strengthen the contrarian voices. The members of the NAM and the erstwhile New Agenda Coalition in the NSG deserve our special attention. So do Norway and a few other members.

It is extremely important for the global peace movement to take due note of the severely damaging fallout of this dangerous ‘deal’ and spare no efforts, both conventional and creative, to stop it in its track.

Thank you.
“Dialogue between Governmental Representatives and NGOs for a Nuclear-Free, Peaceful and Just World”

Presentation at Panel Discussion on 8 August 2006, Nagasaki

Hiroshi Taka
Secretary General
Japan Council against A & H Bombs

It is a privilege for me to be part of such a prestigious panel with Mr. Ehab Fawzy, Deputy Assistant Minister for Political Affairs, Mr. Ulises Canchola Gutierrez, Director General in Charge of the U.N. System, Mr. Mohamed Ezzeldine Abdel-Moneim, Special Advisor on Disarmament and Strategic Affairs, and Mr. Sukla Sen, a leader of the antinuclear movement in India. Speaking before the leaders of Japanese and foreign antinuclear and peace movements, I feel I am exceeding my competence and I apologize for this.

The Declaration of the International Meeting expressed deep concern about the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East. A hundred thousand people reportedly took to the streets in London to protest the current Israeli attacks against Lebanon. As this fact testifies, the world community has unanimously manifested its grave concern about the deteriorating situation in Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq. Let me first call for the immediate cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq, and the peaceful settlement of the Iranian issue.

When we look closer at how this ongoing violence in the Middle East has started and evolved, we come upon at least two basic questions. The first question is: What is the actual threat for the world? Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has claimed that terrorism and proliferation pose new threats and acted as if violence exercised by powerful nations could bring an end to these new threats. Based on this logic, the U.S. attacked Afghanistan without U.N. approval. It also used force against Iraq, despite the opposition of the majority in the Security Council, but it did not find any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction it expected to find in Iraq. The use of force by a superpower has not brought peace either in Afghanistan or Iraq. On the contrary, every day, even at this very moment, many people are being injured or killed in these countries. In addition, as the belief in violence is contagious, more and more countries adopt similar policies. The most typical example is Israel. The problems of terrorism and proliferation are thus being aggravated instead of being settled.

The second question we would ask is: What is the actual role assigned to nuclear weapons in this deteriorating situation? Some states are still trying to acquire nuclear weapons or to develop nuclear missiles, believing that these could be used as diplomatic cards, but this is merely an anachronistic reaction of a handful of nations that find themselves driven into a corner. It does not represent the major current in the world.
The Bush Administration takes advantage of this situation to claim that there are threats in which nuclear weapons would be used, but it is the U.S. that has actually set forth the use of nuclear weapons as a realistic option in its military strategy. The U.S. itself has declared it on several occasions and expressly stated it in the recently published Quadrennial Defence Review as well as in the New National Security Strategy.

As was the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so long as the use of nuclear weapons is kept as an option, these weapons may eventually be used. When the force is wrongly perceived as protecting an order, then war is seen as a solution of the problem. Likewise, when nuclear weapons are presented as playing a positive role, they may be used anytime and very easily, much more easily than we think. I think we in the anti-nuclear movement as well as those responsible for international politics should pay much more attention to this and be more vigilant.

Nevertheless, there has been a major change since the end of the Cold War era: it is that public opinion favourable to the abolition of nuclear weapons has grown much stronger. Those who demand that nuclear weapons be eliminated represent a current far more powerful than could have been imagined during the Cold War period. Twenty years ago, there was no consensus on the abolition of nuclear weapons, even within the antinuclear movements in the world, but today, an overwhelming majority in the arenas of international politics supports the elimination of nuclear weapons. The key to make this objective a reality is how successfully we could combine the three elements: persevering and courageous actions for the elimination of nuclear weapons, an overwhelming support from public opinion, and actions for peace.

The negotiations for the NPT Review eventually broke down last year, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has been in a deadlock for nearly a decade. In that context, the role the United Nations must assume has grown more important.

This point is emphasized in the Declaration adopted by the International Meeting. Originally, the U.N. had been given the mission to ensure the survival of the human race and to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. And it is the mission of the U.N. Security Council, especially its permanent members, to act so that the U.N. fulfils its initial mission. As the U.S., by far the most powerful nation in the world, refuses to act in that way, all other countries must get together and force the U.S. to fulfil its mission.

This is why the World Conference against A & H Bombs proposes to press for negotiations among all countries to be undertaken immediately in view of totally banning nuclear weapons as a measure established by international law. Now that it has become clear that the use of violence does not bring any solution, we must unite our efforts to bring back the U.N. to where it started and to make it a driving force for reversing the world trend from war to peace. The most urgent and vital task in this operation is the joint initiative for totally banning nuclear weapons, an initiative capable of rallying the broadest possible forces and creating the widest possible consensus. I want to see more emphasis placed on the fact that this is the vital challenge for the U.N. to take up if it wants to give real meaning to its existence. I have great expectations for the governments of like-minded countries to do their best so that such an initiative will emerge from the U.N. General Assembly this autumn.

What is equally important is public opinion. The huge antiwar movement against the Iraq War started with the action of four hundred thousand London citizens in late September 2002. Citizens’ actions then spread all over the world and moved their governments. At the Open Debate
organized by the U.N. Security Council where sixty-one countries spoke, fifty-nine of them expressed their opposition to military solutions. Finally, most of the governments of the NATO countries supported a solution by peaceful means. They became part of a “second superpower” and changed world opinion. This is something new that happened in the twenty-first century. The U.N. Charter’s pacifism has become the principle of the citizens’ charter for action.

The elimination of nuclear weapons is a challenge on which the very survival of humanity depends. In that sense, it requires a vast mobilization of people and countries, much larger than that against the Iraq War, combining actions of governments and those of citizens around the world.

The people of Japan have a particularly important role and responsibility to assume in this worldwide effort. This is because many Japanese believe in the an ideal of pacifism, the ideal of renouncing war, and the ideal of the three, non-nuclear principles, ideals that are based on the repentance for past aggressions and the experience of atomic bombings. Furthermore, the Japanese are in a position to implement pacifism and the three, non-nuclear principles. Normally, it belongs to the Japanese government to take the lead in this, but it has failed to do so. Therefore, we in the antinuclear and peace movements must consider ourselves as the mainstream, as the genuine representative of Japan’s pacifism and non-nuclearism, capable of uniting the Japanese people in their majority and leading our country as we advance.

Let us collect signatures for the petition for the “Swift Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” in all municipalities across the country so that we can present as many signatures as possible to the U.N. in October. Let us always uphold great ideals and objectives and advance steadily step by step, keeping in mind that sober and simple campaigning creates wonderful solidarity and friendship with people around the world.
II
Indo-US Nuke 'Deal'
Dealing with the Nuclear Deal

M. V. Ramana

Despite intense effort on the part of the Indian government and its lobbyists, the controversial U.S.-India nuclear deal has not yet made it through the U.S. Senate. There is now some concern among officials that the bill would not make it through the Senate this year. It is even possible that should the Democrats gain more seats in the upcoming elections, there may be more conditions applied on the deal, which the officials belonging to the Indian government and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) have warned would be deal breakers.

The events at the U.S. Senate are the latest episode in a saga that began publicly in July 2005 when President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement laying the grounds for the resumption of U.S. and international nuclear aid to India. Such international support was key to the nuclear infrastructure and capabilities developed by the DAE. Even the 1974 nuclear weapons test used plutonium resulting from technology and materials supplied by the United States and Canada. These were supplied with the understanding that it would be used only for peaceful purposes. In turn, that provided one reason for the Indian diplomatic effort at trying to make the 1974 test to be a peaceful nuclear explosion; few outside the country bought into that charade.

Following India’s 1974 test, the United States and other countries formed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) with the aim of preventing exports for commercial and peaceful purposes from being used to make nuclear weapons. NSG Guidelines list specific nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies that are subject to export controls. The Guidelines are comprised of two parts. Part I was created specifically in response to the 1974 test and lists materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use, including fissile materials, nuclear reactors, and reprocessing and enrichment equipment. Part II lists dual use goods, such as machine tools and lasers, which are non nuclear items but which can also be used to develop weapons; this was adopted in 1992 after discovering how close Iraq came to making nuclear weapons material by employing dual use imports in a covert programme.

In 1978 the United States also passed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act that required any country, other than the five nuclear weapon states, to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all its nuclear facilities ("full scope safeguards") before the United States would engage in any nuclear cooperation with it. The Indian government’s refusal to give up its nuclear weapons and sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) meant that no NSG state, including the United States, would sell nuclear technology to it.

This embargo has not been strictly followed and commercial or other institutional interests have sometimes overridden non-proliferation considerations. One example is in the case of the Tarapur
I & II reactors that were supplied by the United States with a fuel supply guarantee; NSG members like Russia have sold enriched uranium fuel (which the DAE does not have the capacity to manufacture in adequate quantities) for these reactors by using an exception clause - somewhat disingenuously - that allows for the sale of material or equipment in case there are safety considerations involved. Likewise, Russia is also supplying the Koodankulam reactors by claiming that the agreement governing that deal was signed in the 1980s by the then Soviet Union before it joined the NSG.

The July agreement requires the United States to amend both its own laws and policies on nuclear technology transfer and work to adjust international regimes on the supply of nuclear fuel and technology so as to make an exception for India. In exchange, the Indian government has designated, through the separation plan offered in March 2006, several nuclear facilities as civilian, and volunteered them for IAEA inspection in a phased manner. At the same time, it has marked a large number of facilities, even those that would normally be considered civilian, such as power reactors, as military ones and refused safeguards on them. However, the final shape and status of the deal is still unclear since the U.S. Congress may attach conditions that India may not accept, and the NSG countries may not be able to reach the necessary consensus on the deal.

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(note: military reactors will not be open for safeguards)
The deal marks a new phase in the nuclear relationship between United States and India. Both countries will be going against their historical policies, the United States with regard to its stance on nuclear non-proliferation and India with regard to its longstanding opposition to having international safeguards at domestically constructed nuclear facilities. At the international level, it represents a challenge to the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, which are based on the assumption that access to nuclear fuel and technology must be given only in exchange for signing the NPT and joining the regime.

Of Failures and Motivations

On the Indian side, a primary motivation for the deal has been the history of failure of its DAE to produce large quantities of nuclear electricity. In 1962, Homi Bhabha, the founder of India's nuclear programme, predicted that by 1987 nuclear energy would constitute 20,000 to 25,000 MW of installed electricity generation capacity. His successor as head of DAE, Vikram Sarabhai, predicted that by 2000 there would be 43,500 MW of nuclear power. Neither of these predictions came true. Despite over 50 years of generous funding, nuclear power currently amounts to only 3,900 MW, just 3.1 per cent of installed electricity capacity of 1,27,056 MW (as of September 2006). Even if the DAE meets its current projections of 20,000 MW by the year 2020, it will only be 8-10% of projected total electrical generation capacity.

