Index

Editorial / 2

A. Indian Scenario in Regional and Global Contexts / 3-12
I. The Strange Alliance of South Asia's Nuclear Savages / J. Sri Raman / 3-6
II. Think Globally, Act Regionally? South Asia, China and the United States / Zia Mian
and M. V. Ramana / 7-12

B. The Global Perspective / 13-44
I. New Momentum for Nuclear Abolition: Opportunities and Obstacles / Alice Slater / 13-19
II. Only the End of the World: Reporting from the United Nations General Assembly
   First Committee, October 2010 / John Hallam / 20-24
III. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next? / Gareth Evans / 25-35
IV. On the Issue of Nuclear Terrorism / Achin Vanaik / 36-42
V. The Hiroshima Declaration on the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons / Nobel Peace
   Laureates / 43-44

C. Book Review / 45-48
On Nuclear Power / Sukla Sen / 45-48
Editorial

This November the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) has attained a significant milestone--it has completed a decade of its existence. This decade began with the Indian state going openly nuclear with five nuclear test explosions in May 1998.

Deeply appalled and stirred by the disturbing development, anti-nuclear peace activists from various corners of India sat together to give an effective voice to their protests. A national convention in Delhi, in November 2000, resulted in the formation of CNDP.

Since then CNDP has been constantly engaged in raising the demands for a nuclear weapon free India, South Asia and the world. The fight against the Indian nuclear establishment, its utterly non-transparent ways and regrettable disregard for public safety in the sector of power production, has emerged as an important component of the overall struggle. Of late this has assumed even greater salience. This journal, Peace Now, started its journey in the summer of 2003 as a part of that engagement. The inaugural national convention has since been followed by another two national conventions – one in Jaipur in November 2004 and the other in Nagpur in February 2008 which had begun in response to the Indian state going openly nuclear with five nuclear test explosions in May 1998. In 2010 the Tenth Anniversary of the National Convention is being held in Delhi from December 9-12, to renew the commitment to a nuclear weapon free world and to reenergise the campaign.

Ten years back India remained largely stigmatised and isolated in the world as a consequence of the nuclear blasts, about two and a half year back, in May 1998, the tensions between India and Pakistan reached a peak; today India stands substantially, even if not completely, integrated in the global nuclear order as a de facto nuclear power despite being a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) like Pakistan and Israel. The latest offer of the US President on his recent trip to India in early November to support India’s claim for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which ironically came up in 1975 to tackle the consequences of India’s first nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974 in flagrant violation of the global norms of the day, as a full member are just two most recent markers of this continuing reversal process. While the heat between India and Pakistan has somewhat abated, both remain feuding neighbours nevertheless and locked in a nuclear and non-nuclear arms race. And the relation between India and China has attained greater importance over this period.

On the world stage, the election of US President Barack Obama and his call for a “world without nuclear weapons” on April 5 2009 in Prague soon after assuming office brought in new hopes for global nuclear disarmament. This was in stark contrast with the preceding years of Bush regime. The modestly positive outcome of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 also stands in sharp contrast with failure of the previous NPT in 2005 to come up with any resolution at all. But more recent developments have dampened the optimism in the air to a great degree. But the peace activists all the world over remain nonetheless determined in their bid to attain a world without nuclear weapons in a foreseeable future. The demand for a global Nuclear Weapons [Abolition] Convention has emerged as the focal demand in the process.

In this issue we carry a number of articles dealing with and explicating both the Indian and global scenarios. And Peace Now conveys its best wishes to the forthcoming Tenth Anniversary National Convention.
A. Indian Scenario in Regional and Global Contexts

I.
The Strange Alliance of South Asia's Nuclear Savages

J. Sri Raman*

De-hyphenation of India and Pakistan – that is supposed to be the heart’s desire of the Indian "elite" and establishment, disdainful of their poor sub-continental cousins and defining their own new role at the head of a "rising power". They keep making this claim, even while missing no opportunity to seek anti-Pakistan assistance from the rest of the world, especially the Washington-led west. India's nuclear disarmament movement, however, can hardly contemplate such de-hyphenation.

What the movement confronts is an India-Pakistan nuclear threat. It is a joint threat not only because both the countries possess nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon programmes. It is so also because the ruling classes of the two neighbouring and rival nations, while keeping up their nuclear arms and missiles race, have combined it with a common defence of their presumed right to possess and augment arsenals of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

They have done so not only as non-signatories and adversaries (in the name of "national sovereignty") of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They have done so even more by pressing claims to recognition as "responsible" nuclear-weapon states, despite the dreadful nuclear threats they have continued to trade against each other.

They have made no departure from the pursuit of this paradoxical, officially under-stated policy in the decade since the founding of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace in New Delhi in November 2000.

The hyphenation of the threat went hardly unnoticed in the Charter of the CNDP, adopted at the first meeting of its National Coordination Committee in Chennai in January 2001. The Charter stated: "...India and Pakistan have now joined the original five members of the nuclear weapons club and Israel who, unmoved by the horrifying experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945, have amassed nuclear weapons. Such a legitimisation of nuclear weapons deserves unequivocal condemnation. The (CNDP) was constituted...in response to nuclear weaponisation in India and Pakistan against a background of the global amassing of nuclear weapons."

The Pokharan II and Chagai nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 in India and Pakistan respectively were followed by street-level display of jingoism and militarism in both countries. Strangely and simultaneously, however, both New Delhi and Islamabad claimed that the acquisition of nuclear arms by two countries, in effect, banished the prospect of even a conventional war between the two. The Kargil conflict belied the claim in less than a year. In between, came a joint international exercise of the two governments.

India's then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee undertook his famous bus ride to Lahore in early 1999. The main Vajpayee mission, it soon became clear, was to pursue the theme that nuclear weapons actually promoted peace between the neighbours.

What was new about the Lahore Declaration signed by Vajpayee and Pakistan's Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif at the end of a two-day summit (February 20-21) was the portion dealing with nuclear weapon issues. This writer sums it up as: "The Vajpayee mission was part of a post-Pokharan II image-mending exercise. On the morrow of its tests and before Chagai, India might have challenged Pakistan to a trial of strength, but the attempt now was to tell the world that nuclear weapons had invested the two countries with a new sense of responsibilities. The Declaration pledged that both 'shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence-building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict'. The accompanying memorandum of understanding detailed steps contemplated in this direction."

Not a single one of these measures has been implemented thus far. Four years later, in 2003, was initiated, amidst much hype and many hopes, an "India-Pakistan peace process".

The series of parleys, held under this process, failed to produce any significant progress towards nuclear confidence building. Analysing the official-level talks conducted in September 2004, when a Congress-led government had already succeeded Vajpayee's regime, this reporter noted: "Marked by polite smiles and prolonged handshakes, the process continues without making the least progress on the two life-and-death issues for the sub-continent's people."

The analysis added: "The more frightening and fundamental of the issues has, in fact, been forgotten, with both side tacitly agreeing to leave it untouched. The ministers have not wasted time over the minor problem of nuclear weapons. Their officials had disposed of it before, while discussing nuclear 'confidence-building measures' (CBMs). These 'measures' - like notification of each other before tests of nuclear-capable missiles - were somehow supposed to create confidence that the people of the two countries were safe even when such missiles stayed in military deployment and on hair-trigger alert."

The proposal for the "peace process" came after events that made South Asia the "most dangerous place on earth" and brought it to the brink of a nuclear war. A terrorist attack on India's Parliament in December 2001 led to the deployment of nearly a million troops on both sides of the India-Pakistan border, especially in Kashmir, and an "eye-ball to eyeball confrontation" accompanied by several threats from both sides to "use the ultimate weapon". The experience did not make nuclear confidence-building more than a ritually mentioned part of the "peace process".

Nor did the fears raised over the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands. While Islamabad and the Pakistan army have continued to dismiss such apprehensions indignantly, it is notable that India has not joined the West in embarrassing Pakistan on this score as it might have been expected to do. In November 2010, India's army chief V. K. Singh has gone out of his way to allay fears on this count. He is reported to have said: "Probably Pakistan also has and they are taking extra measures....I don't think there is any reason to say things are not secure. Things are secure."

"Pakistan, too, officially subscribes to a nuclear outlook that defends the competitive madness of both the countries on this count. Former Pakistani diplomat Tariq Osman Hyder argues the fundamentally flawed case for "nuclear stability in South
Asia". In a paper, presented at an international conference in the University of Hamburg in Germany in 2007, he says: "If stability between the West and the USSR rested upon their strategic capabilities, why should the same not be true in the case of Pakistan and India in South Asia?"

He asserts: "The nuclear capabilities of both countries have played an important role in managing a difficult relationship. The resulting stability that has been achieved is certainly of benefit to South Asia ... as well as the international community."

This absurd theory of nuclear weapons as a sine qua non for peace has actually been acted upon. As Hyder notes: "In the first round of nuclear CBMs in New Delhi in June 2004, in the joint declaration, both countries recognised that the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor of stability. This is the first time that potential nuclear rivals have made such an (official) acknowledgment. Both countries also declared that they would work towards such strategic stability."

The fallacy of this argument does not really need to be argued at length. Michael Krepon, who has suggested CBMs between two countries, points to the illogicality of the proposition peddled by Hyder and others. Krepon writes: "Achieving strategic stability may, however, be even harder for India and Pakistan than for the Soviet Union and the United States. After experiencing harrowing crises over Berlin and Cuba, Moscow and Washington tacitly agreed not to play with fire in each other’s back yard. Their strategic competition then played out in more out-of-the-way locales, where missteps were severely punished by proxy forces. The locus of Indian and Pakistani competition, on the other hand, is the contested back yard of Kashmir. The cruellest irony of it all consists in the fact that the talk of Bombs for peace has been accompanied by active and actual preparations for a nuclear war. The clearest warning about this came from India’s former army chief General Deepak Kapoor and his "Cold Start" doctrine. In November 2009, the general told a seminar in New Delhi: "The possibility of a limited war under a nuclear overhang is still a reality, at least in the Indian subcontinent." He followed this up with public observations on the Cold Start plan – to "launch self-contained and highly-mobile 'battle groups', adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours". The doctrine envisaged something "short of a nuclear war", which could very conceivably get worse.

India’s security analyst Subhash K. Kapila described it as "a blitzkrieg-type strategy" designed to promote war by countering Indian democracy and international peace initiatives, by denying time for intervention by either the country’s "political leadership" or "Pakistan’s external patrons".

Explaining the doctrine, Kapila said: "Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrents) are endangered. Offensives under the doctrine will not allow "Pakistan to reach the above conclusions."

An essential condition for the success of the strategy will be what Kapila calls the "political determination to cross [the] nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined:"

Pakistan’s responses were prompt and even worse than predictable. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff
Ashfaq Pervez Kayani charged India with "charting a course of dangerous adventurism whose consequences can be both unintended and uncontrollable."

Former Pakistani diplomat and analyst Maleeha Lodhi wrote: "(The doctrine) overlooks the fact that in a crisis the nuclear threshold will be indeterminate. The threshold cannot be wished away by 'speed in mobilization'... In fact, the shorter the duration needed for a mobilisation, the greater the risk of escalation and the likely lowering of Pakistan's nuclear red lines."

The consequences of a nuclear war for millions upon millions in at least the major cities of India and Pakistan are, of course, too horrendous to contemplate - for anyone outside the fraternity of nuclear militarists whose idea of "patriotism" includes no concern for the people at all. The consequences of such a war for the rest of the world are going to be no better either, except in the immediate aftermath.

There have been several scientific attempts before to foresee these consequences. The latest in the series is reported by the Scientific American in its issue of January 2010. According to the report, computer modelling suggests that a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of around one billion people.

Assuming that each of the 100 bombs would burn an area equivalent to that seen at Hiroshima, the researchers estimated that the weapons used against Pakistan would generate three million metric tons of smoke and the bombs dropped on India would produce four million metric tons of smoke. Winds would blow the material around the world, covering the atmosphere over all continents within two weeks. The reduction in sunlight would cause temperatures to drop by 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit for several years and precipitation to drop by one-tenth. The climate changes and other environmental effects of the nuclear war would have a devastating affect on crop yields unless farmers prepared for such an occurrence in advance.

We in the CNDP can count on the world peace movement's support for our struggle towards the goal of South Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as we face the strange and formidable alliance of the savage nuclear warriors of India and Pakistan.

* The author is a Chennai-based veteran journalist and author. A member of the CNDP National Coordination Committee (NCC).
II.
Think Globally, Act Regionally?
South Asia, China and the United States
Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana*

For many people in India and Pakistan, the confrontation between their two countries is a defining feature of the past, present and future. There is good reason, however, to believe that the bilateral Pakistan-India relationship is increasingly part of a larger process involving the political, economic and military power and ambitions of China and the United States. The role that India and Pakistan will choose to play in this larger rivalry will shape the future of the sub-continent and of the global order. Peace movements in India and Pakistan need to engage with this larger dynamic by reaching out to make common cause with civil society efforts for peace, democracy, human rights and justice in China and the United States.

The US, China and South Asia in the Cold War

For sixty years, the United States has sought fitfully to have India become a part of American political, strategic and economic plans for Asia. The first efforts by the US to co-opt India into its strategic ambitions came soon after the latter gained independence from England. The US initially wanted India as an ally in the emerging cold war against the Soviet Union. After the Chinese revolution in 1949, the United States hoped that India would serve as a friendly potential regional power in Asia willing and able to compete with “Communist China.” Under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, India refused to play either role.

Pakistan, on the other hand, was happy to accept a role in US plans for south Asia. It built an enduring strategic relationship with the United States, starting in 1954. The United States provided economic and military aid, and Pakistan provided military bases, prepared to be the frontline in a possible war with the Soviet Union, and supported America in international foray.