Even if the United States does deliver on its promises and international nuclear trade with India resumes, it is by no means clear that the DAE will be able to generate a significant fraction of the country's electricity requirements for decades. Further, such electricity is likely to be expensive. In the case of French reactors which are typical of Western supplied power plants, M. R. Srinivasan, former head of the DAE, has stated that, "Recent cost projections show that if an LWR were to be imported from France, the cost of electricity would be too high for the Indian consumer. This is because of the high capital cost of French supplied equipment".

A second motivation for the deal represents another of DAE's failures: in ensuring sufficient supplies of uranium to fuel its nuclear reactors. This lapse was evident in the statement from an Indian official to the British Broadcasting Corporation soon after the U.S.-India deal was announced: "The truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear programme". Nuclear Power Corporation of India data shows that most of its reactors have had lower capacity factors in the last few years. A. Gopalakrishnan, the former head of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, has reported that "uranium shortage" has been "a major problem... for some time."

India has been unable to import uranium for its unsafeguarded nuclear reactors because of the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group mentioned earlier. Apart from two very old imported U.S. reactors, India relies on natural uranium fuelled nuclear reactors (based on the two Canadian designed and built pressurized heavy water reactors it acquired in the 1960s). The total electric capacity of these reactors is 3,580 MW. At 80 per cent capacity, these require over 500 tons of uranium every year. The plutonium production reactors, CIRUS and Dhruva, which are earmarked for nuclear weapons purposes, consume perhaps another 30-35 tons annually. We estimate that current uranium production within India is less than 300 tons of uranium a year, probably even as low well short of the fuel requirements. DAE has been able to continue to operate its reactors by using uranium stockpiled from when the nuclear capacity was much smaller. Our estimates are that, in the absence of uranium imports or cutbacks in nuclear power generation, this stockpile would be exhausted by 2007. This explains DAE's desperate efforts to open new uranium mines in the country, which have met with stiff public resistance, primarily because of deleterious health impacts of
uranium mining and milling on the communities around existing mines.

How Many More Bombs?

If U.S.-India deal goes through the DAE will be able to purchase the uranium it needs to fuel those reactors it chooses to put under IAEA safeguards from international sources. This will free up domestic uranium for potential use in the nuclear weapons programme and could allow a significant and rapid expansion in the nuclear arsenal. This option has been suggested by, among others, K. Subrahmanyam, former head of the National Security Advisory Board, who has argued that "Given India's uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our ...nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India's advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapons grade plutonium production."

Our estimate of the current stockpile of weapons grade plutonium is about 520 kg, sufficient for about a hundred nuclear weapons. There is no public information on how much of this plutonium has actually been turned into weapons; some estimates suggest that about half of this has been. If this is not reprehensible enough, there are reports of plans that involve an arsenal of 300-400 weapons within a decade. Realizing these plans will require the production of much larger quantities of fissile material and at much higher rates than achieved so far. As has been emphasized time and again by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and various other government officials, such production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons is not constrained by the deal.

The domestic uranium that is freed up through imports can be used to make weapons useable fissile material in several ways. One route would be to build a large plutonium production reactor to add to CIRUS (which is to be shut down in some years as part of the deal) and Dhruva, the weapons grade plutonium production reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Bombay. CIRUS and Dhruva could continue to produce about 25 to 35 kg of weapons grade plutonium a year, sufficient for about 5 to 8 bombs. Another Dhruva sized production reactor could yield an additional several bombs worth of such plutonium each year.

Another way to increase fissile material for weapons is to expand the uranium centrifuge enrichment programme and make highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. So far, it is only believed to have made fuel for the nuclear submarine that has been under development since the 1970s.

There is also the possibility, as hinted at by some hawks, that the DAE's nuclear power reactors may be used to make weapons material. For instance, if kept out of safeguards and with sufficient uranium supplies on hand, power reactors could be used to make weapons grade plutonium by limiting the time the fuel is irradiated. Run this way, a typical 220 MW pressurized heavy water reactor could produce between 150-200 kg/year of weapons grade plutonium when operated at 60-80 per cent capacity. This could mean as much as an eight fold increase in the existing rate of plutonium production. The penalty to be paid in terms of the increased and less efficient use of uranium could be covered by access to imported uranium to be used in other power reactors and/or the use of depleted uranium as fuel.

Finally, the fast breeder reactor under construction will also be a source of weapons grade plutonium. The DAE has always resisted placing the breeder programme under international safeguards and is doing so again when asked to do so as part of the deal. Anil Kakodkar, Secretary of the DAE, has said in connection with not allowing safeguards at the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR): "Only that which is clearly of no national security significance, only that part will be civilian". DAE's resistance to safeguards on the breeder programme begs the question as to whether this is or ever was only for civilian purposes. The PFBR could produce on the order of 135 kg of
weapon grade plutonium every year, sufficient for about 25-30 weapons, a four to five fold increase over the current weapon plutonium production capacity.

**U.S. Motivations**

This potentially large increase in fissile material production capacity that the deal would allow should not be news to most U.S. policy makers. Why then do they want to renew nuclear trade?

As is often the case, the publicly stated reasons are not the real ones. The Bush administration often claims that the deal will reduce India’s carbon emissions or its oil imports. Without going into finer points about whether nuclear power is a sensible way to reduce carbon emissions or whether nuclear electricity driven vehicles are going to become a significant fraction of our transport sector, it should be obvious that when an administration known for its anti-environmental views is espousing environmental reasons for some action, then something else is at stake.

The significance of the nuclear deal can be appreciated only in the context of a changing U.S. geopolitical strategy under the Bush Administration and an evolving U.S. India relationship. In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2000, Condoleezza Rice, the main foreign policy adviser to Bush in his presidential campaign, indicated that a future Bush administration would take a new approach to India and argued that the United States “should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance... India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.” How to include India in the U.S. calculations was explained by another key player in U.S.-India relations of the past few years - Ashley Tellis. Tellis wrote: “If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such that India’s nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025.”

To this strategic motivation one can add another - a strong push by business groups, especially the defence lobby and nuclear technology manufacturers. The Bush Administration has been known to be particularly receptive to these groups. U.S. business groups seem to have been motivated largely due to promises made by people like Montek Singh Ahluwalia that India would become a large market for American products, especially those related to nuclear technology, aerospace, and defence.

**Institutional Motivations**

With earlier U.S. ideas of capping or rolling back India’s nuclear capability thrown out of the window and the main aim becoming that of propping India up as a counter weight to China, the question was what India’s Foreign Policy establishment desired in exchange. For over a decade now, the Indo-U.S. diplomatic discussions have prominently featured three demands from the Indian side: access to civilian nuclear power technology and dual use technology, and cooperation in civilian space research. Through constant repetition, these demands have acquired the status of being pre-conditions for improved U.S.-India relations. There is, of course, no inherent reason why Indo-U.S. relations should be predicated on these. Therefore, what the insistence on these three demands points to is the power of the respective lobbies - the nuclear, the space, and the military - to shape India’s foreign policy.

The motivations for the DAE to desire external inputs have been elaborated earlier. Regardless of whether their desires for uranium and foreign reactors are met, and regardless of whether the deal actually goes through, the events leading to the deal and, more crucially, the debate following the July agreement have bolstered the DAE’s institutional power domestically, at least for the short to medium term. The DAE’s institutional power comes from a unique combination of abilities: it is the only entity that can both generate electricity and make nuclear weapons. In other words, it can promise
the wherewithal for mass production and mass consumption (through its projections of electricity to be generated) and for mass destruction (through its weapons programme).

In the first case, the DAE’s power results not from the actual installed electric capacity but from its confident projections, unshaken by past failures, of immensely large quantities of nuclear electricity sometime in the future and its claim that it is the only credible large scale source of power. In the second case, again, the DAE’s power is dependent less on the actual amount of weapons useable fissile material it has produced as it is on the ability to make much more of it. This is why it put in so much political capital into keeping the breeder programme and a number of power reactors out of safeguards. The DAE Secretary Anil Kakodkar even gave an interview to the Indian Express, where he categorically stated that the breeder programme would not go under safeguards - an unprecedented public statement on a policy under negotiation.

**Conclusions**

If there is one thing that is more worrisome than the nuclear deal between India and the United States, it is the quality of the debate that has ensued in its wake. Several missing elements stand out: of these we highlight three.

First, much of the criticism of the deal has been that putting some of the power reactors under safeguards would mean a decrease in the capacity to produce fissile material. The government has denied this charge - and it is actually right. Indeed, what we find is that if the U.S.-India deal goes through, it could actually result in a significant increase in the capacity to produce fissile material for weapons without any cutbacks in the nuclear energy programme. This fact has not escaped Pakistan’s attention and its National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by President Pervez Musharraf, has declared that “In view of the fact the [U.S.-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.” This suggests that an expansion of fissile material stockpiles in South Asia may ensue - in other words a nuclear arms race.

Second, the debate has not questioned in any significant way the fundamental premises that underlie either of the sources of the DAE’s institutional power: the desirability of a large scale expansion of nuclear power, and the necessity for more weapons useable fissile material. It is indeed shameful that many, even some who are supposedly against the acquisition of nuclear weapons, have sprung to the DAE’s defence against international controls over its facilities that would merely ensure that material from those facilities are not used to make nuclear weapons.

Third, much of the debate accepted without question the contention on the part of the supporters of the deal, both in the United States and India, that India was a “responsible” nuclear state and therefore deserving special treatment. The peace movement’s role must be to point out what “responsible nuclear states” are truly responsible for, a silence that was particularly disturbing on the 60th anniversary of the wholesale destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

**Whether or not the deal goes through, the role of the peace movement is to emphasize again and again the moral, political, social, economic, and environmental arguments against nuclear weapons, and the close connections between nuclear energy and weapons.**

October 5, 2006

The United States and India: New Best Friends?

Immanuel Wallerstein

George W. Bush has gone to India and concluded an agreement which many analysts are hailing as historic and a turning-point in the geopolitics of the world-system. On the face of it, this trip (which some have even compared to Nixon's meeting with Mao in Beijing) does seem to mark a major shift in attitudes by both countries. But perhaps there is less there than appears to be on the surface.

In the post-1945 world-system, India was in many ways a very disturbing element from the point of view of the United States. It was the original "non-aligned" power in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. And the United States did not appreciate the consistent, forthright way the Indians argued their case. The United States considered India's non-alignment a de facto favouring of the Soviet Union, and after 1948 began to favour Pakistan in order to create difficulties for India.

The Indian National Congress was a national liberation movement, in many ways the model for movements throughout Asia and Africa. The policies of the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and of his immediate successors, combined non-alignment, active support for anticolonial movements everywhere, and a variant of social-democracy internally. India also was interested in strengthening its military capacity. Since the United States wouldn't help its military ambitions, India bought arms and airplanes from the Soviet Union, which was a further irritant to the United States.

The Indian National Congress, however, underwent the same kind of disabling disillusionments that similar movements elsewhere suffered in the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, Congress had lost its sheen, and a rightwing, Hindu supremacist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), governed India from 1996 to 2004. Congress, in the post-Cold War era, no longer proclaimed nonalignment nor anticolonial solidarity nor much that resembled social-democracy.

In the last five years, there have been important changes in both countries. On the one hand, India's economic development has made her a major locus of outsourcing for U.S. informatics. Indians in the United States who have made considerable money in informatics and other professions have maintained their ties with India, and being a conservative group politically, have urged upon the Indian government closer ties with the United States.