The United States tried again with India during the early 1960s, under President Kennedy. Even before becoming president, he had argued that the United States and its western allies put together a package of aid and support “designed to enable India to overtake the challenge of Communist China.” As president, he sought to put together such a package. But US efforts to enlist India were frustrated. When Kennedy and Nehru met in 1961, they apparently clashed over Vietnam and nuclear disarmament among other things.

Recently declassified reports from May 1963 reveal that President Kennedy and his aides considered whether and how the US might support India in case there was another China-India war. The defence secretary Robert McNamara argued that “Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given, we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack, we would have to use nuclear weapons.” The US was unwilling to make such a commitment to India.

Some in India sought US nuclear help, however, especially after China tested a nuclear weapon in 1964. Homi Bhabha, the founder and head of the department of atomic energy, in 1965 urged the US to give India a nuclear device or just the blueprints for one to help it catch up with China. But the United States preferred instead to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. Increasingly bogged down in Vietnam and worried that its future wars
in the third world would be even more difficult if nuclear weapons continued to spread, the US joined with the Soviet Union, which had similar worries, in crafting a nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The treaty was negotiated in 1968 and came into force in 1970. At the same time, the US began to improve its relations with China. India's 1974 nuclear test further eroded hopes of a US-India nuclear relationship as a new regime of non-proliferation restrictions took shape.

**New Alliances in the Post-Cold War Era**

As the cold war ended, the US determined that no other power should be allowed to emerge as a potential rival. The leaked 1992 draft Defence Planning Guidance prepared for defence secretary Dick Cheney by Paul Wolfowitz, then under-secretary of defence for policy, declared:

“Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defence strategy and requires that we endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.”

To this end, it proposed “we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role”. In other words, the prevailing geopolitical order must be frozen with the United States maintaining relative superiority not just globally, but even in the different regions of the world.

China again became the focus of attention for the US as it increasingly became a major economic and political force in international affairs. This time India had new leaders: Prime Minister Vajpayee and the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party believed that Nehru was mistaken to pursue non-alignment in the cold war and felt that India should have made common cause with the US against communism and against China. In a May 1998 letter President Clinton justifying India’s nuclear tests, Vajpayee pointed first to China – the “overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India” and claiming that “an atmosphere of distrust persists.” This was despite major progress in India-China relations, such as Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in 1996 and the signing of an agreement on confidence-building measures along the so-called ‘line of actual control’ in the border areas. This built on an earlier 1993 agreement on ‘Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity’ in the disputed border areas.

In the wake of the May 1998 nuclear tests, a US sponsored Security Council resolution unanimously called on India and Pakistan to "immediately stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.” The Clinton Administration largely ignored the resolution once it was passed.

The new direction in US-India relations became clear in March 2000, when President Clinton visited India. The joint statement that he issued with Prime Minister Vajpayee declared “In the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together for, strategic stability in Asia and beyond.” The shared goal of “strategic stability in Asia” can be read as India finally accepting US ideas about what should be the relative balance of power in Asia, and sharing US concerns about a rising China.
The ‘new direction’ identified in Clinton’s March 2000 visit was taken up concretely in the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’ agreement of January 2004. This announced that the United States and India would ‘expand cooperation’ in civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade, as well as on missile defence. It is worth pointing out the obvious, namely, that cooperation in this context is a euphemism for the US providing India access to aid, information and technology in these areas.

US officials have made clear the purpose of this ‘Strategic Partnership’ agreement. A senior US official announced that “Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century….We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement.” The deputy state department spokesman explained further that the US was ready to ‘help India’ with command and control, early warning and missile defence, and noted that “Some of these items may not be as glamorous as combat aircraft, but I think for those of you who follow defence issues you’ll appreciate the significance.”

Former senior US officials and countless strategic commentators have pointed out the inference that is to be drawn from the new US effort to ‘help India’. Robert Blackwill, who served in the Bush administration as US ambassador to India and then as a deputy national security adviser for strategic planning, has wondered, for instance, “Why should the US want to check India’s missile capability in ways that could lead to China’s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?” His adviser, Ashley Tellis, drew a direct analogy to the critical role of US support for the nuclear programs of Britain and France during the Cold War and argued that “If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objec-
tives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such that India’s nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025.”

Tellis outlined in particular a path for US-Indian cooperation on India’s nuclear weapons program, modelled on US help to France:

“In a previous generation, the United States assisted the British and French nuclear weapon programs in critical ways so as to deny the Soviet Union permanent strategic immunity vis-à-vis these two smaller states. U.S. aid to the French nuclear weapon program is particularly pertinent: first, because it occurred despite President Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from the unified military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and second, because of the form it took, namely, the quiet but effective practice of “negative guidance,” through which U.S. weapon scientists were able to tell their French counterparts when and how they were in error, even if the Americans could not always provide the French with the information to remedy those mistakes…there is good reason to believe that the latter may come to resemble the former at some point because of the anticipated growth of Chinese power.”

India and China

Along with an increasingly charged US-China relationship, there is a new emphasis in India about China. Typical of this strain of thinking was the August 10, 2009 speech of Admiral Suresh Mehta, the outgoing chief of the Indian Navy:

“Coping with China will certainly be one of our primary challenges in the years ahead. China is in
Peace Now / Special Issue / December 2010

the process of ‘consolidating’ its comprehensive national power and creating formidable military capabilities. Once that is done, China is likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in its immediate neighbourhood. Our ‘trust deficit’ with China can never be liquidated unless our boundary problems are resolved. China’s known propensity for ‘intervention in space’ and ‘cyber-warfare’ would also be major planning considerations in our strategic and operational thinking… On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap and countering the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean Region. The traditional or ‘attritions’ approach of matching ‘Division for Division’ must give way to harnessing modern technology for developing high situational awareness and creating a reliable stand-off deterrent."

This is not just talk. The Indian military has been developing a new doctrine and want to be able to fight wars against Pakistan and China at the same time, i.e., on two fronts. Speaking at a closed-door seminar in New Delhi, the Army chief General Deepak Kapoor said that there was now “a proportionate focus towards the western and north-eastern fronts” according to the Times of India. This is part of a larger process of dealing with what the armed forces see as the emerging strategic scenario, and as a follow up to the “Cold Start” strategy that the military has been practicing for over five years through several war games. General Kapoor also declared that the armed forces should “substantially enhance their strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities to protect India’s geopolitical interests stretching from Persian Gulf to Malacca Strait”. While General Kapoor seemed to be talking about the armed forces, he was really being the army’s spokesperson, and this should also be seen as the army’s effort to find a role for itself and its tank divisions. Likewise, the Navy is going around building nuclear submarines.

China has not responded officially to these statements, which were widely reported. However, Chinese analysts have been concerned about what they see as an aggressive shift in Indian military strategy in recent years and about growing ambitions. For example, China’s Ministry of National Defence website hosts an article by the deputy director of Institute of Strategic Studies that pointed out in its overview of developments in 2009 that “The Indian military expenditure increased by 24% as compared with that of the previous year. Moreover, India which had begun to build the aircraft carrier on its own and launched its first home-made submarine “Arihant” was pressing ahead towards its goal of possessing the three-dimensional nuclear strike capability”. For its part, China has been continuing its own modernization process, increasing its military expenditures by over 200 percent in the last decade.

Pakistan and India

India’s attempts at achieving some kind of strategic parity with China have also attracted attention from Pakistan. Pakistan’s efforts are aimed at parity with India and at holding India back to where Pakistan can keep up.

The 1998 nuclear weapon tests by the two biggest countries in South Asia transformed their already antagonistic relationship into a nuclear armed one. For Pakistan’s leaders, its nuclear weapons are a counter to India’s nuclear weapons and an “equalizer” against India’s conventional military superiority. They see the weapons also as a shield behind which they can continue to support a proxy war by Islamist militants against India.
Indian military planners have struggled to come to terms with a nuclear armed Pakistan. An important landmark was the Kargil war. For Indian military planners, Kargil meant that they would have to find ways of waging limited war that would not lead to the eventual use of nuclear weapons. The experience of the 2001-2002 crisis following the attack on the Indian parliament also led them to conclude that any limited war would have to be prosecuted very expeditiously without allowing time for diplomatic intervention by other powers, especially the United States. This idea has been furthered through the new and dangerous war doctrine called “Cold Start”. Pakistan’s military planners, in turn, have warned of the possibility of a “hot end” if India were to implement this doctrine during a real conflict.

Growing Budgets

The four-cornered US-China-India-Pakistan arms race is evident in their immense and growing military budgets. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the United States, China, and India are among the top 10 countries in terms of military expenditure. In 2009, these three countries spent an estimated $663 billion, $99 billion, and $36.6 billion respectively (using market exchange rates) or 4.3, 2.0, and 2.6 percent of their respective GDPs in 2008. SIPRI estimates that Pakistan has spent $4.8 billion or 2.6 percent of its GDP. The increases in the last decade for the four countries are 83%, 236%, 73%, and 24% respectively.

All four countries also seem to be holding on to their nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. As the first country to have built nuclear weapons and the only one to use them in war, the actions of the United States are particularly important. Much has been made of President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech, where he expressed his desire for “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”. However, he went on to put in the caveat that “this goal will not be reached quickly -- perhaps not in my lifetime.” General Kevin Chilton, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, has offered a more specific horizon, claiming “When looking into the future a basic question is … will we still need nuclear weapons 40 years from now? I believe the answer to that question is yes”. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pushed this goal further back, arguing, “Our goal [is] of a world someday, in some century, free of nuclear weapons.”

A Way Forward

The four way arms race between Pakistan, India, China, and the United States is dangerous. The United States seems determined to maintain its dominant global position by making sure China and India have no choice but to fit into the present global balance of power, in which the US tries both to make the rules and to enforce them. China, for its part, is pushing ahead with its ambitions to become a more powerful regional power and, one day, a true global power. India pours precious resources into military programs and prestige projects that its leaders believe will establish them as equals to China. Pakistan, the weakest of the four, is a particular concern. The country is reeling under an economic and governance crisis compounded by the disastrous floods of summer 2010 and Islamist militancy bent upon destabilizing the country. The arms race with India warps national priorities and drains scarce resources and pushes Pakistan yet closer to the brink.

Civil society in India and Pakistan has been involved for many years in challenging the structure of competition and conflict between the two
countries by building cross-border dialogues. These efforts have evolved into a people-to-people movement that brings together thousands of activists, scholars, businesspeople, and retired government officials on issues ranging from national security and cross-border conflict, to poverty and development, education, ecology, the rights of women and minorities, arts and culture, and economy and trade. Some of these are documented in Bridging Partition: People’s Initiatives for Peace Between India and Pakistan, edited by Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian with Kamla Bhasin, A. H. Nayyar and Mohammad These (Orient Blackswan, 2010).

This civil society effort has resulted in networks being built that could not have been imagined only two decades ago. Political leaders, including presidents and prime ministers, now feel obliged to meet delegations of visiting citizens from the other country; government officials talk of the importance of people-to-people contact and the need to ease visa restrictions; new cross-border transport links have been established; trade is increasing; cross-border theater, film and music festivals are emerging; major mainstream media groups in the two countries have launched a joint campaign to promote peace through increased people-to people contact.

It is time to expand these bilateral India-Pakistan efforts and reach out to civil society in China and the United States. Building bridges and making common cause between people in all four countries can help end the India-Pakistan conflict, foster democracy in China, and wean America from its imperial role, all of which will be necessary if the new century is to be one of greater peace and freedom and justice for all.

* Zia Mian is a physicist with the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, USA. M. V. Ramana is a physicist, nuclear expert and a research scholar at the Princeton University. He is a member of the CNDP NCC.
B. The Global Perspective

I. New Momentum for Nuclear Abolition

Opportunities and Obstacles

Alice Slater*

On this tenth anniversary of the Indian Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, launched in the wake of India’s nuclear tests and Pakistan’s entry into the nuclear club as well, the world is facing ever new dangers in the nuclear age, even as these growing perils spark burgeoning new demands for nuclear disarmament across the globe. Perhaps the most unexpected call, which kicked off much of the current avalanche of new campaigns, initiatives, and projects for nuclear abolition, was an article in the Wall Street Journal, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons” in January 2007, when four rusty cold warriors, led by Henry Kissinger together with Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Schultz warned of the dangers of terrorism and nuclear proliferation and called for nuclear disarmament.¹

Their article inspired a whole series of statements around the world by former military and government officials, echoing their call for a nuclear weapons free world²; essentially providing the political cover for President Obama’s Prague speech in April, 2009, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize. Obama pledged “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”³ – although adding that it might not be reached “in my lifetime.”⁴ His Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton subsequently misquoted him, noting that “the President has acknowledged we might not achieve the ambition of a world without nuclear weapons in our lifetime or successive lifetimes.”⁵ And then Clinton pushed the ball even further down the road, speaking about the new START Treaty with Russia, foreseeing “a goal of a world someday, in some century, free of nuclear weapons.”⁶

After the initial statement of Kissinger and company, the group was tagged by various journalists and pundits as “the four horsemen”, perhaps ironically unaware that the biblical reference in the New Testament to the four horsemen of the apocalypse, is to a quartet of mythical marauders representing evil, war, famine and death. The following year, in 2009, the world welcomed a Five Point Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament urged by UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon⁷ which included the goal of a Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework of agreements to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Ban-ki Moon’s proposal validated at last the largely unheralded efforts of civil society, which immediately after forming the Abolition 2000 Network at the 1995 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension conference, extending the 25 year old NPT’s expiration date indefinitely, called for negotiations on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The Network’s Working Group of lawyers, scientists, and policymakers drafted a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, submitted by Costa Rica to the UN as an official document.⁷ As the millennium approached, Abolition 2000 then enrolled over 2000 members in 95 countries and kept its name, despite the failure of negotiations to materialize. Fifteen years later, the nuclear weapons convention is an idea whose time has come, with calls for negotiations arising from every part of the globe.⁷

The Kissinger crew noted the growing power of campaigns and initiatives including grassroots pressure on America’s NATO allies, Belgium,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway for NATO to remove U.S nuclear weapons now stationed in Europe under NATO’s “nuclear sharing” policy, calls to revive the Rajiv Gandhi Plan for Nuclear Disarmament, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Global Zero, the expanding Parliamentary Network for Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, the Mayors for Peace approaching 5,000 member cities, together with leaders around the world clamouring for negotiations to begin on a treaty to ban the bomb. They issued a second statement one year later in 2008, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World”. Clearly walking back from their earlier call, they warned of a “nuclear tipping point” demanding better measures to prevent nuclear terrorism and more secure controls on nuclear material and the nuclear fuel cycle, while bemoaning the fact that:

*In some respects, the goal of a World free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can't get there from here. But the risks from continuing to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible.*

Of course, Civil Society had no difficulty seeing the top of the mountain and was proposing to reach it by urging that negotiations begin on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons, just as the world had done for chemical and biological weapons, and landmines and cluster bombs as well. It wasn't as if the world had never banned a class of weapons before. With a third article this year by Kissinger and his colleagues, their lack of good faith is apparent. Titled “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent”, they emphasize the importance of maintaining the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent by supporting the Congressional drive to undercut, with a multi-billion dollar modernization program for the nuclear weaponers, the modest START treaty negotiated by Obama and Medvedev.