On the other hand, the United States has become quite isolated politically because of the policies of the Bush regime. India is now one of the very few countries where polls report a majority having favourable views of the United States. This is not to say that there is no longer a very large group with unfavourable views, but India has been moving in the opposite direction from the United States's traditional allies like Western Europe or South Korea.

All this provides the background for the trip, the culmination of negotiations between India and the United States concerning U.S. assistance to India's nuclear programme. India was one of only
three countries that had refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty. The other two were Pakistan and Israel. All three countries have developed nuclear weapons. Up to now, the official U.S. position had been strong disapproval of India's nuclear programme and, when India exploded bombs in 1998, the United States curbed the export of nuclear technology to India.

The United States has now reversed its position. By this agreement, the United States agreed to sell both nuclear fuel and technology to India, despite the fact that India still will not sign the non-proliferation treaty. To be sure, the assistance will only be for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and provides for inspections, but only of plants engaged in developing peaceful uses. And India will decide which plants are for peaceful uses and which for military uses. Bush has hailed the agreement as the beginning of a "strategic partnership."

What India gets out of this agreement is very obvious. They get needed technical assistance that allows them to speed up their nuclear programme. And they get de facto recognition as being a legitimate nuclear power, more or less in the same category as the five permanent members of the Security Council. To get this, they have given up almost nothing.

What the United States gets out of this agreement is less obvious. It is said that the United States wants to build up India as a counterweight to China's potential military and political strength in Asia. Perhaps. And the United States gets a friendly nod from a major power, something in very short supply these years.

But the treaty has immediately drawn much fire. Within India, all those who are against the geopolitical tilt towards the United States are unhappy, and this includes coalition partners of Congress in the legislature. And within the United States it has drawn fire from the whole political spectrum on the grounds that it liquidates de facto the non-proliferation treaty. Furthermore, of course, it undoes the whole basis of the arguments concerning Iran, since Iran is really asking for the same thing India has gotten. And of course, Pakistan is very unhappy, since Bush made it clear right away that the United States was not thinking of a similar arrangement with Pakistan.

The real question is what will be the result of all of this. Critics in the U.S. Congress are already poised to impose conditions for approval of the treaty. And it is quite likely that, if they prevail (which is probable), India will reject the conditions. If that happens, the warmer feelings of the Indian government for the United States will likely vanish, but at the same time the relations between the United States and Pakistan, already strained, will have deteriorated further.

India will emerge ahead in any case. Russia has already offered to sell nuclear fuel to India, something that the United States has in the past sought to prevent. But the United States no longer has any good argument. Furthermore, its weak case against Iran is now considerably undermined. And the North Korean government is no doubt chortling.

The bottom line of the historic breakthrough - many pluses for India, and an additional setback for U.S. diplomacy. Far from a strategic partnership, the treaty distributes further grains abrading the U.S. geopolitical position.

Source: http://www.binghamton.edu/fbc/181en.htm

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Excerpts from the Interview of David C. Mulford, the US Ambassador in India, on the Prospects of the Indo-US Nuke Deal

Mr. Ambassador, you said [recently] in Jaipur [in late-September] that the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act is likely to be passed before the U.S. Congress finishes its term. What if it isn’t and one of the Houses is captured by the Democrats?

... If we get a floor vote [before the current session expires on September 29], I believe it will be strongly positive by a substantial majority. It will be a bi-partisan majority. [The current session, however, expired without the vote hoped for.] If [and when] we get that vote, the Bill goes to the Conference of the House and the Senate. That is a select group of members. They will rationalise the two Bills into one single Bill and the single Bill will go back for approval to both the Chambers, which is a quick action and then be signed by the President. If that does not happen before the end of this Congress, which will be adjourning by early December. [There’ll be another (lameduck) session commencing in early November before the term of this Congress expires by early December.] Then we will have to go back to square one in the Congress all over again and start with the committees, the mark-ups for floor action, and the Conference all over again. How the elections come out will influence that situation because if the House changes hands those committees will be chaired by people on the other political party.

My own view is that it will not matter a great deal [because] both the parties are very supportive of this agreement. But I am afraid that it would draw the process out because there wouldn’t be the same pressure on the Congress to act. So it would take more time to re-position, work through the committees and the whole process again. But it will not change the commitment of this Administration to get it done.

The July 18, 2005 Joint Statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush and the March 2006 Separation Plan are a win-win arrangement for both India and the U.S. in civilian nuclear cooperation. So why are the House of Representatives Bill and the draft Senate Bill trying to change the terms of this agreement into issues of concern over proliferation and why are efforts being made at capping India’s nuclear weapons programme? In short, why is the U.S. shifting the goalposts?

First of all, let me emphasise that the goalposts have not been shifted and they will not be shifted. The Administration has reached an agreement on the deal and for the deal to be implemented, the law has to be changed. The law has to be changed by the United States Congress. They have had certain suggestions to make about legislation and they are in the form of either what we call declaratory points which are not enforceable but are matters of stated opinion. The other type of
amendments is in the form of substantive amendments. Most of the people who make those amendments believe that the amendments they are making are within the spirit of the July 18 Agreement. The Indian Government does not agree with that and the Administration does not agree in every case with that either. So we are trying to soften and change some of those amendments. And the question is what is the best tactic for doing that?

We have judged that it is not the best tactic to change the amendments on the floor of the Senate. That it is better to make that effort in the conference between the two Houses. The line that will be taken is that these amendments were put forward in June. That was very early in the process. They were put forward in the committees. Now we have floor votes with overwhelming support. So we would be making the point to the members that the overwhelming intention of the Congress, both the parties, is to see that this Agreement is put in place. So let us not have amendments there we know will make the deal unacceptable to the Indian Government because in their view these would fall outside the parameters of the Agreements of July 05 and March 06.

The second point is that the bilateral agreement which is being negotiated, the so-called 123 Agreement, is the operational agreement. When it is concluded, it would be submitted to the Congress for a vote. That vote will be an up or down vote. There will not be any opportunity to make amendments there. So what we will say to the people is, “Your amendment is a very detailed provision which is changing the law and the issues that you are worried about are dealt with in the 123 agreement. You will get a chance to vote on that later. If you don’t like what you see, you can vote against it. We think that the Agreement will be supportive.” We hope that one way or the other, we can soften or remove some of these amendments. But we do not know because it is in the hands of the Congress. [Emphasis added.] [It is rather extraordinary that the Ambassador is openly talking of manipulating and dodging the verdict of the US Congress in two possible ways to suit Indian requirements.]

You said you will try to reconcile things in the conference. That is one way of getting around this. The Senate Bill also includes a lot of provisions similar to the House Bill. It may not be in exactly the same language but the thrust is the same. How much of scope is there for reconciling the two in such a way that it is acceptable to India?

There is some scope which I have already explained. We should first get to know what is really acceptable in the final analysis or what is unacceptable. May be some of the things in there will turn out to be acceptable. For example, there are recording functions which are mentioned, I think, in the House Bill. These are requirements that would be imposed on the Administration. They are not imposed on India.

In the draft Senate Bill, there is a provision that any waiver on nuclear technology transfers to India in areas such as reprocessing and enrichment or on fuel supplies “shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act.”

That is an issue that is pretty well taken care of and will not be an issue there. I can’t commit on behalf of the United States Congress but my understanding is that that issue can be worked out. I think you might be scrutinising these issues closely. [Again he is hinting at manipulating the verdict of the Congress.]

If the deal does not come through, India will not be unduly worried because India has got its own three-stage nuclear power programme and it will go on.
It is up to India to decide what is in its national interests. If it finds that the agreement isn’t helpful, then I suppose it will not accept it. But that is up to India to decide. It is not the impression I have that India thinks this deal is unimportant. I think they think that it is very important; very important to finish, to put into position. But India is a sovereign nation. It will make its own decisions. It is fair to say that you are scrutinising very closely a very complicated process which is being handled fully transparently by two major democracies. That is a recipe for some complication. This is not a deal, which is being cut in the backroom somewhere. This is a deal which is well agreed in the full light of the day and it is being processed by both the Governments in accordance with their democratic arrangements. So it is a very impressive process and it also by definition has some imperfections in it. Right? I think you will agree with that? But we should get some credit for doing it within the full, transparent democratic process in both the Governments. Both of us should get credit for that.

The U.S. President is very much interested in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). There are plans to set up international reprocessing centres under the GNEP, especially in the P-5 countries. There is a strong feeling in the nuclear community in India that India is being played out of these international reprocessing centres although it has mastered the art of reprocessing (that is, India will not host any international reprocessing facility). Why isn’t India being given its due recognition in this?

They [India] weren’t cut out. In the negotiations, it was very clear that for India to have full access to the GNEP group, it would need to place one of its fast breeder reactors under safeguards. India decided that it would not do that. So India decided not to become a full-fledged member of that group. I guess if they decided to do that later [place one of its fast breeder reactors under safeguards], they will not then be restricted. That was the understanding at that time.

III
Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia
Concept Paper on Creating a Process and Mechanism to Initiate Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia

Zia Mian and A. H. Nayyar

1. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan has created grave peril and a sustained crisis for both countries and the people of South Asia.

2. India sees its nuclear weapons with relationship to the region, China, and its own larger global presence, Pakistan sees its nuclear weapons as more than just a counter to India and seeks to use these weapons as a way to internationalise its conflict with India.

3. India has a nuclear doctrine that calls for a triad. It is working on a nuclear submarine, talks of sea based assets which means there will be nuclear weapons in the Indian ocean as well as within India and Pakistan, imperilling other countries of the region. Both India and Pakistan are developing short and long range missiles and acquiring aircraft that can deliver nuclear weapons.

4. India has recently signed a defence agreement and a nuclear deal with the United States and is likely to continue its nuclear build-up. Pakistan continues to seek and receive military and nuclear support from China. It is likely that the nuclear and conventional arms race between India and Pakistan will continue at whatever level they can afford.

5. One obvious source of conflict is the Kashmir dispute. India and Pakistan have prevented intervention on the issue of Kashmir in their own respective ways with India refusing any outside role, and Pakistan seeking to counterbalance its relative weakness with India by involving the US in particular.

6. While South Asian countries should try to engage India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, the nature of the dispute limits the scope and form of possible engagement. There is little the countries of the region can do except to urge the two states to find a peaceful settlement that respects the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

7. Even if India and Pakistan were to resolve the Kashmir issue, they would not necessarily either give up their nuclear weapon status or end their mutual hostility. The experience of the cold war shows that even when the obvious source of conflict between two nuclear weapon states ends, the logic of the weapons has an enduring effect in preventing the establishment of peace in any meaningful sense.

8. Efforts to develop South Asian institutions have been limited by the failure to settle disputes and now the nuclearisation of the subcontinent. This has prevented the emergence of strong economic and political arrangements that can benefit the individual South Asian states and strengthen their capability to negotiate with international capital or financial institutions. Individual states in South Asia are left to fend for themselves in the international arena on the basis of their limited capacities. It is the poor who suffer the consequences.

9. Civil society and peoples movements in all
the South Asian countries need to make collective efforts to find the political and organisational form for a possible South Asian regional intervention to end the nuclearisation of the subcontinent.