The treaty would cut deployed weapons in their massive arsenals of about 23,000 nuclear bombs, from 2,200 each to between 1,500 and 1,675. There are 1,000 nuclear bombs, in total, in the remaining nuclear countries – UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. START would also cut strategic bombers and land and sea-based missiles from 1,600 each to 800. US mid-term elections with Republican control of the Congress and a diminished Democratic Senate majority may scuttle START’s ratification leaving both countries without the ability to resume mutual inspections and verification of their nuclear activity which ended when the old START treaty expired in December 2009. Disturbingly, the international committee of the Russian Dumas has rescinded its recommendation that Russia ratify START, pending US action, in light of the disappointing US elections results and the steep price tag the Republicans have attached to buy their votes for ratification.

Since Russia and the US still have more than 10,000 weapons, START is only a modest step forward but one that is essential to demonstrate US and Russia willingness to tackle the unconscionable numbers of bombs in their arsenals. It was a difficult negotiation, hedged with caveats on missile defences. The Russians are alarmed at US efforts to surround Russia with a ring of missile “defences”, seeking to site missile and radar bases in Poland, the Czech Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, right up to the Russian border. Indeed, these START negotiations echoed the
tragic lost opportunity at the Reagan-Gorbachev 1986 Reykjavik summit when negotiations for the total abolition of nuclear weapons collapsed because Reagan wouldn’t give up plans for a Strategic Defence Initiative to dominate space.

Obama submitted START to the Senate for ratification attached to a Faustian bargain with the military-industrial-scientific-congressional complex for an additional $80 billion in new nuclear weapons testing and modernization and funding for a plutonium pit bomb factory at Los Alamos, a uranium processing plant at Oak Ridge, and a new manufacturing facility for non-nuclear bomb parts in Kansas City – spreading the evil largesse across the whole continent – as well as an additional $100 billion for delivery systems – planes, submarines and missiles for launching nuclear bombs by air, sea and land. Obama also assured Congress that nothing in the START treaty would preclude the US from developing offensive missile “defences” and its planned “prompt global strike” weapons systems, an integral part of US plans to dominate and control the military use of space. In October, the US and Israel were the only countries to abstain on a UN Resolution against the weaponisation of space. This was actually an improvement in the US position since up to now it was the only country to vote NO on the resolution. The US has consistently blocked consensus on voting for negotiations on a draft treaty, submitted to the UN by Russia and China, to ban weapons out of space. While the US. and its allies have been excoriating Pakistan for blocking consensus on proposed negotiations to cut off the production of fissile materials for “weapons purposes”, no countries are holding the US. to account for blocking consensus on keeping weapons out of space. Pakistan is still playing catch up to produce nuclear materials while the other nuclear powers all have excess 1600 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (PU) from both military and civilian production. There are about 1600 tons of HEU and 500 tons of PU on our planet, enough to produce more than 120,000 nuclear weapons! Enacting the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty now, without moving rapid on nuclear disarmament as well, would give an advantage to older more technologically advanced nuclear weapons states which already have excessive surpluses of bomb making materials. And it is also an exercise in futility. By calling for the cut-off of fissile materials production only for “weapons purposes” without cutting off the production of materials such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium for so-called “peaceful purposes”, the treaty would be no more than a leaking sieve as hundreds of tons of bombmaking material would continually be churned out in civilian reactors in more than 40 countries around the world. India was well aware of discriminatory nuclear legislation when it refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 because the treaty provided that five existing nuclear weapons states, the US, UK, Russia, France and China, need only negotiate in “good faith” for nuclear disarmament while all the other countries of the world had to promise not to acquire nuclear weapons. India proposed unsuccessfully that a nuclear abolition treaty for all nations be negotiated and then went on to develop its own nuclear capabilities, acquiring the bomb in 1974. In 1988 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed “An Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Non-Violent World Order” which was totally ignored by the US although Russia expressed some interest in the plan.
Every year since 1996, the UN General Assembly votes on a resolution to commence negotiations leading to the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention based on the 1996 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, a host of countries spoke in support of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention and proposed a meeting in 2014 to discuss the path forward. Although the meeting proposal was blocked in the final document, the nuclear weapons states for the first time agreed to include a reference to negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention although the language was watered down considerably from the first draft. Significantly, a unique provision in the outcome document affirmed, for the first time, the need for all States to comply with International Humanitarian Law under which the ICJ held that nuclear weapons are generally illegal. This provides new possibilities for action by non-nuclear weapons states to shift from the usual “step by step” approach of arms control to legislation on an outright prohibition of nuclear weapons as illegal under international law, as was done with landmines and cluster bombs.17

There were 140 nations who made statements supporting negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention at the NPT Review, including one nuclear weapons state — China.18 And when the annual resolution came to a vote in the UN First Committee of the General Assembly this fall, three nuclear weapons states, China, India, and Pakistan supported the call for negotiations.19 Once again, the U.S. attempted to put the brakes on when Rose Gotmoeller, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, in remarks at the UN, belittled the prospects for a nuclear weapons treaty urging "a pragmatic step-by-step approach rather than the impractical leap of seeking to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention or the pointless calls for convening a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, for which there is no international consensus.”

In October, 2010, Obama test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile 5,000 miles away from California to Guam and conducted the first “sub-critical” nuclear test since 2006, 1,000 feet below the desert floor, exploding plutonium with chemicals, without creating a chain-reaction. This was the 24th test in a program started by Clinton who tried to buy the support of the military-industrial-scientific–congressional complex for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which they later reneged on anyway. There were seven billion dollars a year for computer-simulated nuclear tests coupled with subcritical tests and new laboratory infrastructure, which the Doctor Strangelove’s contended were essential to maintain the “safety and reliability” of the arsenal. This brings us back full circle to the justification Obama claims for his pay-off to Congress to get START ratified. Furthermore, the UK and France, emulating the worst in US policy, have just announced a “cost saving” plan to combine efforts and build a brand new joint nuclear weapons laboratory in France, to test – surprise, surprise – the “safety and reliability” of their arsenals.22

Small wonder that a new statement in October 2010 by a Russian quartet of military and government officials, led by Yevgeny Primakov, asserted that many countries, including “a widespread belief in Russia” believe that their “nuclear potential is a key element of great power status.”
Asserting that nuclear disarmament requires “greater confidence among nations, along with greater international security and stability” and referring to inequalities in “armaments, anti-ballistic missile defence, conventional weapons, strategic non-nuclear weapons as well as space militarization plans”, they conclude that to achieve nuclear disarmament “we must reorganize international life on more civilized principles and according to the demands of a new century.”

President Obama, in his Prague speech, characterized nuclear terrorism as “the greatest danger we face”. Yet Nobel economist Thomas Schelling, who applies game theory to the study of conflict and cooperation recently described the exceedingly low probability of terrorists ever getting their hands on enough illicit nuclear material to build a bomb.24 Far more dangerous and terrifying is the more than 3500 nuclear bombs, mounted on missiles and ready to fire within minutes which the US and Russia still aim at each other. Just this year we had reports of computer failures in the US that put 50 nuclear weapons out of commission, a UK Trident nuclear submarine running aground in the mud off the coast of Scotland,25 and six nuclear bombs mistakenly flown without knowledge of the commanders across the country from North Dakota to Louisiana.26 A US Defence Department report noted that between 1950 and 1980 there were 32 airplane crashes with nuclear bombs aboard, Luckily none of them ever exploded, although two of them, in Palomares, Spain and Thule, Greenland, spewed plutonium on the ground which had to be cordoned off and contained.27 Not to mention the incredibly close call when a Norwegian weather satellite went off course in 198328 and was interpreted by the Russians as a possible nuclear attack which a wise commander, Stanislav Petrov, on duty in the nuclear bunker, decided heroically, against orders, and to the great good fortune of the world, to disregard.

Furthermore, we are creating much greater danger in our efforts to secure and lock down radioactive bomb material. Rather than containing the toxic poisons in sturdy, aboveground concrete casks, which last for hundreds of years, under guns, gates and guards, we are actually transporting our lethal legacy through populated areas over roads, rail and seas, from the four corners of the earth back to reprocessing facilities. The US and Russia are using the highly enriched uranium they transport, for example, which was spread around to 28 countries during the atoms for peace program for research reactors,29 in reprocessing facilities where they are blended down for fuel for so called “peaceful nuclear power plants” now in the planning stages for exponential growth in a “nuclear renaissance” around the planet, about to spread their radioactive poisons into the air, water, and soil, while giving ever more nations the reactor-generated capacity to make nuclear bomb material.

Even if these materials are never used in a nuclear bomb, they are already causing death, destruction and illness in the communities where the uranium is mined, milled, processed and in the environs surrounding nuclear power plants. A German study found an increased incidence of childhood cancer and leukaemia in communities where the uranium is mined, milled, processed and in the environs surrounding nuclear power plants. A German study found an increased incidence of childhood cancer and leukaemia in communities with nuclear reactors.30 A recent study by Russian scientists published by the New York Academy of Medicine found nearly one million people died from the 1986 Chernobyl accident,31 contrary to corrupted reports from the World Health Organization which has a collusive agreement with the nuclear-industry dominated International Atomic Energy Agency to submit its health find-
ings on radiation issues to the IAEA before they can be made public. The two agencies habitually underreport the true extent of the carnage caused by this lethal technology.

Moreover, while the Non-Proliferation Treaty guarantees every member the right to the “peaceful” use of nuclear technology, the US and its allies are picking which countries can exercise that right – it’s OK for Japan, but not for Iran. In the past few years, there has been an explosion of planned nuclear power plants in many new countries, including Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Turkey, Indonesia, Vietnam, Algeria, Burma, and others who want to get in under the wire before the nuclear “haves” preclude them from freely accessing the whole panoply of technology for the nuclear fuel cycle. Indeed the US just made a deal with the United Arab Emirates that they would not enrich uranium in return for US technical assistance on civilian nuclear power, but Jordan is balking at making the same agreement. The perfect recipe for chaos. The top of the mountain beckons. It’s time for a moratorium on any further development of nuclear weapons or nuclear power. The sun, wind, tides, and geothermal heat can readily supply humanity with all its energy needs. in the words of the visionary thinker and architect, Buckminster Fuller:

We may now care for each Earthier individual at a sustainable billionaire’s level of affluence while living exclusively on less than 1 percent of our planet’s daily energy income from our cosmically designed nuclear reactor, the Sun, optimally located 92 million safe miles away from us.

Building on the burgeoning support for a nuclear weapons convention, civil society, together with parliamentarians and Mayors are exploring possibilities for various governments to put together a like-minded group of governments to begin an “Ottawa” or “Oslo” process, the way the world was able to ban landmines and cluster bombs. Blocked by consensus rules at the UN, the governments of Canada in the case of landmines, and Norway in the case of cluster bombs joined in partnership with civil society and like-minded governments to negotiate those landmark treaties. Eventually many of the hold-out countries signed on.

Who will take the lead for organizing the talks for a nuclear weapons convention? Over one hundred nations spoke in favour of the nuclear weapons convention at the NPT. And there are three nuclear weapons powers, China, India, and Pakistan on the record in support of those negotiations in a UN Resolution. Perhaps in the 21st century; it is time for Asia to take the lead. If a country like Norway, or Switzerland or Austria, which has spoken in favour of negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention, were to host such a conference, having the three Asian powers in attendance would send a powerful signal to the world that the time has come to ban the bomb. Certainly India, with the Rajiv Gandhi plan has already given much thought to this critical dilemma.

Even if the other nuclear weapons states were to sit out the negotiations, eventually world opinion would catch up with them and they would have to join in. In the meantime, the steps for moving forward, for dismantlement, verification, monitoring, inspection, handling of nuclear materials, insurance against breakout, additional research, and administration of the treaty could be discussed and debated. Much of this has already been proposed in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which can be reviewed, together with commentary on its various provisions, at
http://www.icanw.org/securingour-survival. NOW IS THE TIME FOR ACTION! After 65 years it's time to retire the bomb.

Alice Slater is the New York Director of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and serves on the Coordinating Committee of Abolition 2000.