10. Some possibilities are:

a) Create a South Asian Peace Coalition to educate the peoples of South Asia about the risks and consequences of nuclear war in South Asia;

b) Use existing regional official and civil society institutions and organisations to demand that India and Pakistan disarm;

c) Campaign for the establishment of a South Asian nuclear weapons free zone

d) Mobilise the countries other than India and Pakistan to negotiate a treaty establishing a South Asian nuclear weapons free zone among themselves, and demand India and Pakistan become parties to it.

Draft Outline of the South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, as well as of the obligations of all States to contribute to this end,

Aware that regional disarmament measures contribute to global disarmament efforts,

Believing that the South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone will protect South Asian States and peoples from nuclear war,

Determined to promote regional co-operation for sustainable social and economic development of the South Asian subcontinent,

Determined to keep South Asia free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter,

Welcoming the co-operation of all States and governmental and non-governmental organizations for the attainment of these objectives,

Have decided by this Treaty to establish the South Asian NWFZ and hereby agree as follows:

Article 1 — Renunciation of nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes:

(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere;

(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device;

(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device;

(d) Not to produce or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over weapon usable fissile material.

Article 2 — Prevention of stationing and transit of nuclear explosive devices

1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

2. Each Party undertakes to prohibit any visits by foreign ships and aircraft carrying nuclear explosive devices to its ports and airfields.

3. Each Party undertakes to prohibit any transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters carrying nuclear explosive devices.

Article 3 — Prohibition of testing of nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes:

(a) Not to test any nuclear explosive device:
(b) To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) Not to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State anywhere.

Article 4 — Declaration, dismantlement, decommissioning or conversion of nuclear explosive devices, fissile materials and the facilities for their manufacture

Each Party undertakes:

(a) To declare all facilities for the production or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices and fissile materials;
(b) To dismantle any nuclear device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty;
(c) To declare and put under multinational safeguards any stocks of fissile materials in its possession;
(d) To decommission all facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices and fissile materials;
(e) To permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as IAEA) and the Commission established in article 9 to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production.

Article 5 — Prohibition of nuclear weapons-capable delivery systems

Each party undertakes:

(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear weapons-capable delivery systems by any means anywhere;
(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear weapons-capable delivery systems;

Article 6 — Prohibition of dumping of radioactive wastes

Each Party undertakes:

Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter anywhere within the South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Article 7 — Verification of Peaceful Uses

Each Party undertakes:

(a) To conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict multinational safeguards and control to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses;
(b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA.

Article 8 — Prohibition of armed attack on nuclear installations

Each Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the South Asian nuclear-weapon free zone.

Article 9 — Mechanism for compliance

For the purpose of ensuring compliance with their undertakings under this Treaty, the Parties agree to establish the South Asian Commission on Nuclear Disarmament.

Article 10 — Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
Article 11 — Duration

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely.

Article 12 — Signature, ratification and entry into force

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any State in the South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. It shall be subject to ratification.

2. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification.

3. For a signatory that ratifies this Treaty after the date of the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, it shall enter into force for that signatory on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article 13 Depositary functions

1. This Treaty shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of SAARC, who is hereby designated as Depositary of the Treaty.

Central Asian States Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Despite U.S. Opposition

The foreign ministers of the five Central Asian States—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — signed a treaty establishing a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) on September 8, 2006.

The treaty created the world's fifth nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), alongside those in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa.

The negotiations began in 1997 and the CANWFZ treaty text was finalized at talks held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in February 2005.

The signing of the treaty went forward despite objections by the United States, Great Britain, and France. To a greater extent than the previous zones, the one in Central Asia will showcase a commitment to nuclear disarmament by a group of states which previously had nuclear weapons on their territory and continue to live in a nuclear-armed neighbourhood.

Surrounded by Russian, Chinese, Pakistani, Indian, and Israeli nuclear weapons, and housing Russian and U.S. military bases, the new zone, according to its proponents, will serve as a powerful example of nonproliferation.

At the signing ceremony, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymoshomart Tokayev underlined the symbolic significance of the new zone, stating: “The countries of our region declared a firm commitment to the principles of disarmament and nonproliferation. This is our contribution to ensuring global security.”

Source: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060905.htm
IV

Indo-Pak Peace Process
Pakistan under Musharraf: India Must Deal With

Praful Bidwai

Pervez Musharraf depicts himself in his memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, in his varied roles as Pakistan’s President, its Chief of Army Staff, the architect of its radical foreign policy turn after September 11, and as someone who wants to be remembered as a statesman.

It contains his messages about Pakistan’s current dilemmas and future trajectory, about its relations with the rest of the world, its disposition towards the “global war on terrorism” (GWOT), and its role in the Islamic world. But what do they imply for India-Pakistan relations, which are rather uncertainly poised despite the Manmohan Singh-Musharraf Havana handshake?

Two messages are involved here: the direct message that Musharraf wants to deliver through the book and his talks and interviews around it; and the message that we must draw out by interpreting the book and the response it has generated. The first message, ironically, is conveyed far more eloquently by the 16-page folio of photographs than by the 352 pages-long text.

The folio’s very first three pictures are all about the December 2003 assassination attempt on himself—a not-so-subtle *ersatz* self-portrait, if you like, of Musharraf as a *victim* of terrorism, and hence a reliable ally in GWOT. Then follows a short album of personal, career and family photos. After that, it’s all politics.

This carefully arranged montage is calculated, to start with, to refute former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s claim that he was kept in the dark about the preparations for the Kargil intrusion (Sharif is shown present at an army briefing in the Kel sector south of Kargil).

It also contains a progression of standard “photo-op” pictures with world leaders, naturally including George W. Bush (at Camp David, both men in open collars, with their wives, signifying bonhomie), but also others including the Saudi King, Hu Jintao, Tony Blair, etc. India gets four pictures, including one against the Taj Mahal backdrop. In conclusion, there is Musharraf the Benevolent, consoling the victims of the Muzaffarabad earthquake.

Remarkably, of the 32 post-coup pictures, Musharraf appears in uniform in only five.

That about sums up the book’s basic content. Here’s Musharraf telling his two audiences—mainly Western, particularly American, and secondarily, the domestic public—that he is a reliable leader committed to a moderate Islamic state, who pulled Pakistan from the brink of disaster and rescued the world from yet more violence instigated by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He is indispensable.

Without Pakistan as an ally, the Great Powers can do little in Afghanistan. As he bluntly said to BBC Radio: “You will be brought down to your knees if Pakistan doesn’t cooperate with you... If we were not with you, you would not manage anything... If the ISI is not with you, you will fail.”

To the domestic audience, Musharraf tries to appear as the conventional, reliable hardcore nationalist who can be trusted to defend Pakistan’s “honour”. (It’s another matter that this appeal isn’t very convincing, but more on that later.)
The book’s content, composition and priorities reflect Musharraf’s main purpose. Thus Part Five, devoted to “The War on Terror” occupies 82 pages, while his pre-Kargil army career claims only 38. The chapter on Kargil, which has been discussed to death in India, is only 12 pages long. The text totally hides Musharraf’s identity as a General.

Musharraf states his facts and makes his disclosures selectively. For instance, he tells us a lot about the seven specific demands made on Pakistan by the United States on September 13, 2001, including blanket overflight and landing rights for U.S. troops to conduct operations in Afghanistan, as well as the “use of Pakistan’s naval ports, air bases, and strategic locations on borders.”

He is equally articulate in blaming India for the failure of the Agra summit. His account of how an agreed draft of a joint statement was withdrawn at the last minute because Atal Behari Vajpayee capitulated to Advani’s pressure is largely correct. As he told Vajpayee, “there seemed to be someone above the two of us who had the power to overrule us.”

However, Musharraf is opaque on why he came to Agra and what he expected from the summit. After all, he is the man who decided not to receive and salute Vajpayee when he rode the bus to Lahore in February 1999. He was also the Kargil incursion’s architect. He also does not disclose what persuaded him to make/respond to yet another attempt at a thaw with India, which culminated in the Islamabad meeting with Vajpayee in January 2004 and paved the way for the dialogue process.

The book’s tone is consistently self-justificatory, even self-congratulatory and full of hubris. Musharraf sees himself as someone who need not obey too many rules. He speaks nonchalantly of his record of indiscipline as a soldier. When the record comes up for review, he says: “It was shocking indeed. Entries in red ink were overflowing the total allocated space.” But Musharraf also sees himself as a victim of circumstances, who unfailingly makes the right decisions that will rescue Pakistan from chaos and bring it glory, as in Kargil. There’s a special Man-of-Destiny hubris right in the Prologue. Speaking of the 2003 attempt on him, he says: “I immediately realised… I was staring terrorism in the face…[as] the target. But unlike most leaders, I am also a soldier, Chief of Army Staff and Supreme Commander… I am cut out to be in the midst of battle - trained, prepared and equipped. Fate and the confluence of events have seen to it that Pakistan and I are in the thick of the fight against terrorism… My training has made me constantly ready” for this!

Musharraf’s account of why he made the fateful decision in 2001 to dump al-Qaeda-Taliban and join the United States’ GWOT is shot through with contradictions. He is loath to admit that he was arm-twisted through Bush’s “you-are-with-us-or-you-are-against-us” ultimatum. But he also exaggerates the threat from Washington and the harshness of the language in which it was delivered.

Nobody has corroborated his statement that US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told his intelligence chief that Pakistan would be bombed “back to the Stone Age” if it didn’t join GWOT. Armitage has denied this. Bush expressed surprise over it. And the then ISI chief hasn’t been available to the media.

Musharraf pretends that the decision had “nothing to do” with the threat Armitage conveyed. “I made a dispassionate, military-style analysis of our options, weighing the pros and cons… My decision was based on the well-being of my people and the best interests of my country-Pakistan always comes first. I war-gamed the United States as an adversary. There would be a violent and angry reaction if we didn’t support the US.

“Thus the question was: if we do not join them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no, we could not…” Besides, India would exploit the situation to make the Kashmir status quo permanent. “The
security of our strategic assets [read, nuclear weapons] would be jeopardised", destroying Pakistan's strategic parity with India. Pakistan's economy would badly suffer.

Yet, Musharraf doesn't ask why there would be "an onslaught" from America. All his "dispassionate" analysis is a charade, a rationalisation for capitulating to US pressure.

Musharraf also depicts a false consistency in Pakistan's approach towards the Taliban. He holds that Pakistan's original support for the Taliban was justified: "there was nothing wrong with our intentions, except that we did not realise that once the Taliban had used us to get to power we would lose influence with them."

Despite this, Pakistan was right to support the Taliban even after it came to power and unleashed a reign of terror: "We still supported them, for geostrategic reasons. If we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on our western border, or a vacuum of power there into which might have stepped the Northern Alliance, comprising anti-Pakistan elements. The Northern Alliance was supported by Russia, India, and Iran."

Musharraf just won't admit that Pakistan was disastrously wrong to create this monster in the first place. The "national interest" demanded this in 1994. Seven years later, it required the opposite.