Notes:
19. Ibid.
34. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com10/votes/L50.pdf
35. To get involved, check out these organizations:
37. Parliamentary Network for Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament: www.pnnd.org
38. Mayors for Peace: http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/
II.
Only the End of the World
Reporting from the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, October 2010
John Hallam*

A perpetual grievance of mine is that every time every government on the planet gets together and passes a series of resolutions that are not only eminently sensible, but that would if implemented ensure the continued survival of the human species, global media treats it as if it had simply never happened. Australian media in particular thinks that the sex-lives of its football heroes are ever so much more important than the governments of the world getting together to talk about nuclear disarmament. India has its own version of this parochialism. The UN obliges us with 72 page press-releases giving a blow by blow, vote by vote, account of every diplomatic move that is invaluable to wonks like me and ignored by everyone else.

This year, as I attended the first two weeks of UN First Committee, was no exception.

From the 4th of October until the end of that month, First Committee met at the UN headquarters – the big blue building by the river – in New York as it does every year. First Committee is the oldest and largest and arguably the most important of six main committees of the General Assembly, all of which meet throughout October before UNGA gets together in plenary to pass all that has been recommended by the various committees in November/December.

First Committee deals with international security and disarmament, and nuclear weapons form just under 50% of all its deliberations, the rest being warfare in space, in cyberspace, land-mines, small-arms, chemical and biological weapons, and conventional weapons.

First Committee has a well-defined sequence, starting with general statements by the delegates about disarmament generally, and then going on to more detailed ‘cluster one’ statements that deal with nuclear weapons, then statements dealing with other subjects, and finally ‘action on resolutions’ which effectively means voting.

As on every previous First Committee since 2006, Steve Starr and I organized a panel on the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems. And again this time, we managed to get the governments of New Zealand and Switzerland for our panel – sponsorship that enabled us to bring out from Moscow, Colonel Valery Yarynich, Russian expert on nuclear command and control who helped design Russia’s ‘doomsday machine’, Perimiter (sometimes known as the ‘dead hand’), and who more recently part-authored the computer simulations of nuclear war (‘100 nuclear wars’), on which the Foreign Affairs article entitled ‘smaller and safer’ is based.

‘Smaller and Safer’ while still based on deterrence and according to some, on ‘citybusting’, did show decisively that smaller nuclear arsenals at lower levels of alert, would be much more strategically stable than current high-alert arsenals, thereby knocking into the silly arguments that somehow, de-alerting would be ‘de-stabilizing’, that come from some (but not all) in the military establishment. We also had the foremost US commentator on nuclear weapons affairs in the US, Hans Kristensen, comment on the article, which he did with his usual expertise.

The panel itself was held in the same vast confer-
ence hall as the main proceedings before about 50 diplomats and NGOs. It was kind of odd being up there on the same podium that the chair of First Committee and the UN undersecretary for disarmament occupied, but it enabled us to use the excellent visual facilities. As I spoke of 'casualties of hundreds of millions to billions in a 40 minute time-frame' in my summing up, I noted that everyone's eyes swiveled to my right shoulder over which on the vast data projector screen, Steve's animated graphic of Washington being nuked was running, to make the same point.

Our resolution on operational readiness when it was finally adopted by First Committee about ten days after my return to Sydney, passed by 144 votes to 3 'Noes', and 22 abstentions – compared with 134 last times, in 2008.

Notable new 'Yes' votes included China, Canada, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovenia. This last vote may have had something to do with the fact that the Slovenian ambassador and I kept on bumping into each other and talking at the computers in the back, next to the café. The addition of nuclear weapons state (and very major player) China is clearly a big deal. Most important of all, ours was probably the resolution in First Committee that attracted the most 'buzz' as NZ ambassador Dell Higie put it. It was also virtually the ONLY disarmament resolution that increased its vote count.

India also sponsors a resolution on operating status of nuclear weapons systems, entitled 'Reducing nuclear Dangers' and has done so for longer than the 'operational readiness' resolution. Indeed it was the desire to make a resolution on lowering operating status more widely acceptable than 'Reducing Nuclear Dangers' has been, that motivated NGOs to push for the 'Operational Readiness' resolution, and motivated Doug Mattern and I to put together the appeal signed by 44 Nobel Laureates in 2004 that led to the Operational Readiness resolution.

However the reality is that the texts of the two resolutions, while they approach the subject in somewhat different ways are eminently compatible (indeed complementary) and ought to be mutually reinforcing – and the vast majority (around 2/3rds) of all governments vote for both resolutions. 'Operational Readiness' does attract a high proportion of NATO votes plus countries such as Japan, Canada and Australia, who don't vote for Reducing Nuclear Dangers for whatever reason – the main one seems to be a perception that Reducing Nuclear Dangers is somehow a 'NAM' resolution only, and for whatever odd reason they don't wish to be perceived as part of that.

I believe this is unfortunate.

Even more unfortunate is that while operational readiness gathered ten extra votes, reducing nuclear dangers lost votes, going from 113 yes votes in 2009 to 103 in 2010 – though the number of no's also went down by two votes from 50 to 48, still too many for reasons nowhere near good enough.

It would be highly desirable if governments could (and some do) vote purely on the merits of a resolution, and if wider support could be achieved for BOTH these utterly vital resolutions. Still more wonderful would it be if they could be translated into actual changes in the nuclear posture of the US and Russia, India and Pakistan.

It is worth noting this year that the Indian position and the various resolutions that India sponsored, were introduced by Mani Shankar Aiyar, who
spoke about the Rajiv Gandhi Peace Plan of which he was the original principal architect (and about which he has an article in the Times of India). I believe that Mani’s simple presence in the UN this year was a good sign.

The Rajiv Gandhi Peace Plan of 1988 is another highly worthy initiative that really ought to achieve much greater support than it in fact does. Elements of it that are particularly important include its emphasis on the fact that the large-scale use of nuclear weapons was and is likely to be terminal for civilization and possibly for humans, and its call for a nonviolent world order. Important in the various latter-day iterations of it by India has been the emphasis on lowering operational readiness as an essential first step toward a nuclear weapons free world, and emphasis on a nuclear weapons convention, that would permanently ban nuclear weapons.

At the same time, I am leery of any suggestion that this or than plan is 'THE' one and only route to a nuclear weapons-free world. And the Rajiv Gandhi peace plan, in spite of its real merits, has not yet managed to ignite the enthusiasm that it perhaps should have ignited, outside the usual NAM circles (though 'NAM' DOES constitute some 2/3 - 3/4 of the planet). Still, to gain traction, such a resolution should aim at getting both NAM and Non-NAM States to support it, and especially NATO states.

And the fact that India and Pakistan have gone ahead and developed nuclear weapons aimed primarily at each other clearly has not helped. Immediately after Mani gave his speech I was able to walk over to him and congratulate him. He immediately invited me to a lunch the next day at a decidedly up market restaurant of the kind I would never ever afford, and where about a dozen highly distinguished people were gathered including the Indian ambassador. We all gave impromptu speeches on the way to get rid of nuclear weapons, some more overarching and global than others, and with a broad degree of consensus and overlap. When my turn came I said I didn’t have 'THE' way and didn't think there was such a thing as 'THE' way, but rather that it was important that, whatever way we chose we actually moved in the right direction and maintained the political commitment to do so. I made a couple of specific suggestions, namely that:

— India talks with the sponsors of the operational readiness resolution, with a view to ensuring that the two resolutions reinforce each other rather than being seen as in competition.

— That there is confidence building measures and a nuclear build-down instead of an arms race on the subcontinent.

Talking with Pakistan with a view to ending the nuclear arms race in the subcontinent is obviously vital to the very physical survival of both societies. As things now stand, both India's and Pakistan's military establishments are pressing ahead with 'improvements' in their nuclear capabilities. India is moving ahead with further tests of its long-range AGNI-III missile. Pakistan is augmenting its arsenal and (according to Hans Kristensen) has a slight edge over India in numbers of warheads and in medium-range delivery capability. It is also accumulating weapons-grade plutonium as well as the enriched uranium that has so far fuelled its nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan are likely to move toward a more centralized, more computerized, more automated, nuclear command and control system than they now have, with a more rapid-response posture – a development that paradoxically makes a nuclear catastrophe all the more likely.
We discussed on the panel exactly what that would involve. (Steve’s website, (www.nucleardarkness.org) has an animated graphic of the nuking of Mumbai.) The ‘bottom line’ of it all is that after a VERY bad day, something between 50 million and 150-300 million people would have died, and in the ensuing ‘year without a summer,’ akin to the year 1815 in which famine ensued after a major volcanic eruption, up to a further billion people might die. This does not factor in at all the catastrophic effects such a conflagration will have on the ozone layer, which will especially affect Australia. The use of the ‘on alert’ arsenals of the US and Russia would of course, still destroy civilization and 95% of complex land-based life-forms including possibly humans.

These OUGHT to be the most powerful arguments possible for de-alerting the US and Russian arsenals – thereby taking the apocalypse off the agenda – and for confidence building and a nuclear build-down in South Asia.

You are of course, getting from me a completely one-sided view of what took place at First Committee. For a truly objective view you need to go to the Reaching Critical Will website (just Google ‘Reaching Critical Will’). There were a large number of very important nuclear disarmament resolutions that were adopted by First Committee, though I believe that it was ours that created most ‘buzz’.

One would have to note at least:

— The ‘L50’ resolution on a nuclear weapons convention (follow-up to the advisory decision of the International Court of Justice). Not nearly enough countries voted for this one, though India certainly did. My own country, Australia, alas, wimped out and abstained. It would be important for countries not normally considered part of the ‘NAM’ bloc (even though that is between 2/3 and 3/4 of the planet) – to vote in support of a nuclear weapons convention especially as this is now incorporated in the final declaration of the NPT Review Conference. From memory, I believe that Sweden and NZ may have voted amongst the yeses.

The actual vote this time (121 yes’s to 27 no’s to 22 abstentions) is 5 yes votes lower on 2009, but also two no votes lower. One would have to say there is a need for more progress.

— The ‘United Action toward Total Elimination’ resolution on nuclear disarmament, cosponsored by Australia and Japan and now by the US. This resolution gathered 154 votes including the nuclear weapons states. This figure is actually lower from 2009 (161 votes) also. There is one less 'no' vote, and 5 more abstentions. India did not vote for it for reasons that are understandable but entirely unhelpful. However this resolution pointedly does NOT reference a nuclear weapons convention.

— The New Agenda resolution. (Towards a Nuclear Weapons-Free World – L25) This is the original buzz-creating resolution, but the buzz seems to have gone out of it. At one stage the US actually voted for it but no more. The number of yes votes is again, down by 7 votes, from 165 in 2009 to 158 in 2010.

— The NAM resolution. This created barely a ripple. ‘Yes’ votes are down from 112 in 2009, to 107 in 2010. Noes have risen from 43 to 44. While the actual text of NAM contains much that is good, the fact that Myanmar is the main sponsor and at the same time seems to be developing a nuclear program is clearly not helpful. Yet the pattern of decreased support seems to be across the board, not limited to the NAM.
Various resolutions on a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Again these created barely a ripple and introduced nothing new.

There was in addition what I would call the US-Russia Mutual admiration resolution, sponsored by the US and Russia, on the New START treaty. This resolution is new.

The high level of support for this resolution should not obscure the fact that the rather underwhelming reductions in warhead levels envisaged by New START still leave the US and Russia with ample capacity to make the planet uninhabitable in 40 minutes several times over, no changes to nuclear posture are contemplated, and it seems less and less likely that the US congress will in fact actually ratify the treaty.

Failure to ratify New START (and I judge the probability of ratification at less than 50%), would expose the world – at least potentially – to a new US-Russia nuclear arms race.

On the other hand, it could be argued that this UN resolution is desirable as it helps to 'lock in' the US and Russia to reductions that inadequate as they are, are obviously better than no reductions at all and a nuclear free-for-all. Who knows? Maybe as a last expiring gasp, the 'Lame duck' Congress will manage to ratify New START.

Finally there was and NGO presentation to a plenary session of First Committee at which Steve managed not only to get onto the podium (in front of around 3-400 delegates this time), but actually managed to get all of them to watch his terrifying animated graphics. And maybe that too had something to do with the numbers for Operational Readiness. I'd like to think so. We also managed to call for the UN to sponsor research on the climatic consequences of large-scale nuclear weapons use.

After all – it is only about the end of the world.

*John Hallam is an international anti-nuke peace campaigner from Australia. He is associated with the People for Nuclear Disarmament Nuclear Flashpoints Project.*
III.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?*

Gareth Evans

Let me come straight to the point. We are still at a real watershed with respect to the whole nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament project. Hopes have been so high for most of the last two years, especially following the political breakthrough that came with the election of a US president totally committed to the ultimate achievement of a nuclear weapon free world. But unless the key players in the international community, and there are many that matter in this context, not just the US and Russia, get really serious about moving forward on the multiple critical agenda issues that face us – not just safeguards, the subject of this symposium, but right across the whole spectrum of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful-uses challenges – there is a very real danger that such remaining momentum for change as there is will stall, that the whole project will fall apart, and that we will be condemned to live for the indefinitely foreseeable future in a nuclear world that is very dangerous indeed.

The prevailing sentiment after the May Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was one of relief – that the conference had not broken down as it did in 2005, that catastrophe had been avoided: in effect, that this particular watershed point had been passed. But the positive gains from that conference, when objectively assessed, were negligible on crucial NPT-regime strengthening issues, and, with the possible exception of the agreement to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, very slight indeed elsewhere.

And, weighing in the negative balance, there have been some serious disappointments on other key benchmark issues spelt out in President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech and on which real movement had been hoped for this year. Nothing has moved on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification by the US or any other major-nuclear power; the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiation remains completely stalled; there is now real uncertainty about US ratification of the New START treaty with Russia, and with it any major new round of arms reduction negotiations; there has been less than hoped for movement in reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons in national security doctrine; there has been no movement on the DPRK file; and concern about Iran's intentions remain as strong as ever. About the only ray of real light for the year has been the substantial measure of agreement achieved at the Washington Summit on nuclear security issues and cooperative implementation of the global anti-terrorism agenda.