The point about such inconsistency that its practitioners can suddenly switch to yet another position and still claim continuity. Musharraf is indeed creating a basis for effecting such a shift-by making a radical distinction between the Taliban and al-Qaeda. He has just reached an agreement with Taliban sympathisers in North Waziristan. The new pact will effectively create a sanctuary for both Taliban and al-Qaeda elements.

Musharraf also wants the "moderate" Taliban to be accommodated in the Afghaniyatn government. The recent complex - and probably fractious - negotiation between Bush, Musharraf and Karzai in Washington was all about that. Musharraf is bargaining hard as the Afghan endgame approaches. The US-UK are exhausted, NATO is unwilling to take on risky assignments, and the Taliban are rearming.

That brings us to the "bombing back to Stone Age" business. That hype had a definite purpose: to remind Bush of the assurances that his administration apparently gave to Musharraf in return for joining GWOT, including containment of the Northern Alliance and raising Pushtun representation in the Karzai regime; and help in getting India to discuss the Kashmir issue.

Similarly, Musharraf's obviously doctored version of Kargil has a purpose. Musharraf knows that his account won't sell even with Pakistan's cognoscenti. Former foreign minister Sartaj Aziz has contradicted the claim that Sharif was fully briefed before the Kargil invasion, especially at a February 5 meeting in Kel: "I was present at the meeting... Kargil was not mentioned ...." Meanwhile, Nawaz Sharif has fired a bombshell. He says Musharraf couldn't explain how the Northern Light Infantry lost as many as 2,700 men during the "victorious" Kargil operation.

Musharraf's primary purpose here seem no nobler than to create a constituency for himself by emphasising his anti-India hard-nationalist credentials. It's no surprise that while talking of Sharif's attempt to prevent his plane from landing on the day of the 1999 coup, he describes India as an "enemy" country, where he couldn't make an emergency landing even in those exceptional circumstances.

Musharraf is preparing either for the next presidential election, or, like other disgraced Pakistani leaders, exile.

Musharraf is also given to self-delusion and fantasising. He claims he is more genuinely democratic than all the civilians who had ruled Pakistan for the preceding 11 years. Similarly, he says most "emphatically", that "whatever movement has taken place so far in the
direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is owed considerably to the Kargil conflict."

As for Kargil preparing the ground for the peace process, the claim is laughable. India and Pakistan fought long and hard to overcome Kargil’s bitter legacy. It’s only after they put behind themselves Kargil, and the 10 month-long confrontation of 2002, that their relations thawed. If Kashmir is ever resolved through talks, as one hopes it would be, that will be through peaceful negotiations conducted without fear and intimidation and without triumphalist references to past conflicts.

One does not really know how much Musharraf believes all this himself. After all, he has shown remarkable flexibility and openness in dealing with India since 2004. He has negotiated CBMs with sincerity and stopped insisting on making agreements on all other issues conditional upon resolving Kashmir.

Yet, the book rubs many people up the wrong way, makes controversial claims (which infuriate some of those who disagree with them), and reveals the boastful, brash side of Musharraf’s personality rather starkly. That’s precisely why its publication is seen as unhelpful for the India-Pakistan dialogue.

Some in our so-called strategic community have already declared Musharraf an unreliable interlocutor who does not care about his credibility and cannot be trusted. The Bharatiya Janata Party will use passages from the book to buttress its view of the Havana handshake as a “sell-out” for parochial reasons.

The book isn’t written to promote the dialogue process. It has many negative and unpleasant features. They reveal a complex, at times troubled, military personality dealing uncertainly with fraught situations in a country beset by multiple crises, including a crisis of identity. Musharraf is not an analyst, nor a deep thinker. His thinking is linear, at times naïve.

But that’s no reason why the world should stop pushing Musharraf towards further moderation, to which he seriously pledges himself in the book. There’s even less reason why Indian policy-makers should discount the bilateral dialogue and instead pin their hopes upon getting Washington to exert pressure on Islamabad on their behalf—at a high likely overall cost to India.

In spite of all his negative observations, Musharraf doesn’t minimise the dialogue process. He remains committed to it. India must engage him. India must recognise the contribution the bilateral process has made, and build on it. It has yielded much more—movement on a clutch of issues, including Kashmir, and invaluable people-to-people contacts, with over 2.5 lakh crossing the border last year—than working through Washington. Even if the nuclear deal goes through to India’s satisfaction, and a strong India-US strategic partnership emerges, the US won’t abandon Pakistan as a friend. Pakistan is unlikely to do India’s bidding under American pressure.

India must evolve a long-term policy towards Pakistan, one which looks way beyond Musharraf and recognises that military or semi-military rule there is the single greatest obstacle to real progress, both domestically and in relations with India. But India has to deal with Musharraf as long as he is there—warts and all.
V

On North Korean Nuke Test
Statement on N. Korean Nuke Test by Women Making Peace, S. Korea

We oppose North Korea’s nuclear testing, finding reasonable and peaceful ways of resolving this issue.

North Korea has finally conducted its first nuclear bomb test on October 9, 2006. It shocked the world by conducting the test on the Korean peninsula. We remember tens of thousand Korean victims of atomic bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan in 1945.

North Korea’s actions deny the illegal nature of nuclear weapons and breach the 1992 South-North joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. It also threatens peace on the peninsula, and may lead to the expansion of arms and nuclear proliferation throughout Northeast Asia. It has also undermined the hope of Korean women who have worked hard to peacefully reunite Korea. We women once again clarify our position opposing to any form of nuclear testing and weapons that defy peace and threaten human lives. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme must be abandoned.

North Korea’s testing was expected. North Korea had announced that it would take hard-line measures on the US financial sanctions against North Korea to secure their livelihood and sovereignty, demanding bilateral dialogues with the United States. The United States ignored North Korea’s demand and kept sanctions in place. As a result, North Korea has finally carried out their threat, conducting the test. The current situation is due to a lack of active measures to build mutual trust between the United States and North Korea.

Another concern is the international community’s move toward raising tension. We women can not agree with the United Nation Security Council and Korea’s neighbouring countries on placing economic and military sanctions against the North Korea. Raising tension such as blockade and pressure would only lead the North to take another hard-line stance. Sanctions will not resolve this issue. They will instead lead to more tension and instability on the Korean peninsula and heighten the danger of war, making our hope of peace unattainable. With the current situation, more reasonable and peaceful measures are needed to resolve the issue of North Korea’s nuclear testing.

This issue must be resolved through dialogues and negotiations.

The United States, especially, needs to start dialogue with North Korea immediately. Despite the Six Party Joint Declaration of September 19 last year, the United States imposed financial sanctions against the North and led to the current testing. This issue can be resolved through a package deal with the United States guaranteeing the security of the regime in North Korea and North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons programme. Those countries involved in six-party talks must support the milieu promoting mutual trust between the United States and North Korea. Thus, rather than force, the North’s issue can be resolved in a diplomatic manner by enticing North Korea to participate in six-party dialogues.
The South Korean government should be more independent and assertive when it comes to North Korea. Modifying the engagement policy toward North Korea and reviewing the Mt. Kumgang tourism project and Gaesung Industrial Complex matter would further heighten tension. Rather than joining sanctions against North Korea, we women demand the Korean government to strive to minimize tension and concentrate on diplomatic efforts to achieve long-term goals of settling peace and achieving reunification of the Korean peninsula. In difficult times, the reconciliation and cooperation policy and South-North exchanges should be continued for peaceful dialogues.

We women will join hands with the forces in South Korea and abroad to resolve North's nuclear issue in a peaceful manner and to realize a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. We will strive until the day peace has arrived.

October 10, 2006

Women Making Peace
Tremors in India After the North Korean Test

J. Sri Raman

The most immediate questions raised by North Korea’s nuclear-weapon test were not about its impact on Northeast Asia. They concerned the consequences of the test for two far-off countries of the continent - Iran and India.

The world waits, with trepidation, to see what the blast means for Tehran and the bleeding Middle East. What deserves to be watched with nearly equal concern is how the “provocation” from Pyongyang (as Washington describes it) impacts the US-India nuclear “deal.”

Indications as of now are that the nuclear test won’t act as a deterrent against the “deal.” Not only that. Chances are that the US-India “strategic partnership,” which the “deal” is supposed to symbolize, is now poised to be carried to the stage of a closer and more dangerous collaboration.

The first reactions to the test in the pro-“deal” quarters in India betrayed a new fear following a major frustration. New Delhi’s reverie, in which it saw the elite nuclear club receiving it soon at least as a second-class member, suffered a rude jolt in the US Senate at the end of September. The House went into a recess then without passing a bill to arm President George Bush with powers to implement the “deal.” Nuclear hawks, wearing the hat of “experts,” hastened to restore the morale of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government. They held out the hope that Indian and US mandarins together will find a constitutional way out of the impasse by mid-November.

Then came the North Korea’s nuclear revolt, and the hope seemed to recede. Reports from Washington recorded the fears of the pro-“deal” lobbyists (with corporate interests in the lead) that Kim Jong-Il had thrown a lifeline to their opponents in the Senate. The Bush regime - so it was argued - could not convincingly act outraged over North Korea’s violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while rewarding a non-signatory to the treaty with nuclear largesse.

Such simple and straight logic, however, did not apply to a “strategic partnership.” The “experts” swung into action again, counselling the government and reassuring the country against despair over the “deal.” In their view, a prompt and correct response to the test could save the “deal” and actually strengthen the “partnership”. New Delhi acted on the advice, and has had no reason for regret.

In fact, New Delhi has long been rehearsing for the role of a recognized member of the “nuclear club” by lecturing non-nuclear- weapon nations on non-proliferation. Even while pursuing the “deal,” it has been reminding Iran and North Korea of their “duties” under the NPT, which India has rejected as “discriminatory” down the decades. The harangue has acquired a holier tone since the North Korean test.

Besides denouncing the test as a “violation of [North Korea’s] international commitments”, India’s Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee talked of Pyongyang’s illustration of “the dangers of clandestine
proliferation”. The layman may wonder if a nuclear bomb becomes any more or less of a weapon of mass destruction because of the manner of its acquisition. The Indian “experts” and establishment, however, are trying to make an entirely different point.

The reference to “clandestine proliferation” is a none-too-veiled allusion to reports of covert nuclear collaboration between North Korea and Pakistan, with the suspected involvement of infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan. Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf has reacted by making a distinction between his country and Khan as an individual scientist of adventurous inclinations. The general has also denied any link between the Pakistan and North Korean nuclear programmes.

New Delhi, however, has not been deterred from its campaign with the dual aim of pleasing Bush and baiting Pakistan. The articulate “experts” are admonishing innocent Indians who might have taken the India-Pakistan “peace process” too seriously. They are asking the people to remember that Pakistan’s missiles, developed with North Korean help, can hit all major Indian cities. That India’s missiles can bomb out Pakistan’s cities, too, seems to the “experts” somewhat beside the point.

The “experts” have proven right in their expectations from Washington. US Under Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Nicholas Burns has just ruled out any comparison between the Bush-aided blooming of India as a nuclear power and the reprehensibly “clandestine proliferation” represented by a “rogue state” like North Korea. Burns has assured New Delhi that the Bush administration will continue to “push” the “deal.” That should have sufficed for the purposes of the “strategic partnership”.

The “experts”, however, are of the view that, with the test, the time has come to enlarge the scope of the US-India team-up. They are calling on New Delhi to take two concrete and major steps toward making the “strategic partnership” appear almost a military alliance. They want India to enlist as a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and to get inducted into the US Missile Defence programme. India’s political establishment has not been opposed to either of the proposals in principle.

In the wake of 9/11, India’s navy joined the US in the euphemistically so-described “search” and “anti-piracy” operations in the Straits of Malacca and did not endear itself to the Southeast Asian countries and governments in the process. This was the beginning of the Bush campaign for a PSI.

A senior strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan, closely identified with the establishment, now writes: “It is fine to raise the alarm bells on illicit nuclear trade (as India has done after North Korea’s test). But what is India doing about it?... Why is New Delhi not part of the current global mechanism (the PSI) designed precisely to counter clandestine proliferation?”

In 2001, India was among the first few states to extend support to the National Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence programmes of the USA. In return then for India’s support for the programmes (on the specious ground of the “deep cuts” these would effect in the US nuclear arsenal), Washington had certified that India had developed only a “minimum nuclear deterrent.”

On June 28 2005, in Washington, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and India’s Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed a ten-year agreement titled the New Framework for US-India Defence Relationship (NFDR). The agreement had a provision for India’s induction into the missile defence programme. Raja Mohan argues that this is an ideal time to tap the potential of the provision.

Says he: “One inevitable consequence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons will be the
acceleration of the missile defence programmes of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan. Must India be the last Asian power to focus on missile defence?"

The North Korean nuclear test will not only threaten peace and security in Northeast Asia. The post-test tremors will be felt in South Asia as well.
North Korea’s Bomb: A Technical Assessment

Ivan Oelrich

Last Sunday, North Korea apparently tested a nuclear explosive. The "apparently" is needed because the explosion was so small by nuclear standards—that some have speculated that it may have been a large conventional explosion. What is the technical significance of the test, what does it mean, and what should we do now?

There is no question that the political and security implications of the test are huge and almost entirely negative. The technical implications are more mixed; the technical significance of the test is somewhat less than meets the eye.

There was early confusion about how large the explosion actually was, with U.S., French, and South Korean seismologists reporting a yield equivalent to about 500 tons of high explosive, that is half a kiloton, while the Russians reported that the yield was in the range of 10 to 15 kilotons, or twenty to thirty times larger. From the beginning, the source of this huge discrepancy was difficult to understand. Soon, the Russian seismic data were released and it became clear that even their own data did not support the Russian claim. Most reports as of yesterday had settled on the lower yield figure of about half a kiloton.

The assumption is that the low yield indicates a major failure of the test. It is actually easier to build a medium-sized nuclear weapon than a small one. The simplest Manhattan Project style weapons will naturally have yields in the ten to twenty kiloton range. It is quite difficult to design and build a nuclear weapon that reliably produces a limited yield. Sophisticated nuclear powers have done it, with some bombs and nuclear artillery shells, for example, having yields of a fraction of a kiloton. That was most likely not the aim of North Korea, nor is the country likely to have the technical sophistication to build a very low-yield nuclear weapon. It follows that the low yield was a mistake, a test failure. (It is fair to ask how the North Koreans could accomplish by accident what only the most sophisticated nuclear powers can do by design. The difference is reliable yield. If the North Koreans repeated their test, they might get a yield of several kilotons, or a yield of zero. Making a bomb that will sometimes be a dud is easy, making a bomb that is exactly the same "dud" each time is difficult.)

So how has the situation changed with this test? From a technical perspective, less that we might first think. The outside world knew that the North Koreans had plutonium available from fuel rods that had been removed from the reactor at Yongbyon. We knew that at least some of the plutonium had been separated out of the fuel rods and, since separation is a fairly straightforward process, it was a fair assumption that most or all of the plutonium had been separated. So we knew about their plutonium supply (and the test tells us nothing more about that except that now they have a little less), but another key question remained: Could they fashion the plutonium into a bomb? We did not know, although the U.S. intelligence
community concluded as far back as in the early 1990s that North Korea probably had built a couple of nuclear weapons.

There are two basic routes to a nuclear weapon, either using plutonium or enriched uranium. Enriching bomb-grade uranium is more difficult than producing plutonium in a simple nuclear reactor (although this is becoming less true with the continuing developments of gas centrifuges). Once a bomb-builder has the uranium, however, the construction of the simplest uranium bomb, a so-called “gun-assembled” bomb, is relatively easy. Plutonium is the opposite: producing the material is the easier step (especially if one does not worry about radioactive environmental contamination) but plutonium demands a more sophisticated and challenging bomb design, an “implosion” bomb. The Iranians seem to be on the uranium route (like Pakistan); the North Koreans have followed the plutonium path (like India).

Before the test, we did not know whether the North Koreans could build an implosion bomb or not. Had the test been successful, we would now know that they could, although we would still not know how close they were to a useable weapon; their test device might have weighed tons and been a once off, rigged up, laboratory experiment. But the test was not successful, so we still don't know whether the North Koreans can build a workable implosion bomb. Presumably the North Koreans learned something from the test so the probability of the next test being successful is somewhat higher than the probability that the first test would have been successful. This is not much of difference, leaving us in pretty much the same position we were in before the test. So the political implications of the test are huge but the technical implications are quite limited.

Why might the test have failed? An implosion bomb uses conventional high explosives to compress plutonium until it becomes "critical," that is, it will sustain a run-away chain reaction. The pressure from the conventional explosives has to be carefully controlled, for example, it must be symmetric or else it is like squeezing a ball of putty in your hand: pressure on one side doesn't compress the plutonium, it just squirts it out the other side. The most likely reason for the failure is some problem with the compression and there is any number of reasons why the compression might not be adequate. Assuming the test was carefully instrumented (and given North Korean technology, this is not certain), the North Koreans should be able to narrow down the cause, which will give them a much improved chance for success with their next test.

We might be able to learn something ourselves about the test if radioactive debris escaped from the test site. It is not easy to completely contain an underground nuclear explosion. Russian tests often leaked. The US was much better at containing tests but even US tests leaked in a couple of cases. Of course, it is much easier to contain a half kiloton test than a ten kiloton test but some radioactive material might have leaked out. Detecting that would, first, confirm that the test was, in fact, nuclear and analysing it might provide some limited information about the design of the weapon and the source and age of the plutonium.

What does this mean about possible responses? First of all, there is something to be accomplished by responding. When the North Koreans broke out of the safeguards on their reactor, making several bombs' worth of plutonium available, it was a disaster for the control of their weapon program. The outside world could keep an eye on the reactor and account for the materials there but once the material left the site, trying to track it was hopeless; the volume of the plutonium is small, any of thousands of buildings could house it. But there was one remaining important hurdle that would generate a clear signal if
jumped by the North Koreans: a test. Had the test been successful, then the cat really would be out of the bag. There would be no way to track some uncertain quantities of plutonium and the North Koreans would have a design that, in principle, could be replicated to produce more bombs in any of hundreds of nondescript light industrial facilities. (I say "in principle" because a more sophisticated nuclear power would require more than one test, but the North Koreans may have substantially lower reliability and confidence requirements.)

But the test was not successful. The North Koreans no doubt learned a great deal from their test but they have not proven to themselves, or the world, that they have a design that works. If the first test were successful, the marginal value of subsequent tests would have been relatively much smaller but with an unsuccessful test, the value of the next test will be as great or greater than the last test. We should not give up and say this is now a lost cause. There is much to be gained by using threats of sanctions and other tools to stop follow-on tests.
VI. CNDP in Action

American Peace Activists Visit India

Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, based in the US, along with his co-worker Mary Beth Sullivan, recently undertook a lecture-tour to India and visited and participated in a number of programmes held in Chennai, Vishakhapatnam, Raipur, Nagpur and Delhi. The programmes in Chennai, Raipur and Delhi were organised by the CNDP and its constituents.

Chennai

Their first stopover was Chennai and on October 3 they visited the stall of the Movement Against Nuclear Weapons (MANW) - a leading constituent of the CNDP, at the annual, three-day public exhibition here to mark the Gandhi Jayanti. There they interacted with a large cross-section of local peace activists and common people.

On October 4, the MANW organized a news conference. Thirteen different media outlets attended, including the Hindu, the New Indian Express and some television channels. Here Bruce spoke of the growing American people’s protests against the warmongering activities of the George Bush Administration as well of the dire need to oppose the US-India nuclear deal. He also talked of GN’s efforts to lobby intensely with the US Senate against the deal. This received wide media coverage here.

Earlier, the MANW had organized an interactive session for the CNDP’s Achin Vanaik with mediapersons and students on one of his visits to Chennai. The MANW had also organised, along with the People’ Union for Civil Liberties and other mass organizations, in a demonstration against the US-supported Israeli aggression on Lebanon. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki anniversaries had also been observed.

Raipur

On the 7th of October the visiting team was at Raipur.

In the morning Bruce addressed local students at the Political Science Department of The Durga College. He talked about the Indo-US nuclear deal and about the political stances taken by the Republicans and Democrats in the US on this issue. Then there was a lunch meeting with peace activists from Chhattisgarh. Post-lunch he interacted with students from the Anthropology department at the University here. In the evening, there was a 200 strong meeting comprising mainly local doctors, journalists and peace activists. Here Bruce spoke more about the prevailing political climate in the US, about Bush’s imperial designs, and about the politics of oil. Mary Beth made a very moving presentation about the peace movement in the US. Then there was intense and enlightening interaction between then audience and speakers.

Delhi

Delhi was the team’s last stopover. On October 12 the CNDP in Delhi organised a press conference on ‘Space Weaponisation and Peace’. This was addressed by both the members of the visiting team, ND Jayprakash (CNDP-NCC member) and Kavita Krishnan (President, AISA). Journalists from both national and international media were present in large number. Senior Journalist Praful Bidwai (CNDP-NCC member) was also present.

Seminar on ‘Indo- American Agreement on Atomic Energy’ in Kanpur, UP

A seminar on ‘Indo-American Agreement on Atomic Energy’ was held at the DAV College, Kanpur hosted by the CNDP Kanpur Chapter on September 29. Mr. Qamar Agha (CNDP-NCC member), a senior journalist and strategic analyst, was the key speaker and made a very detailed and enlightening presentation.
An inter-college essay competition on this subject had been held and the chair of the programme, the principal of the DAV College, Shri Ashok Saxena, felicitated the winners. He urged the students to develop the nation by contributing their bit by helping in nuclear disarmament. The need to develop harmonious relations between all countries and peace were also discussed on the occasion.

The convenor, Dr. Pradyot Pradhan, elucidated on the aim of the essay competition and the seminar.

Campaign against Planned Expansion of the Koodankulam Nuclear Power Plant

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL), which had originally planned to set up 6 X 1,000 MWe light water (Russian-made VVER-412) nuclear reactors at Koodankulam, has now decided to increase the number to eight. It is the flagship project of the NPCIL. The project is envisaged on a thousand-acre plot in Koodankulam, 18 km northeast of the tourist town Kanyakumari. Water is a key resource for the running of the reactors and condensers, a resource that has led to serious local opposition.