In my own approach to difficult international policy issues I usually err on the side of congenital optimism, and it is possible to see the glass as half-full rather than half-empty on most of the specific issues I have mentioned - and others as well like the question of multi-lateralisation of sensitive stages of the fuel cycle on which the IAEA Board of Governors has already expended so much time and energy. The road ahead – as mapped in detail, e.g., in the report last year by the International Commission on Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) with which I hope you are familiar – was always going to be long and slow.

But everything depends on some real momentum being sustained. If that momentum is lost, as it was during the fifteen years or so of sleepwalking that followed the initial flurry of disarmament
activity in the early post Cold War years, and looks in real danger right now of being completely lost again, it is not easy to see how it will ever be regained. And that is very bad news indeed for this planet.

It is worth reminding ourselves on these occasions, although the facts and arguments should be familiar enough to this audience, why such an outcome would be such bad news, and why it is that the work that is done at symposiums and conferences like this matters so much. The truth of the matter is that the threats we face are not remote or trivial, but real, immediate and immense. Confronting them now is not a matter of choice but necessity. Complacency is not an option.

**Why Complacency is Not an Option**

Existing Weapons: Threat number one comes from the existing stockpile. Despite big reductions which occurred immediately after the end of the Cold War, there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined destructive capability of 150,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. Over 9,000 of them are in the hands of the US, around 13,000 with Russia, and around 1000 with the other nuclear-armed states combined (China, France, UK, India, Pakistan, Israel and - at the margin - North Korea). More than a third of all these weapons – over 7,000 – remain operationally deployed. And, most extraordinarily of all, over 2000 of the US and Russian weapons remain on dangerously high alert, ready to be launched on warning in the event of a perceived attack, within a decision window for each President of four to eight minutes.

Given what we now know about how many times the very sophisticated command and control systems of the Cold War years were strained by mistakes and false alarms; given what we know about how much less sophisticated are the command and control systems of some of the newer nuclear-armed states; and given what we both know and can guess about how much more sophisticated and capable cyber offence will be of overcoming cyber defence in the years ahead, it is sheer dumb luck – not a matter of good political leadership or the inherent stability of the weapons systems that have evolved – that there has not to date been a nuclear weapons catastrophe, and utterly wishful thinking to believe that luck can continue in perpetuity. As the Canberra Commission put it, starkly and succinctly, in 1996: so long as any nuclear weapons remain anywhere, they are bound one day to be used – if not by design, then by mistake or miscalculation.

We have been even closer to catastrophe in the past than most people know. Communications satellite launches have been mistaken for nuclear missile launches; demonstration tapes of incoming missiles have been confused for the real thing; technical glitches have triggered real-time alerts; live nuclear weapons have been flown by mistake around the US without anyone noticing until the plane returned to base. About the only consolation to be derived from this comedy of errors, if anything so serious can be called a comedy, is the very recent revelation that for several months of his presidency Bill Clinton completely mislaid the nuclear codes he was supposed to carry in his pocket at all times - which means that a US retaliatory nuclear strike could not in fact have been authorised even had anyone wanted to!

**New Nuclear Armed States**

Threat number two is proliferation – new states
adding new stockpiles, with all the risks of deliberate or inadvertent use that come with them. So long as any state retains nuclear weapons, others will want them, for reasons that may be wrong-headed but have their own force: maybe to buy perceived equivalent prestige in the case of relatively strong powers; or to try to buy immunity from attack in the case of weak ones. India, Pakistan and Israel have already joined the five original nuclear powers. North Korea has thumbed its nose at the NPT, and now has five or six nuclear explosive devices. Iran may or may not be preparing to follow suit; if it does, others in the region are bound to join in. The 'cascade' of proliferation which has been feared since the 1960s may not now be far away, at least in the wider Middle East.

**Nuclear Terrorism**

Add to all that now risk number three: of terrorist actors getting their hands on a nuclear weapon or the makings of one. We can no longer be under any illusions about the intent of certain messianic groups to cause destruction on a massive scale. And - although the probability is small, and probably lower than some alarmist accounts have suggested - their capacity should not be underestimated to put together a Hiroshima-sized nuclear device, using manageable technology long in the public domain and back-channel sourcing of the kind the AQ Khan network taught us to be alarmed about, and explode it from the inside of a delivery truck in Trafalgar Square, or Times Square – or a small boat in New York harbour or on the Thames – causing in each case hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries.

**Peaceful Nuclear Energy**

The fourth risk is associated with the likely significant expansion of civil nuclear energy in the decades ahead, in response not least to the need for non-fossil fuel contributions to base-load electricity generation – maybe a less dramatic expansion than the doublingplus- within-twenty years that was originally widely predicted, but significant nonetheless, and with a number of new countries still likely to take up this option. The problem, as an audience of safeguards specialists will be well aware, is not so much with the power generating plants themselves, but new uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities such countries may be tempted to build: so called "bomb starter kits" of the kind that have caused so much anxiety in North Korea and Iran.

The bottom line is this. Nuclear weapons are not only the most indiscriminately inhumane weapons ever invented, and for that reason alone worth every possible effort to eliminate, but the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet as we know it. And the arsenals we now possess – taking into account the technical refinement of current weapons and their combination of blast, radiation and 'nuclear winter' effects – are able to do so many times over. The only remotely comparable existential threat is from global warming – and nuclear bombs will kill us much faster than CO2. There is only one way we can be confident that will never occur: stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing the existing stockpiles to zero.

So how do we get there? What needs to be done, and how well are we doing it? It is now generally accepted that, as the ICNND and others have framed the current debate, there are three big inter-related objectives about which we have to get serious and, moreover, get serious simultaneously because they are closely interrelated:
— First, disarmament, dramatically reducing the existing stockpile nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating them;

— second, non-proliferation, holding a very tight line against new players coming into the weapons game and taking action to reduce the proliferation risks associated with any major expansion of civil nuclear energy;

— and third, putting in place the building blocks for both disarmament and nonproliferation, three in particular - a comprehensive test ban treaty, a global ban on the production of any new material for fissile purposes, and effective measures of nuclear security to guard existing weapon and fissile material stocks against theft or diversion.

So, taking them in reverse order, let me take you through — in a little more detail — in each of these areas, how far have we come to date, and what remains to be done.

Getting Serious about the Building Blocks

CTBT

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the first crucial building block for both non-proliferation and disarmament, setting as it does a qualitative cap on the capacity of both existing weapons possessors and potential new ones to develop new nuclear weapons. But although concluded in 1996, the treaty is still not in force – and the only thing stopping testing is a fragile voluntary moratorium. Entry into force specifically depends on ratification by nine states who have not done so – six who have at least signed it (US, China, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran and Israel) and three who have not (India, Pakistan and North Korea), despite constant strong urging by the rest of the international community, including at the NPT Review Conference. Indonesia has announced that it will now move to ratification, but the crucial holdout is the US: if Washington moves this will be a real circuit-breaker, certainly with China and India in the first instance (although there is no practical reason for either of these states to wait for the US, and both would enhance their nuclear credentials if they pre-empted it).

President Obama announced in Prague last year that he was determined to "immediately and aggressively pursue US ratification" but has so far been unable to deliver on that promise, with ever more aggressive partisan politics placing the necessary 67 Senate votes, for the time being at least,
out of reach. Tomorrow’s mid-term elections do not appear likely to make his task any easier.

**FMCT**

The quantitative counterpart to banning testing is verifiably banning the production of further quantities of fissile material – highly enriched uranium or plutonium — for weapons purposes. That would be achieved by negotiating to conclusion the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) now before the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. But despite years of skirmishing – and renewed statements of determination by nearly all the key players over the last two years to get the process moving, and with reasonably strong language coming out of the NPT Review Conference – negotiations remain completely paralysed as a result of Pakistan refusing the necessary consensus to even let them commence (in a way that one suspects has not been entirely to the discomfort of at least two other currently nuclear-armed states who also appear to be keen to further add to their nuclear arsenals). It was hoped that the ministerial meeting convened in late September by the UN Secretary General in the margins of the General Assembly would do something to break this logjam, but it appears – to put it gently – to have been totally ineffectual in this respect. Its time for the great majority of states, who do want progress on this, to now either or to seek a separate mandate from the UN General Assembly, or negotiate informally a treaty text and open it for signature. And in the meantime they should at least seek a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

**Nuclear Security**

The only reasonably good news on the building blocks front is in the area of nuclear security, where President Obama’s Washington Summit in April did secure agreement from all the key players to put maximum effort into the effective practical implementation of the multiple treaties, resolutions, arrangements and cooperative threat reduction programs already in place – many of them agreed after 9/11 – designed to put so-called “loose nukes”, i.e. nuclear weapons and materials insufficiently guarded against theft or diversion, once and for all out of the reach of rogue states and non-state terrorist actors. It cannot be assumed that these measures are currently watertight, or will be for the foreseeable future, but as much is being done as could reasonably be expected.

**Getting Serious about Non-Proliferation**

Getting serious about non-proliferation means to effectively remedy the weaknesses in the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the relevant watchdog organisation. But even though those weaknesses have been clearly identified, not least in our Commission report, and widely acknowledged – and will be acutely clear to this audience – the news here is not especially encouraging. The agreed language on these issues at the NPT Review Conference was either limp or non-existent, the most that can be said following the NPT Review Conference is that all this is still work in progress.

**Safeguards**

Most states now acknowledge that the traditional safeguards system, which focuses essentially on accountancy – tracking the flow of materials inside civil reactors and ensuring there is no diversion to military purposes – has to be supplemented by a proper detection system, enabling the following up, with effective inspections, of intelli-
gence received about a state engaging in unreported fuel cycle activity, or more seriously still, actual weapon design or engineering. The voluntary 'Additional Protocol' by which states can agree to these additional disciplines, has not been universally embraced and there has been a reluctance by many NPT members – again unhappily in evidence at the NPT Review Conference – to put pressure on the foot-draggers by making its acceptance a condition of supply by others of nuclear technology or materials.

Withdrawal

It is also very widely recognized that there need to be some explicit pains and penalties attached to a state purporting to walk away from the NPT – as North Korea has done – after spending years sheltering under it building weapons capacity in the guise of a peaceful program. But again, with a number of states claiming that this is at odds with the general right under international law to withdraw from any treaty, action has so far gone no further than rhetoric – with not even any rhetoric on the subject in the agreed Conclusions of the NPT Review Conference.

IAEA

It is also widely recognised – and well documented in particular by the Zedillo Commission report on the Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond – that the IAEA badly needs more personnel, expanded and updated laboratories and general budgetary support if it is to be able to do its monitoring and inspection job, and a hopefully expanded such job in the future, with maximum efficiency, but its member states have again, so far anyway, shied away from delivering much more than purely rhetorical support, with not even much of that evident in the NPT Review Conference outcome.

Peaceful Uses

Getting serious about non-proliferation also means addressing the proliferation risks potentially associated likely dramatic expansion of civil nuclear energy in the years ahead. Proliferation resistant technology – involving mainly new reactor designs which don’t require or produce sensitive material – may be part of the answer in the longer run, but the most immediate need is to ensure that no new ‘bomb starter kits’ are built by new countries.

That means in turn being able to offer them assurances of supply of the fuel they need, the creation of an internationally managed fuel bank, or some other multilateral arrangement that would pose less risk. While all these options are under active discussion by the IAEA Board of Governors, agreement on any of them, in a way that would put this concern to rest still seems some distance away, and the NPT Review Conference did nothing much to bring it closer. It is to be hoped that countries like Brazil and South Africa will exercise their growing global influence to find a solution to this problem, rather than continuing to focus on difficulties.

The most immediately pressing of all non-proliferation needs is, of course, to deal effectively with the specific problems of North Korea and Iran – getting Pyongyang back into the NPT box, and ensuring that Tehran doesn’t jump out of it. The NPT Review Conference was vociferous on North Korea in its absence, but – understandably but disappointingly — completely silent on Iran, which was very much present.

DPRK

Although the North Korean problem on the face of it is more immediately serious, given that it has
already tested nuclear explosive devices and possesses half dozen or so of them, it is in a sense more manageable: neither of the countries most threatened by this development, Japan or South Korea, have shown any signs of wanting to join the race; there is no reason to fear – unless one accepts a ‘madman’ theory, never usually a good idea in international relations despite its popularity in the world’s tabloids – that North Korea would ever commit national suicide by actually using its devices aggressively; and with the succession issue now apparently resolved for the time being, there are some signs that Pyongyang is again getting serious about restarting denuclearisation negotiations. Don’t hold your breath for a result - nothing in this country is ever beyond doubt – but the old contain-and-deter-but-keep-the-door-open-for-negotiations formula seems to be working.

### Iran

The Iran case is more troubling, not only because just one or two nuclear bombs in its possession would be seen, understandably, as an immediate existential threat by Israel, but also because it is also reasonable to assume that a number of its neighbours – of whom Egypt has been the most explicit – would almost certainly want to respond with weapon programs of their own. Tehran’s excessively secretive and insufficiently responsive behaviour has certainly justified the international sanctions that have been imposed so far, but it has always been Quixotic to think that pressure of this kind alone would be enough to stop Iran’s whole uranium enrichment program dead in its tracks.

I believe that we have to try harder than we have done so far as an international community to understand Iran’s thinking. One does not have to look hard for reasons for Tehran pushing the limits of international tolerance as far as it has to date, including making up for the humiliations of the Mossadeq era and beyond; demonstrating its technological prowess; and making clear its distaste for those Western powers whose perceived double standards abandoned Iran to the chemical weapons-mercies of Saddam Hussein in the war of the late 80s.