Spurred by the ongoing Indo-US nuclear deal, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is banking on the proposed six VVERs in Koodankulam to improve its capacity from the current lowly figure of 3,577 MWe generated from 16 reactors, accounting for just about 3 percent of India's energy needs, to 40,000 MWe by 2030 and 275,000 MWe by 2052, maybe around 10 percent of the nation's energy needs. The VVER reactors are the biggest in scope in India. They are also of a kind that India has not constructed so far and hence the questions about the DAE's ability to manage them safely.

Crucially, there has been fierce local opposition to the project in Tirunelveli and Kanyakumari districts, led primarily by farmers and environmentalists, since 1988. The tsunami of 2005 that battered the neighbouring Kanyakumari town has added a new dimension to the concerns of geologists and environmentalists. To compound matters, one of the many lacunae in the Environment Impact Assessment report prepared by National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) for the four new proposed NPPs, is that it ignores the possible impact a tsunami could have on the reactors.

The Koodankulam nuclear power project authorities had recently planned to conduct a secretive public hearing on October 6, 2006 at the Tirunelveli collector's office in order to add four more mega nuclear power generating units (No. 3 - 6) that would generate 4,000 MW electricity.

But words spread and their plan floundered. Around 800 people gathered at the site. Vociferous opposition was made against the expansion plan and the power plant as a whole. Strong objections were made against taking the Pechiparai dam water (which is in Kanyakumari district at a distance of around 65 kms.) to the Koodankulam plants. Given the severe water scarcity in the region this became the main focus of the furore. Eventually the District Collector had to announce that there would be public hearings with proper publicity and notice in advance in all the three districts likely to be affected.

This was small but significant victory scored by the local people against the NPCIL authorities.

Dr. S P Udayakumar who is playing a lead role against the nuclear power plant in Koodankulam is also a leading member of the CNDP.

Struggle in AP against Uranium Mining

[Reproduced below is a letter to the National Human Rights Commission, which is self-explanatory.]

To,

Hon’ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand
Chairperson
National Human Rights Commission,
Faridkot House, Copernicus Marg,
New Delhi, PIN 110001
Respected Sir,

Sub: - Uranium Project - Tummalapalle of Cudapah District, Andhra Pradesh - Environmental Public Hearing - False cases hoisted on Protestors - Gross violation of Human rights.

This is to bring to your notice that recently (on 10th Sepetember 2006) an Environmental Public Hearing (EPH) was conducted in Tummalapalle of Cudapah district in Andhra Pradesh on Uranium mining proposed by Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) as mandated by the Environment Impact Assessment Notification of 1994 issued by Ministry of Environment and Forests.

That so called Environmental Public Hearing (EPH) conducted had turned out to be a "Private" hearing of UCIL and the individuals colluding with UCIL. The presence of large number of hired people brought from the villages not likely to be affected by the project and unprecedented large Police Force and prevention of the villagers likely to be directly affected by the project, from participation, are clear indications of the stage managed EPH, with the collusion of the authorities concerned.

Purpose of EPH

The EPH is the only legal space that is available to the people, where they can raise their concerns about the proposed project, which are to be considered in the process of decision making, for according Environmental Clearance to the project or otherwise. But unfortunately the people of the villages likely to be affected by Tummalapalle Uranium Project i.e. Mining & Processing of Uranium, had been denied of this opportunity by not permitting them to take part in EPH conducted on 10th September.

The Electronic and print media have extensively covered the event, giving the particulars of the way the EPH was conducted and the presence of some individuals not connected with the EPH process on the stage, which has vitiated the entire process. The press clippings of the same are enclosed. However the District Collector in his closing remarks, is reported to have stated that the public had expressed in favour of the project and accordingly the Report will be submitted to the authorities, which it is in contradiction of the actual facts.

Sustainable Development

The right to "Sustainable Development" has been declared by the UN General Assembly to be an inalienable Human Right. The 1992 Rio Conference declared that Human beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development and Human beings are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. In order to achieve "Sustainable Development" environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of development process and cannot be considered in isolation of it.

The Gross Injustices of Corrupt Police Department

The local police officials have foisted false cases on the protestors against this project blaming them of various crimes, which they have never committed.

The most irregular thing about these police cases is the fact that no individual or agency has lodged any complaint on any of them.

We strongly believe that this is being done to discourage local people to participate in a future public hearing, which is being demanded after cancelling the one held on 10th September 2006, by various organisations as well as all major political parties like TDP, CPM, CPI and MIM. The press clippings on the same are attached for your reference.

Request

In the light of the position explained above, it is requested that all the false and malicious cases booked against innocent villagers who were exercising their fundamental rights by voicing their concerns be lifted and also strict action be taken against the officials involved. We also request you to declare the EPH conducted on 10th September 2006 be treated as null and void in view of the human rights violations of not allowing people to exercise their Freedom of
Speech, Illegal and conduct a fresh EPH after giving adequate notice, in a free, fair and transparent manner under the supervision of impartial body like the State Human Rights Commission.

Thanking You,
Yours Cordially,
Capt. J Rama Rao I.N. (Retd)
Convener MAUP (Movement Against Uranium Project)
[MAUP is a constituent of the CNDP.]

(Salient Details of the Project
Nature of Mine: Underground
Extent of Mine & Processing Plant: 879 Hectares
Est. Cost of Project: 1029.57 Crore
Rated Production: 3000 Tonnes per Day
Total Life: 30 Years
Uranium Concentration: 0.039 %
Water Requirement: 5225 M3/Day
Power Demand: 17.85 MW
Scope for employment: 934 Persons)

IDPD Campaigns against Nuke

Over the last couple of months, the Indian Doctors for Peace and Development (IDPD) - an important constituent of the CNDP, organized a number of events to highlight the issue of nuclear danger and the dire need to fight back.

Hiroshima Day was observed on August 6 by the local IDPD units in Agra and Patna.

In Agra a peace march was held at the back of the picturesque Taj Mahal on the bank of Yamuna River to demand an end to the ongoing nuclear arms race. Medical students and doctors from different parts of the country participated in this march. This was followed by a seminar to commemorate the victims of atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The seminar demanded immediate elimination of all nuclear weapons from the earth, end to arms trade, resolution of conflicts through mutual dialogues and diversion of funds from arms race to health and education. The seminar was organized jointly by the IDPD Agra unit and the Prelude Public School.

Students of the school participated in large number and paid homage to the victims of Hiroshima through dance and songs. The Principal of the school, Ms. Mohini Ghosh, in her opening remarks highlighted the need to educate the school students on such vital a question of peace health and development. Dr. Sanjeev Verma formally welcomed the guests. Dr. Sudhir Dhakre introduced the subject to the audience. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Vinod Saigal delivered the keynote address and dealt with the current turmoil in West Asia in great details. Other eminent speakers included Achin Vanaik, Dr Arun Mitra - General Secretary of the IDPD and Ms Amarjeet Kaur. Prof. Deoki Nandan, Principal, S.N. Medical College Agra, was the Chief Guest. Students from a number of medical colleges from nearby regions also made valuable presentations.

In Patna Hiroshima & Nagasaki day was jointly commemorated by the IDPD and AIAIF at the local Gandhi Maidan. Prominent doctors and social activists including Dr. S. L. Mandal - President of Bihar Chapter AIAIF, Prof. O. P. Jaiswal - Secretary, Dr. Manju Geeta Mishra, Dr. Shanti Singh, Dr. Gopal Prasad Sinha, Dr. Sachidanand Singh - Secretary of IMA Bihar, Dr. Ram Sharan Sinha, Dr. A. K. Gaur and Dr. Shakeel-Ur-Rahman participated in this meet. Mr. Arun Kumar Singh and Mr. Sadhana Mishra - both social activists, also addressed the meeting. The rally had started from the Gandhi Maidan near Mahatma Gandhi’s statue and ended at the Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose Park. A seminar was also organized on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century at the Nalanda Medical College.

In Chandigarh, on August 27, a seminar was held on Energy Security and Indo-US Nuclear Deal. The seminar was presided over by Dr M M Puri, former Vice Chancellor of the Punjab University, Chandigarh. Presenting his lead paper Dr Arun Mitra, General Secretary, IDPD posited that nuclear power is neither safe nor economical and it cannot be the answer to India’s future energy needs. It is fraught with dangers right from mining, transport, storage, utilization and management of waste product. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 is a grim reminder. Similar accidents in any other nuclear plant cannot be ruled out. Radiation related diseases in population around uranium mines and nuclear facilities are also well known. As per the reports there have been 300 such incidents of serious nature. Moreover there is no foolproof method with which we can
dump the end product safely. He called upon the Govt. of India to hold an informed national debate on the issue. In conclusion, he posed the question why should India adopt nuclear energy when it is neither safe nor economical and is being phased out in most of the developed world?

In Goa on October 13 a seminar on Peace, Health and Development was held in the Goa Medical College in which 20 faculty members and over 100 medical students participated. It gave a call for complete abolition of nuclear weapons from the earth within a time-bound framework. The seminar, first in the series of national campaign to abolish nuclear weapons as a part of the international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons (ICAN), was organised at the inspiring initiative of Com. Christopher Fonseca (CNDP NCC member) - a leading trade unionist and social activist of Goa. A team of five medical students, comprising Ms Prajakta Chinchankar, Ms Deepali Panchal, Ms Shradha shirole, Mr.Swapnil Gadhwe and Mr.Sachin from the MHF Medical college, Sangamner (Maharashtra), under the guidance of Dr R.S Gunjal, Chairman, MHF Medical college, Sangamner along with their team-leader Maj. Dr. Jeetendra Singh, in-charge students wing and Executive Committee member of the IDPD addressed the seminar. They informed the august gathering as to how nuclear weapons are the weapons of mass annihilation. The nuclear arms race in south Asia has squeezed our finances exorbitantly, which could otherwise be used for the betterment of health and education status of our people. If steps are not taken well in time this race will continue unabated as has been witnessed by recent nuclear weapons testing by North Korea. The presentations were followed by an intense interactive session. At the end, a declaration calling for abolition of nuclear weapons A Step towards Peace was put up for signature and endorsement. The Dean pioneered the move along with faculty members and around 60 medical students.
VII. Education about Nukes?
Where Are We Heading?
How Do We Get There?

Lalita Ramdas

A Brief Retrospective

Almost from the time that the CNDP was constituted in the year 2000, EDUCATION AND AWARENESS BUILDING has been a clear priority. At many meetings and conventions over these past six years, decisions about preparing materials, working with teachers and students, have been taken with good intent. However, the actual achievements on the ground have been extremely disparate and uneven in spread and in quality, as also in their sustainability.

The reasons for this uneven performance lie both in the profusion of issues and agendas, as also in the severe pressures and constraints on human, material and financial resources. Also structurally speaking, despite the availability of a large potential pool of activists and experts we did not have a clear mandate to make this a priority.

Over time, the initial success of the CNDP efforts in awakening and building a much broader and active constituency of anti nuclear activists, which in turn would fuel a growing and vociferous body of public opinion, seems to have lost momentum and energy. Clearly the agenda of a lively and active education component also sagged because it was also not resourced. The picture is not encouraging - both domestically and globally.

Global Dimensions: Some Milestones

2005 - IAEA and El Baradei are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize - for their 'heroic' efforts to contain Nuclear proliferation — but the Hibakusha, who have battled gamely for over 6 decades to demand a nuclear free planet, get no global recognition

July 2006 - The Non-proliferation treaty is in shambles - the signing of the deal between and Indian and the USA is merely one more indication..........

Nov 2006 - The Indo-US Nuclear deal is in Limbo - but India’s resolve to strengthen our nuclear status and capability in the sub-region is strong and unwavering............

Today - Oct 10 2006 - the papers are screaming out about North Korea’s perfidy in actually carrying out their nuclear test - and our government is slamming their action as clear proof of the nexus with Islamabad.

Conferences, Coalitions, endless calls for Total Abolition, disarmament and non-proliferation notwithstanding - we in the overall peace movement find ourselves at the crossroad.

The Domestic Scene

We live in complex and changing times, where at any given moment there are raging debates and actions around a bewildering yet compelling list of concerns and questions. Members of our Coalition - while undoubtedly being exercised by the Nuclear Question - also bring their own primary agendas and priorities, which dictate the levels to which they are actually able to contribute energies to
working on the nuclear dimension. At the risk of putting down a laundry list of major issues - here is a pot pourri of things that we are involved with at any given point of time:

- US Imperialism, MNCs, and the role of Media and their corporate masters?
- The War in Iraq, US plans to invade Iran, the assault on Palestine and the Israeli attack on Lebanon
- The Global Campaign against Poverty and the anti-people Policies of the World Bank and IMF?
- Terrorism, the war on terror - Black Laws and anti-people ordinances - assault on democratic institutions?
- Justice, Human Rights, Gender... Communal Harmony and Peace - Malegaon - Justice for Gujarat - now Mangalore .......the list goes on and on
- Big Dams- SEZs and mass displacement of people.
- Degradation of our land, our forests, our oceans? Genetic engineering - GM cotton - BT brinjals? Forest policy and the continued marginalisation of indigenous populations?
- WATER - HEALTH - SANITATION-NEW DISEASES
- Corruption - Arms dealers - Kickbacks - nexus between politicians, the bureaucracy and members of the Armed Forces.
- POVERTY< HUNGER <ILLITERACY< VIOLENCE<????????????????
- Building Grass Roots democracy -
- Dangers of nuclearisation, nuclear plants, energy, weapons etc. We at CNDP are a house divided - those who support Nuclear Energy as 'clean energy' - but are against weapons; and those who are very clear that neither is acceptable
- In the ultimate analysis - is it Gandhi - Marx - or Keynes? Or is it, as Munna Bhai has now coined the phrase - 'Gandhi-giri', because the time for 'isms' is over?

I almost dread opening my email - the inbox is crowded with messages about any or all of the issues listed above - all of them are invariably urgent - petitions on everything from Coca-cola, to forests, to Kashmir, to clemency for Afzal......

The truth is that there are too many urgent, increasing and sometimes conflicting - pressures and demands on the likes of us civil society - peoples movements - peace constituencies - and all too often, given our fragmentation and paucity of numbers, we are like uncoordinated puppets frantically running from one to the other - fighting fires - or as some cynical observers like to say - 'tilting at windmills'. It is also a fact that there is a shrinking resource base - both human and material - to be able to fight these many battles.

If we are indeed to focus on our primary agenda - namely to focus on the nuclear question - which includes both disarmament and energy - while also working on building the Peace - then we need to be clear about our priorities - revisit them if necessary - and agree on how we wish to proceed.

We must also be ruthless in assessing our strengths and capabilities - like any strategic commander and determining our actions based on these assessments.

Perhaps on account of the plethora of agendas - we have been 'reacting and responding' rather than providing direction and leadership. In turn - this has blurred and diluted our own vision and action - and perhaps we have found it easier to respond to external stimuli while determining some of our actions.

At the recent meeting of the NCC held in Ludhiana - for the first time perhaps - we
were able to reach a consensus on the need to include the question of nuclear Energy in addition to the primary issue of Nuclear Disarmament - as part of our work. And we did have a vocal consensus on the need to prioritise our focus on a broadly educational canvas - which would also include the preparation of kits for the education of elected representatives, in addition to that of school and college students.

Our Agreements are summed up below:

· The need to prioritise an Education Agenda and Action Plan for CNDP - which would contain a comprehensive approach to working with students and teachers at several levels.

· We should deal with the Nuclear issue within a larger framework of discussion on Peace studies - war - violence - competition and intolerance in our society. This should be viewed as a tactical decision in view of our experience of the past 7 years.

· We will prepare a comprehensive data base of all existing materials and experiences of work in schools and colleges - names of resource persons, teaching methodologies, materials writers and producers.

· To prepare and develop a proposal for a PEACE TRAIN - (similar to the PEACE BOAT) - which could ply in the sub-region. **Subsequently - post our voyage on the Peace Boat - we have also discussed with Peace Boat activists and others, the possibility of our own PEACE BOAT - in the neighbouring oceans - countries of the Indian Ocean rim so to speak.

· To develop content and materials specifically around Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy and Power Plants, Radiation, Mining, Health and Safety Issues, in appropriate formats and which could be included in the formal education system.

· To explore the possibility of using spaces and slots in the newly developed National Curriculum framework for subject areas of Peace and Human Rights, and Environmental Education.

· To follow up on the possibility of meeting relevant people in HRD, NCERT, CBSE etc towards this end.

· Bring together a core group of persons interested in working further on the education programme on Nuclear and related issues. Plan an initial 'brainstorming' session between Sept and November 2006.

· To involve others from the region and international groups who have been working on education for Peace and Nuclear disarmament - Clean Energy.

· Mobilize Funds and identify Human and other resources for all of the above!

Conclusion

Where then are we heading and where do we put our energies? Who is the real enemy? Where should the battle be pitched? And of all the myriads of competing issues - is it possible to narrow down the focus to a few really critical ones?

A related question is the tricky one of how to link the Nuclear question with the ethical issues of the nature of technology - its awesome destructive potential etc - and to de-link it from the questions related to National Security and nationalisms - the whole debate around nuclear Nationalism etc.

Our approaches might need some radical re-thinking and re-positioning. Clearly activists and academics alike will have to re-strategise if we are not to be totally marginalized. Perhaps the way ahead will have to rely on reaching out to the largest possible numbers of students and teachers, in educational institutions, as also in communities. The accent should be to provide information,
stimulate debate and dialogue, rather than push our own positions on these questions. One can only hope that once they are armed with the facts, they will themselves be able to take positions which are not influenced purely by nationalistic or other forms of chauvinism. Given the present climate and dominant discourse - particularly the influence of media - the task is by no means easy. We continue to see the long and weary struggle waged by our friends and colleagues in the anti nuclear movements in the west. What we need is for many more people to be part of the action and the work that lies ahead.
VIII. Resources:
Two documents

A. 13 Practical Steps

At the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament were agreed to by all governments signed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

1. Signing the CTBT

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. Stopping Testing

A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. Negotiation

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. Negotiation

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. No Going Back

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. Abolishing Nukes

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. Upholding Existing Treaties

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. Implementing Existing Treaties

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Step by Step...

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

* Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
* Increased transparency by the nuclear-
weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

* The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

* Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

* A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

* The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Excess fissile materials under IAEA control

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. General and Complete Disarmament

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Reporting

Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. Verifying

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Source: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/13point.html
B. Synopsis of Hans Blix
Commission Report on WMD

[The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC), chaired by Hans Blix, published a report on June 1, 2006 putting forward a number of proposals on how to rid the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Entitled ‘Weapons of Terror’, the report analyses the threats under which the world is living today - above all, those derived from 27,000 existing nuclear weapons and the efforts by other states and perhaps terrorist groups to acquire further WMDs.

The WMDC was established on an initiative by the late Foreign Minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh, acting on a proposal by then United Nations Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala. The Swedish government invited Dr. Blix to set up and chair the Commission. The Commission commenced its work against the background of more than a half-century’s striving for non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction.]

Weapons of Terror

Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms

Synopsis

Why Action is Necessary:

· Nuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they can, in the hands of either states or non-state actors, cause destruction on a vastly greater scale than any conventional weapons, and their impact is far more indiscriminate and long-lasting.

· So long as any state has such weapons - especially nuclear arms - others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.

· Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War balance of terror, stocks of such weapons remain extraordinarily and alarmingly high: some 27,000 in the case of nuclear weapons, of which around 12,000 are still actively deployed.

· Weapons of mass destruction cannot be uninvented. But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their use made unthinkable. Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world’s reach.

· Over the past decade, there has been a serious, and dangerous, loss of momentum and direction in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Treaty making and implementation have stalled and, as a new wave of proliferation has threatened, unilateral enforcement action has been increasingly advocated.

· In 2005 there were two loud wake-up calls in the failure of the NPT Review Conference and in the inability of the World Summit to agree on a single line about any WMD issue. It is critical for those calls to be heeded now.

What should be done:

1. Agree on general principles of action

· Disarmament and non-proliferation are best pursued through cooperative rule-based international order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral institutions, with the UN Security Council as the ultimate global authority.

· There is an urgent need to revive meaningful negotiations, through all available intergovernmental mechanisms, on
the three main objectives of reducing the danger of present arsenals, preventing proliferation, and outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all.

· States, individually and collectively, should consistently pursue policies designed to ensure that no state feels a need to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

· Governments and relevant intergovernmental organizations and non-government actors should commence preparations for a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction to generate new momentum for concerted international action.

2. Reduce the danger of present arsenals: no use by states - no access by terrorists

· Secure all weapons of mass destruction and all WMD-related material and equipment from theft or other acquisition by terrorists.

· Take nuclear weapons off high-alert status to reduce the risk of launching by error; make deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons; place all non-strategic nuclear weapons in centralized storage; and withdraw all such weapons from foreign soil.

· Prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and phase out the production of highly enriched uranium.

· Diminish the role of nuclear weapons by making no-first-use pledges, by giving assurances not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon states, and by not developing nuclear weapons for new tasks.

3. Prevent proliferation: no new weapon systems no new possessors

· Prohibit any nuclear-weapon tests by bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

· Revive the fundamental commitments of all NPT parties: the five nuclear-weapon states to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.

· Recognize that countries that are not party to the NPT also have a duty to participate in the disarmament process.

· Continue negotiations with Iran and North Korea to achieve their effective and verified rejection of the nuclear-weapon option, while assuring their security and acknowledging the right of all NPT parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

· Explore international arrangements for an assurance of supply of enriched uranium fuel, and for the disposal of spent fuel, to reduce incentives for national facilities and to diminish proliferation risks.

4. Work towards outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all

· Accept the principle that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, as are biological and chemical weapons, and explore the political, legal, technical and procedural options for achieving this within a reasonable time.

· Complete the implementation of existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and work actively to establish zones free of WMD in other regions, particularly and most urgently in the Middle East.

· Achieve universal compliance with, and effective implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and speed up the destruction of chemical weapon stocks.

· Achieve universal compliance with, and effective implementation of, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and improve cooperation between industry, scientists and governments to reinforce the ban on the development and production of biological weapons and to keep abreast of developments in biotechnology.

· Prevent an arms race in space by prohibiting any stationing or use of weapons in outer space.

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