But there are, equally, a number of reasons for thinking that Iran will actually stop well short of actually making the nuclear weapons it may sooner or later have the capability to produce. In my own many off-the-record discussions with senior officials, including key arms negotiators, in Tehran, New York, Vienna and elsewhere over the last few years, wearing my various hats as former Foreign Minister, President of the International Crisis and co-chair of the ICNND. In those discussions I have regularly heard five such reasons, which I think deserve to be taken seriously, though I am well aware that others will disagree.

The first is that Israel will indeed perceive the existence of one or two Iranian bombs as an intolerable existential threat, demanding a pre-emptive
military attack with or without US support, with resources Tehran knows it cannot match. But Iranians consider such an attack very unlikely provided they do not cross the red line of actual weapon accumulation.

Second, it is well understood that there is zero tolerance in Moscow and Beijing for an Iranian bomb, and all the rope that Russia and China have allowed Iran in the Security Council so far will completely run out if Iran acquires weapons. The writing on this wall is seen more clearly still after the most recent round of sanctions decisions...

Third, following from this, there is a clear perception that if Iran acquires an actual bomb, the globally enforced economic sanctions regime will become impossibly stringent. Financial sanctions, direct and indirect, are biting already - including on the significant economic interests of the Revolutionary Guard - and more heavily than in the past, but have so far been tolerable. Once it were to be in unarguable breach of the NPT, Iran sees as inevitable comprehensive global buy-in to a much-tougher-still sanctions regime.

Fourth, it is acknowledged that any regional hegemony Iran is likely to buy with nuclear weapons is likely to be fairly short-lived. There is certainly some scepticism about the capacity of Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Turkey to move quickly to build bombs of their own, and a belief that they would be under much international pressure, especially from the US not to do so, but – equally – a clear view that Arab-Persian, Sunni-Shiite or more straightforward regional power anxieties would make such moves inevitable.

A fifth reason, invariably put with great passion, is religious: weapons of mass destruction are simply against every precept of Islam. This is not a factor to which Western cynics will give much credence, but it has echoed very strongly in every private conversation I have ever had with Iranian officials, great or minor, as it does in all their public statements. And it is not without plausibility: Iran did not, after all, respond in kind when it was bombarded with chemical weapons by Iraq.

I hope my Iranian colleagues will forgive me if I say that none of this is to suggest that Iranian intentions can be taken absolutely on trust. There is too much history, too much disconcerting ongoing leadership rhetoric, and too many ongoing grounds for suspicion, for that. Any agreement involving the lifting of sanctions and Iran's diplomatic isolation would need to be accompanied by Iran accepting very intrusive monitoring, inspection and verification arrangements, going not only to all its nuclear power facilities but also to any suspected weapons design or engineering facilities – and giving others in the international community real confidence that they would have some twelve months lead time in which to respond to any evidence of real intent to move to weapon accumulation.

But it does suggest there is a solid foundation of rationality on which to build in keeping the door well ajar for negotiations. Iran is an extraordinarily complex country, and often perplexing to outsiders. But just as we cannot afford to misread the forces of extremism that undoubtedly persist; we also fail at our peril to read those currents of restraint and good sense that are running within the country, not just in the wider community but at high policymaking levels.

**Getting Serious about Disarmament**

Holding the line against new proliferation breakouts is of course only part of the story. The nuclear threat will continue to hang over us until the last nuclear-armed state destroys its last weapon, and
we have to get serious, now, about disarmament. That means the five original nuclear weapons state members of the NPT getting serious, in a way that they have never been in the past, about their explicit commitment under Article VI of that Treaty to go down that path. And it also means the three nuclear-armed elephants outside the NPT - India, Pakistan and Israel - also being prepared to ultimately eliminate their own respective arsenals.

**Minimization**

The realistic way forward, as our Commission argued and has been very widely accepted (though not, unfortunately, in the NPT Review Conference's agreed conclusions, which are wholly silent on anything resembling timelines, however broad and indicative) is to treat the enterprise as involving two very distinct phases - minimization and elimination - setting a specific target date for the first, but recognising that identifying a credible target date for getting to zero is much more difficult. For achieving the 'minimization point', we argued that 2025 can and should be set as the target date. Getting there would involve three things. First, the reduction of overall nuclear weapons numbers by over 90 per cent, from 23,000 down to less than 2,000: with the US and Russia coming down to 500 each, and all the other nuclear armed states retaining no more than 1,000 between them (which would require none of them to give up, if that’s what they are concerned about, minimum deterrent capability); second, all nuclear states signing up to a doctrine of no first use; and third, all of them giving credibility to that commitment by limiting their actual deployments to an absolute minimum, and certainly (hopefully long before 2025) taking all their weapons off high alert launch status. Getting to this point will be tough, but doable. And it will make the world much safer than it is now.

**Elimination**

But getting from there to zero will, however, we have to acknowledge, be much tougher: it will be perceived by all the relevant players as not just further steps in the same game, but a different game, and one for which it not possible at this stage to set a credible concluding date. Geopolitical and psychological factors will be very much in play: states in dangerous neighbourhoods, like South Asia and the Middle East are going to be very hard to persuade to give up their nuclear weapons unless and until the underlying tensions in those regions are basically resolved, however unusable those weapons might be by any rational calculation.

And states like France, and perhaps Britain as well - for whom nuclear weapons have long seemed to be more a matter of national status and prestige than anything very evidently advancing their security - will have to be persuaded that their standing won’t decline.

Moreover, every nuclear armed state is going to have to be persuaded that verification and enforcement arrangements are in place that will ensure absolutely that no state will be able to rearm without being detected in ample time, and that it will be able to be stopped from going further, without the kind of inhibition created by present Security Council veto rights.

The verification issue is a big challenge for safeguards specialists, and also the IAEA as well as the obviously best qualified institutional candidate for this role. The point is not to be spooked by these realities, but to regard them as challenges that can and will, over time, be overcome.
the UK and Norway are working hard now on shaping a verification regime that will work in a global zero worlds. What seems unthinkable now is likely to seem much more achievable ten years from now: just as pessimism can feed on it and produce pessimism, so too are positive developments selfreinforcing.

Bilateral and Multilateral Talks

The objective now must be focus single-mindedly on the minimization strategy: to bed down the New START treaty between the US and Russia (much easier said than done in the current US political climate), and to start almost immediately on the next round of serious bilateral arms reduction negotiations. There are plenty of obstacles ahead in this respect, not least stated Russian concerns about the US’s perceived massive current conventional weapons superiority, and the problems posed by its ballistic missile defence programs, but they are not insuperable. At the same time the foundations have to be laid for eventual multilateral negotiations with the other key players – not least China (which has concerns about US capability very similar to Russia’s), India and Pakistan, in respect to all of whom the first priority must be try to reach agreement on a freeze on additions to their present arsenals.

Middle East

Of course it is the case that no progress will be made on the nuclear front without serious efforts to remove other sources of tension both globally, and in the different regions.

That’s true of South Asia and North East Asia, and nowhere are regional tensions more acute at the moment than in the Middle East. But the nuclear dynamic at work there is by no means hopeless. It is clear talking to Israeli officials, as I have done a number of times in recent years, that they are no longer obsessed, as they were in decades past, at the prospect of being overrun by their vastly bigger Arab neighbours: they know, as does everyone else, that their formidable military capable is totally capable of dealing with any non-nuclear threat contingency. Their real concern these days is with a possible nucleararmed Iran. Which combination in turn makes the idea of a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, which they could join with their Arab neighbours in supporting, much less unattractive than it was in the past. I believe that the prospect of their cooperation in the 2012 Middle East Conference on such a zone, as agreed by the NPT Review Conference, is rather stronger in fact than their initial public reaction would suggest. And I have already argued that Iran might in fact not prove as big a problem as is currently widely assumed.

Next Steps

Achieving a nuclear weapons world is not an impossible dream, but it will certainly be an incredibly hard slog. To get there, the critical need is to build and sustain the necessary political will. That has many ingredients, as the Commission spelled out in its report, but the most critical of them will be the right leadership. And that has to come at three different levels: top down, sideways from peers, and bottom up. The crucial top-down leadership is going to have to come from the US and Russia: holding between them 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, disarmament is inconceivable unless they lead the way bilaterally. Presidents Obama and Medvedev have made a flying start, but the next two years will be absolutely crucial in determining whether that momentum can be maintained.

When it comes to peer group leverage, like-mind-
ed countries around the world have to be mobilised to maintain the pressure on all the relevant players to do everything that is necessary to advance the disarmament, non-proliferation and building block agendas I have described. Australia and Japan, building on their joint sponsorship of the ICNND, have initiated a Cross-Regional Grouping of ministers - which met first recently in the margins of the UNGA – which may prove useful in this respect.

Another way of keeping political attention focused would be for like minded countries to support financially the ICNND’s proposal to establish, as an ongoing vehicle for analysis, advocacy and pressure, a high profile, independent Global Centre for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament. That Centre would have two distinctive missions - first, to produce an annual score-card which would spell out clear benchmarks for progress, critically monitor how they are being met, and be effective advocates for change; and second to be the international body coordinating worldwide work on crafting a new Nuclear Weapons Convention that would provide a workable framework for ultimate multilateral negotiations. Australia, Austria and Switzerland have expressed interest in supporting such a centre, though not yet on a scale to make it viable, and I hope other countries represented here might help make this work.

When it comes to bottom up pressure, the critical need is to engage and energise influential civil society figures, key NGOs around the world, and the publics on whose support they depend, to focus on what needs to be done, year by year, step by step, and to hold governments relentlessly to account if they fall short. One way of doing that - on which I am also presently working with others, with the support in particular of NTI - is to create a worldwide set of leadership networks, comprising former heads of government, senior ministers and others who may be capable of influencing their own and other governments to take these issues seriously.

The really crucial need, of course, is to somehow capture the imagination of publics around the world in the same way it has been by that other great threat to our global survival, man-made climate change. Maybe the vehicle for that is now to hand with the new film Countdown to Zero, premiered recently in the US and scheduled for worldwide distribution in coming months, by exactly the same documentary team that produced Al Gore's An Inconvenient Truth. I certainly hope so.

My very last word is this. If we are going to generate effective action to avoid the horror of nuclear obliteration it will mean continuing determined effort from all those passionately committed to holding the line on proliferation, and making disarmament happen. That means not just from national and international leaders but from everyone, ordinary citizens in every country across every corner of the globe capable of influencing them. And it certainly means from you, the world’s safeguards specialists, who know more about all these issues than anyone, and are better placed than most to take a large part of this agenda forward. Thank you for your attention, and good luck with your deliberations this week.

*Keynote Address by Professor Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Discrimination and Disarmament, to IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, 1 November 2010*
IV.

On the Issue of Nuclear Terrorism

Achin Vanaik*

As expected, at the recent nuclear summit of 47 countries in New York, President Barack Obama waxed eloquent on the extreme danger of fissile materials falling into the hands of groups like Al Qaeda which would then make and use a nuclear bomb. Mr. Manmohan Singh among others dutifully applauded this view of the dangers of non-state nuclear terrorism seeking only to put his own spin on the matter by indirectly pointing the finger at Pakistan as a collaborating culprit in this respect.

Given that the very nature of nuclear weapons discourse by nuclear weapons states (NWSs) is unavoidably hypocritical and dishonest is it not time for a closer look at the apparently self-evident, and certainly self serving (to NWSs) claim that one of the great dangers today and tomorrow if not the great danger is that of nuclear weapons being built or falling into the hands of ‘terrorist groups’? One of the purposes and effects of this selfserving talk of nuclear terrorism, and hence its popularity and frequency, is that it legitimizes and excuses the NWSs themselves. It does this in a number of ways. First, it dramatizes the wholly artificial ‘divide’ between so-called responsible nuclear powers and supposedly irresponsible nuclear agents, actual or potential. These irresponsible agents are of course selectively identified – among NWSs it is said to be Pakistan and North Korea; among aspirant states it is Iran and Iraq; among non-state aspirants it is supposed to be a range of Islamist groups.

Second, it covers up the indisputable historical reality that the global nuclear mess we are in is wholly the responsibility – in varying degrees – of the NWSs themselves. No notion of nuclear deterrence can justify the existing levels of deployment or stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Despite the end of the Cold War during which the idea of a BMD was actually abandoned, we now have an Obama administration which in continuity with previous post-Cold War US administrations is acting in ways which more than negate whatever mild forward steps are being taken on the nuclear front. US upgrading of existing weapons is endorsed as also the operations (with continued financial support) of the weapons laboratories. The determined long term development of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system is clearly aimed at Russia and China but justified in the name of Iran. There is no dismantling of warheads as distinct from their de-mating and stockpiling in the New START agreement. According to the US’s latest Nuclear Posture Review, the nuclear pre-emptive option is restricted but not rejected, and its negative security assurances to non-nuclear states neither universal nor unconditional. The Proliferation Security Initiative – a fraudulent and illegal initiative – far from being discarded will be pursued in the name of fighting rogue states and terrorists.

Third, it diverts attention away from the fact that it is NWSs, above all the US (which is currently orchestrating the fight against ‘nuclear terrorism’), that has the worst record of repeated attempts at nuclear blackmail and is the only country to have used nuclear weapons and to this day has majority domestic support for these two acts of nuclear terrorism in 1945. Since then it is not only the US and Russia that have come close to actually launching such weapons. Israel in 1973 came close to using such weapons against non-nuclear adversaries but for the fact that the tide turned on the conventional military-territorial front. The pur-
pose of recalling this history is to point out that state actors have not only come close since the advent of the nuclear age to using nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear countries but that they can also be much more confident than non-state actors of getting substantial, even majority support from their citizens for such behaviour.

Fourth, this division between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ and ‘irrational’ nuclear agents, when it comes to the issue of preventing proliferation is again quite fraudulent. All NWSs have either proliferated know how and/or actively collaborated with other states in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This applies to early Sino-Soviet and US-UK collaborations. The UK continues to depend on US missiles and designing for fitting warheads to these imported missiles for its own ‘independent’ nuclear arm. France helped Israel which helped apartheid South Africa. There has been the China-Pakistan relationship. The US deliberately turned a blind eye to Israeli and Pakistani preparations. The Indian government has not proliferated to other countries but has simply cheated and betrayed its international commitments regarding dual-use technologies and materials – the 1974 Pokharan I test. Having so cheated it finally succeeded in getting away with this, indeed getting rewarded politically and materially via the recent NSG exception given to it as part of the Indo-US nuclear deal process. New Delhi which once railed against the nuclear dishonesties of the NWSs and their “club of nuclear apartheid”, now that it has joined that same club is perfectly willing to play the same game of self-righteous and dishonest hypocrisy. What was important was not the existence of ‘nuclear apartheid’, i.e., discrimination between nuclear haves and have-nots but only the fact that India was not a beneficiary of that discrimination until it was able to join the club and of course thereafter to be able to pose as a ‘responsible’ nuclear power.

This new ‘responsible’ nuclear power of India will keep quiet about the record of its similarly ‘responsible’ nuclear allies such as the US and Israel even as it declares itself disturbed by any Iranian efforts to acquire the bomb since this Iranian effort would violate its NPT commitments (a treaty which India used to bitterly oppose) and other international commitments; all this from an India which in 1974 did not hesitate to do the same. Of course, a finger must be pointed at Pakistan’s irresponsibility. How is the record of A.Q. Khan’s proliferation activities to be understood? Does it break the pattern of states being responsible for proliferating behaviour mentioned earlier? It does not. States keen to develop the bomb can get support from other states and purchase materials from private markets as Iraq before 1991 was doing. The great difference between Pakistan and other NWSs (including Israel) is that it is the only one among this group whose civilian government has not been in full control of nuclear arrangements. In Pakistan, the military and not the civilian government, has been the key controller and supervisor over nuclear activities. It is this that gave A.Q.Khan’s set up the autonomy it had and allowed it to act as a proliferators of knowhow and materials independent of the civilian apparatuses of the state but only with the permission and acceptance of key sections of the military and intelligence apparatuses. To pass off A.Q. Khan’s set up and behaviour as an exemplar of independent non-state activity is mistaken. Does this not indict the Pakistan state as an ‘irresponsible’ proliferator? Yes certainly, but no more so than in the case of other states from Israel to France to UK to US to Russia to China which similarly deserve indictments.
Fifth, insofar as nuclear weapons are ‘weapons of terror’ (which they are) nuclear deterrence is itself a terrorist doctrine sanctioning the possession, brandishment and preparations for use of nuclear weapons. The principal discourse that legitimizes the existence and therefore threatens the use of nuclear weapons is not any ‘fundamentalist’ interpretation of religious texts or ‘irrational’ eschatological visions but the very ‘rationality’ of nuclear deterrence thinking and the ‘limited’ nuclear war fighting doctrines that can logically enough flow from deterrence premises and arguments.

Nuclear deterrence is not the simple registration of the idea that nuclear weapons can deter. It goes far beyond this because it is a theorization and rationalization that this property is so powerful and enduring that states can and should rely on it for achieving their security, where this notion of security is understood in the conventional and highly restricted sense of meaning military protection of territory. It is not nuclear weapons that create deterrence. It is the doctrine of deterrence that is created to justify the production, possession and presence of nuclear weapons!

Sixth, the dramatization of the danger of nuclear terrorism by non-state actors derives whatever plausibility it has from two crucial assumptions which need to be seriously questioned rather than unthinkingly accepted. a) That there is a distinct category of persons/groups called terrorists to be distinguished from other collective agents e.g. ‘responsible’ or democratic states supposedly incapable of acting terrorist ally, although they might be at times guilty of ‘human rights abuses.’ b) That those who lead non-state groups or at least some of them, are far more dangerous than those who lead many a NWS because they are more irrational in their motivations and behaviour and therefore much more likely to use a nuclear bomb.

The first assumption is irredeemably flawed. Terrorism cannot be understood as a reference to any category of persons but is a reference to a technique, a tactic, a method involving intimidation and violence. When one seeks to identify what constitutes a terrorist act it is widely accepted that this is a premeditated or calculated act that threatens, or actually carries out, physical injury/deaths to innocent unarmed civilians. This is not an all-inclusive definition of terrorism that covers all its historically variable forms. But it is more than adequate for our purposes here. Understood as such the terrorist act is undertaken by all kinds of agencies including the apparatuses of the state. It is the deliberated, the premeditated and calculated character of the act that makes it terrorist as distinct from a spontaneous or accidental action affecting civilians. Whether the act is undertaken with the intent to injure/kill civilians or whether the act is undertaken knowing that it will injure/kill civilians, the difference between these two states of mind is not significant either philosophically or morally. Most states always claim that they never intend to hurt civilians even as they undertake actions that they know are going to do so. In both cases, the act remains a deliberated and calculated one carried out in full awareness of its negative, indeed immoral consequences. And the scale of civilian deaths caused by states on their own citizens or on the citizens of other countries overwhelmingly dwarfs those caused by the actions of non-state actors. This comparative judgement holds over any historical time period chosen.

Since terrorism refers to a tactic, a method, how on earth is it possible to wage a war on a technique? Yet dominant discourses continue to extend credibility to this absurdity and thus to endorse the US’s fraudulent ‘global war on terror’
in which India is supposed to a responsible partner. The warning and war against ‘nuclear terrorists’ abetted by certain nuclear possessing or aspiring states then becomes a ‘natural’ corollary of this overall war on terror.

In regard to the second assumption, those that lead non-state groups pursuing some political cause for which they are prepared to use violent means, are no more and no less rational than state managers taking decisions in pursuit of so-called national interests. This is as true of Political Islam as of other groups inspired by their particular interpretations of religious and secular doctrines and visions. And in all forms of Political Islam it is the specifically political goals and objectives that are their driving force, howsoever shaped their social, cultural and economic programmes might be by variant understandings of Islam. The temptation to see ‘fanatical’ Jihadi’s as somehow more dangerously irrational and extreme in their political behaviour than say, slave-owning dynasts or colonizers embarked upon a civilizing mission or US imperialists out to finish off communist evil or fervent Hindutva-ites ruling India, is best avoided.

The political conflict between non-state and state actors, insofar as it has an armed and violent dimension is universally described as a form of asymmetrical warfare. What is rarely if ever given the recognition it deserves is that in terms of the scale of suffering imposed (injuries and deaths of innocents and civilians) the terrorism of the strong (of states) – as all historical evidence indisputably and overwhelmingly confirms – far outstrips the terrorism of the weak (of non-state agents). The only way to remain blind to this historical and contemporary judgement is to use the magic wand of re-description. The terrorism of states (some of them) is said to be not really terrorism at all but something else, the usual substitute labels chosen being “law and order excesses” and “unavoidable collateral damage.”

The basic reason for this contrast in suffering imposed has little to do with the asymmetry of means of violence possessed by the two sides, which is obvious. Rather, it has much more to do with the fact that this very asymmetry allows for, and imposes, very different political compulsions and rationalities on the two sides with respect to the relationship between military means and political ends. State managers see themselves as being the only legitimate wielders of violence within the territories over which the state has jurisdiction. States as entities that are supposed to have a monopoly of legitimated violence over a given territory cannot tolerate any other entity carrying out violent actions within the domain over which they are supposed to have juridical control. The more powerful the state, the more intolerable they are of any such actions. It is never the actual material damage done by such violent actions by non-state actors that most disturb state managers, nor the extent to which the act erodes the capacity of the state to carry out its multifarious governmental functions or to retain its geographical boundaries. In this respect terrorist acts by non-state actors are essentially inconsequential.

The idea that 26/11 in India, the London and Madrid bombings or 9/11 in the US represent a serious threat to the structures of democracy in these countries is frankly ludicrous. Claims that this is the case no doubt feature in the overblown rhetoric of state managers and in many supporting editorials of a largely supine media. But these are falsities whose purpose is to justify the ‘reactive’ policies and practices (often themselves antidemocratic) of the state to such events. For what is really at stake is the challenge that such events
like 9/11 or 26/11 pose to the authority of the state. In the era of nation states, that authority rests more than ever it did in the past on an inescapably symbolic dimension of what today constitutes political power. It is here, in this fact of symbolism and its importance that there is an asymmetry of political impact that works against the materially far more powerful side, the state. The terrorism of the weak, of non-state actors, is above all an act of symbolic-communicative politics aiming to weaken and undermine the authority of its opponent state, not its material-physical sources of power. In this respect for non-state actors the political impact to be got from a terrorist act is disproportionately high as compared to whatever material damage it might or might not do.

It is a politics on the cheap, the impact achieved being far more important than the means used. Nonetheless, there is always a cost-benefit rationality at work here too. The nonstate terrorist act aims to do two things – invigorate the 'home' constituency that witnesses the public act and simultaneously demoralize the enemy state and its support base. The scale, character and consequences of likely enemy response are also factored into this cost-benefit analysis. Precisely because Marxists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century grossly underestimated the power and significance of the symboliccommunicative dimension in the era of mass politics, they dismissed and denigrated the possible efficacy of such acts. The classical Marxist approach incidentally, prone as it was to a class-based moral relativism, criticized terrorism on grounds of inefficacy – ‘reformism with a gun’, a ‘substitute for mass mobilization’ – not on grounds of its immorality.

For states, the relationship between military means to be used and political benefits sought is very different. States have to stamp their authority far more emphatically, unchallengeable and assertively than non-state agents that are not under any such compulsion given the very fact of being non-state entities. Asymmetric warfare means non-state agents do not and cannot aim to physically destroy states. They do not have the means nor do they need to strive to acquire such means. What they seek to do is to create the conditions whereby their state enemies lose not their capacity but their will to prevent the achievement of their objectives. (This is also the case in asymmetric warfare between states, e.g., the Vietnam War). By contrast, for states, the more powerful they perceive themselves to be, the more the affront to their sense of authority is the terrorism of the weak, the more determined they are to physically exterminate their non-state opponents, encased though they may be within their own catchment areas of popular support. The resort too much higher levels of violence in pursuit of this more extreme objective of physical extermination become a logical, indeed rational feature of the behaviour of such powerful states. States are also much more able to get away with, that is, justify to a wider public, domestic and even foreign, such levels of violence. These have included the use of depleted uranium artillery shells, white phosphorus, oxygen sucking ‘daisy cutters’, Agent Orange and other chemical defoliants, even the use of nuclear weapons. All this means that there exists far fewer restraints on their exercise of violence or military power.

The situation in which non-state terrorism takes place is quite different in respect of its contextual limitations, barriers and boundaries. The terrorist violence of non-state actors must not reach the point whereby it creates the conditions for legitimising a reactive assault of extreme intensity
against its own popular base and by doing so deeply alienate that base. There is an important line of demarcation that exists. On one side are those actions by states that are widely seen as an unjustified ‘overkill’ that only further alienates the home constituencies of insurgent groups against the enemy state and strengthens support for non-state actors themselves. But this line is crossed when nonstate actors engage in forms of action which by their very nature greatly widen the ‘legitimacy space’ for state reactions of great intensity and scope. There is thus a built-in proportionality in terrorist acts by non-state agents between means of violence used and the political gains sought from that act. The use of nuclear weapons by such groups, leaving aside the underestimated practical difficulties in making or assembling such a bomb, would be disastrously counter-productive politically speaking. Even the use of a ‘dirty bomb’ – dispersal of radioactive materials via a conventional chemical explosive – is highly unlikely even if higher up on the ladder of possibilities than use of a nuclear bomb. The main target of such a dirty bomb, the US, would not hesitate to then resort to a nuclear attack against a designated territorial target, unjustified though this would be. And opponents of the US are not naive enough not to realise this.

As things stand, the US has not rejected the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear adversary using chemical or biological weapons. One of the real dangers of these never ending alarms about nuclear terrorism is that it more strongly prepares the ground for a NWS – most likely the US – to carry out a ‘limited’ nuclear attack precisely to drive home publicly the message that no non-state group or network should have any doubts about US willingness to so behave and thus not even contemplate doing what the US itself has done – possessing, deploying and using nuclear weapons.

Forget trying to acquire a nuclear bomb, no insurgent group or non-state network has tried to poison a city’s water supply or spray debilitating gases or chemicals over a suburban district from a chartered small plane, neither of which are particularly difficult to do. Even before the break-up of the USSR there was a private illegal market in radioactive materials and dual-use equipment and components. Involvement in this trade is for varied purposes and the end users are more often than not state apparatuses seeking to obtain materials otherwise difficult or more expensive to get or make. To what extent agencies roaming independent of states are doing this and to what extent they are ultimately seeking ‘private’ possession and for what private purposes, remain obscure. Though there is little reason to jump to conclusions about the ‘terrorist bomb’, there is of course every reason to want to put in place controls to stop such clandestine activities. But this requires all states including of course all NWSs to come together and to be fully transparent and honest about their nuclear behaviour, and to stop being selective and hypocritical about the issue of non-proliferation. Ending such trade also cannot be divorced from the issue of regional and global disarmament and the refusal of the NWSs to seriously embark on such disarmament. If on one hand India is able to enhance its nuclear arsenal and capacities because existing international rules and norms in respect of such trading is shamelessly eroded (the exception made for it by the NSG under US pressure) then should anyone be surprised that a Pakistan determined to match India’s rising capacities might seek to do so through illegal trading?
The hyped-up discourse on the enormous threat and danger posed by nuclear terrorism specifically and by non-state terrorism more generally is a deceitful and diversionary discourse that seeks to shift focus away from what is the primary problem – that of state terrorism in both its nuclear and non-nuclear forms. There is of course an ‘action-reaction’ feedback relationship between the two kinds of terrorism. Recognition of this does not in any way detract from the necessity of condemning or trying to prevent nonstate terrorism or of bringing its culprits to book. But this legitimate and necessary quest must not be allowed to ever divert us from the far more arduous and important task of exposing, condemning and trying to prevent state terrorism. This in turn requires establishing the mechanisms and procedures for adjudicating, sentencing and punishing the highest echelons among state managers. The International Criminal Court is a faltering and limited step in that direction. Much, much more needs to be done in terms of developments in national and international laws and in the building of related institutions. That is the kind of discourse that needs to be initiated and sustained globally. One is certain, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, President Obama and the US will most definitely never take the lead in this regard.

*The author is a well-known scholar, peace-activist and Professor in the Delhi University. He is a member of the CNDP NCC.

Note: This article was originally published in the Economic & Political Weekly, April 24 2010.
V.
The Hiroshima Declaration on the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

The undersigned Nobel Peace Laureates and representatives of Nobel Peace Prize organisations, gathered in Hiroshima on November 12-14, 2010, after listening to the testimonies of the Hibakusha, have no doubt that the use of nuclear weapons against any people must be regarded as a crime against humanity and should henceforth be prohibited.

We pay tribute to the courage and suffering of the Hibakusha who survived the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and honour those that have dedicated their lives to teaching the world about the horrors of nuclear war. Like them, we pledge ourselves to work for a future committed to peace, justice and security without nuclear weapons and war.

“Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in space and time, in the risks of escalation they create, and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations, and indeed to the survival of humanity.” We strongly endorse this assessment by the International Committee of the Red Cross, three times recognised with the Nobel Peace Prize for its humanitarian work.

Twenty-five years ago in Geneva, the leaders of the two largest nuclear powers declared that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. There has been some substantive progress since then. The agreements on intermediate range nuclear forces (INF); strategic arms reductions (START); and unilateral and bilateral initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons, have eliminated tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. We welcome the signing by the United States and Russia of the New START treaty and the consensus Nuclear Disarmament Action Plan that was adopted by the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Nevertheless, there are still enough nuclear weapons to destroy life on Earth many times over. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use for acts of terrorism are additional causes for deep concern. The threats posed by nuclear weapons did not disappear with the ending of the Cold War.

Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, but they can and must be outlawed, just as chemical and biological weapons, landmines and cluster munitions have been declared illegal. Nuclear weapons, the most inhumane threat of all, should likewise be outlawed in keeping with the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, which reaffirmed “the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law”.

Efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons must proceed along with measures to strengthen international law, demilitarize international relations and political thinking and to address human and security needs. Nuclear deterrence, power projection and national prestige as arguments to justify acquiring and retaining nuclear weapons are totally outdated and must be rejected.

We support the UN Secretary General’s five point proposal on nuclear disarmament and proposals by others to undertake work on a universal treaty to prohibit the use, development, production, stockpiling or transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon technologies and components and to provide for their complete and verified elimination.
• We call upon heads of government, parliaments, mayors and citizens to join us in affirming that the use of nuclear weapons is immoral and illegal.

• We call for the ratification without delay of the New START agreement by the United States and Russia and for follow-on negotiations for deeper cuts in all types of nuclear weapons.

• We call on all the nuclear weapon possessor states to make deep cuts in their existing arsenals.

• We call on the relevant governments to take urgent steps to implement the proposals agreed on in the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document towards realising the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

• We call on China, the United States, Egypt, Iran, Israel and Indonesia to ratify, and on India, Pakistan and North Korea to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that has already been ratified by 153 nations, so that the Treaty can be brought into full legal force.

• We call on nations to negotiate a universal treaty to abolish nuclear weapons, in partnership with civil society.

To ensure that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki never reoccur and to build a world based on cooperation and peace, we issue this call of conscience. We must all work together to achieve a common good that is practical, moral, legal and necessary – the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Hiroshima, November 14, 2010
C. Book Review
On Nuclear Power
Sukla Sen*


The Upside down Book of Nuclear Power

Nuclear power is again a hot topic. It was, admittedly, never too cold, since inception. But with the “nuclear renaissance” making its appearance, for about a decade by now, there is a renewed spurt of discussions and debates.

If initially, there was an abundance of exuberance, the mood pretty much soured in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident in the US in 1979. Then the Chernobyl disaster in the then USSR in 1986 dealt a severe, even if far from fatal, blow. With global warming coming to attract global attention and causing huge concerns and candidly rightwing regimes occupying the seats of power in some of the leading nations – the US, in particular – who paradoxically did their best to deny global warming in the first place; we had a sort of resurgence of nuclear power as a green alternative.

The continuing oil spill caused by a deep sea horizontal drilling rig operated by the BP in the Gulf of Mexico, in the territorial waters of the US, has further added to the complexities of the current debate. On the one hand, as expected, nuclear power is being touted as the apt alternative to power from fossil fuels; on the other, it brings to mind the spectre of a not-so-impossible catastrophic accident. Nearer home, the Bhopal gas disaster is back in news, and with a bang at that. And connections are being made with the civil nuclear liability bill now before the Indian Parliament and possible scenarios arising out of a catastrophic nuclear accident. Evidently, “catastrophe” is the key notion here.

The two books under review are very recent additions to this pool of raging debate, with a number of significant and interesting contrasts though. Most importantly, these are located across the line dividing those pro and anti nuclear power. Just to take up a few examples: while the former is authored by a journalist and editor of some repute reporting on the nuclear industry for close to three decades, the author for the latter does not appear to be dealing specifically with nuclear power on any regular basis. While both are meant to reach out to lay readers, the former builds up its case, bit by bit, composed in subtly lyrical prose with striking poignancy, meant to touch deep within the readers’ hearts and stir them to action; the later is written in a light hearted, and arguably flippant, fashion – meant to be a sort of popular handbook – a “dummy’s guide”, on nuclear power. The very tags of the two books provide helpful clues. Similarly, Stephanie Cooke makes it loud and clear that the purpose for penning her book is to create awareness about the pitfalls and dangers of nuclear power. In sharp contrast, Saurav Jha pretty much cockily asserts that he is “not a bleeding-heart liberal, a sociologist, a demonstrationist [whatever that may mean!], a declier of the concept of ‘nation’ [possibly with Arundhati Roy’s The End of Imagination, a stirring critique of India’s nuclear weaponisation, or maybe even John Lennon’s superbly evocative Imagine, in mind].
For both the authors though these are their first books.

The chief merits of Saurav Jha’s book are essentially two. One, it is an ambitious venture to make the technical, and also some political, aspects of nuclear power accessible to lay readers, from India in particular. Two, there is perhaps no such comparable product originating in the Indian market. The book, in fact, is rather overtly packaged as a marketable product. The use of somewhat unorthodox gimmickry in designing the “glossary” that constitutes almost its entire bulk is just a testimony to that.

Coming to the brass tacks, the main section of book, as has been explained in the Foreword, can be divided into two parts. In the first part, the “glossary”, various topics have been taken up rather imaginatively linking those to all the letters in the alphabet, and arranged accordingly. The second part, Musings: A Rambling Essay deals specifically with India and nuclear power. It’s a short essay, running six pages. The book also provides a list of Selected Readings including a short list of websites. However, the enterprising reader may find these useful.

Easy readability is definitely the brightest spot of the book. But the treatment is decidedly shallow and one-sided. Not just because the author has a point of view.

The Musings duly makes out that “85 per cent of India’s mostly low-grade ore is found in the states of Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya. However, it is only in Jharkhand where mining and milling units are currently operational.” But no mention whatever is made of the fact that both in the Western Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya and Nalgonda district of Andhra Pradesh attempts at uranium mining remain thwarted because of spirited and sustained popular resistance. Nor there is any mention of the uranium mining related health problems in Jharkhand. A documentary film, Buddha Weeps in Jadugoda [in Jharkhand], by Shriprakash, a film-maker from Ranchi, focussing on the woes of the local people on account of the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL) operations including radiations caused health problems like physical disabilities, congenital defects in newborn, cancer and other diseases has come to be internationally known. Anand Patwardhan’s award-winning film War and Peace also highlights the plight of Jharkhand people and high incidence of physical deformities and other health problems on account of radiations caused by mined uranium. The surveys carried out by Dr. Sanghamitra and Surendra Gadekar drawing public attention to this issue is also rather well known in concerned circles.

Similarly, the section where he sums up his arguments, in Zealously Summing Up, he avers: “Radioactive waste is the biggest bugbear of nuclear power today. However, its management is not as difficult as it is made out to be by some quarters. Most scientists believe that it is safe to bury radioactive wastes underground.” But he provides no clue to who these “scientists” are, why it remains the “biggest bugbear” nevertheless. A more elaborate and dedicated section on this particular topic, What a Waste! only tells us that the author had “discussions” with some (unnamed) “Indian scientists” and they’ve assured him that the solution is just “some fifteen years away”! And, that too by “conservative estimates”. Not even a hint of reference to any published paper or so! The fact of the matter, however, is as the radioactive wastes are to remain radioactive virtually for ever; there just cannot be any failsafe method to
preserve the radioactive wastes in hermetically sealed conditions for millions of years. Just the other day, the United States had to abandon its proposed permanent waste dumping site at the Yucca Mountain.

In a similar vein, the longish section on India talks of “Canada pulling out of India” as a consequence of the “1974 test”, but nowhere mentions the specific ground: India in a breach of faith had used the plutonium obtained from the spent fuel rods of the reactor CIRUS, earlier supplied by Canada for peaceful nuclear programme, as the feed to carry out the explosive test on May 18 1974.

Such examples can, in fact, be endless.

Stephanie Cook’s, far more voluminous, work consisting of organically arranged twenty one sections, in the main text, further supplemented with a detailed biblio and notes, is a formidable piece of scholarship and literature. Its special focus is on the (indissoluble) link between nuclear power and weapons.

The original international edition, brought out just last year, has been widely noted and reviewed. The Indian/South Asian edition under review has been further enriched with a Preface that rather succinctly sums up the nuclear history of the subcontinent. It also draws out attention to the grave dangers that the region is faced with as a consequence of developments on the nuclear front.

At the end, two points call for special mention.

One, since the days of the Atom for Peace under Eisenhower, going way back to the very fag end of 1953, the carrot of nuclear power, which is also the stepping stone towards nuclear weapon, has been dangled before nations to keep away from nuclear weapons. The paradox is all too evident to miss. Yet it is was later codified in the NPT(Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty); in fact the grand bargain between Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWSs) that the NPT encapsulates is founded upon has two elements. One, the NNWSs commit to nuclear abstinence in return for a vague commitment of renunciation, at an undefined future date, by the NWS. The deal is very asymmetrical that this carrot to the NNWSs had to be offered by the NWS to make it somewhat less so. So, this paradox became a defining marker of the NPT regime. Even the last NPT Review Conference held in the month of May elected to rely on the same trick. The reason is very clear-the reluctance of the NWSs to commit themselves to any definitive programme for renunciation (of weapons). And also the huge commercial of stakes involved in the process and too formidable clout of the nuclear industrial lobby. The outcome of such hypocrisy is pretty predictable.

Two, the nuclear politics of the South Asian subcontinent is essentially shaped and determined by Indian moves and Pakistani responses to it.

It is, in fact, after May 18 1974, when India carried out its first nuclear blast, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would proclaim that Pakistanis are ready to eat grass if necessary to make the nuclear bomb.

And, finally, it is May 11, and 13, 1998 that made it possible for Pakistan to carry out its own nuclear explosions just in a fortnight’s time on the following May 28 and 30.

**A repetition of the same story.**

In the wake of the Indo-US nuclear deal culminating into opening up of the doors of global nuclear trade to India, ending more than three decades of ostracisation, by virtue of the NSG waiver made
possible by determined US prodding backed up by all out Indian efforts and strong supports from France and Russia in particular; Pakistan is now having a similar deal with China sans the NSG waiver having its demand to be treated on par with India been rudely rebuffed by US and the NSG.

And it is now India's turn to rather helplessly fret and smart as the 46-member NSG elected to look the other way in its last meet this June in Christchurch, New Zealand. So, in order to bring some sanity back into the scenario, both the countries, and India in particular, will have to exercise restraint and initiate joint efforts towards peace and amity in the region, breaching the bounds of, seemingly smart, “realpolitik”, to which Jha smugly proclaims his unabashed adherence. And Stephanie Cook makes a profoundly reasoned and yet impassioned plea in favour of “ethics” as the basis of state policies, both globally and also in the context of the region. And that’s where real prudence lies.

* The author is a peace activist, independent researcher and an editor of this journal.

Note: This article was originally published in The Book Review, August 2010.
The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP) is India’s national network of over 200 organisations, including grassroots groups, mass movements and advocacy organisations, as well as individuals. Formed in November 2000, CNDP demands that India and Pakistan roll back their nuclear weapons programmes. Our emphasis:

- No to further nuclear testing
- No to induction and deployment of nuclear weapons
- Yes to global and regional nuclear disarmament

CNDP works to raise mass awareness through schools and colleges programmes, publications, audio and visual materials, and campaigning and lobbying at various levels.

CNDP membership is open to both individuals and organisations. So if you believe nuclear weapons are evil and peace is important, fill in the Membership Form!

For Private Circulation Only

Published by CNDP
A-124/6, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi - 110 016
Telefax: +91 11 26517814
E-mail: cndpindia@gmail.com
Website: www.cndpindia.org

Editors: Iлина Sen, Anil Chaudhary, Sukla Sen
Copy Editor: Dr. Seema Javed

Cover Design: Akhil Srivastava

Printed by Designs & Dimensions
L/5A, Sheikh Sarai Phase II, New Delhi 110017
M. 9810686122