UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The Security Council,

PP1.  Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,  PP2.  Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,
PP3.  Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,  PP4.  Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

PP5.  Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars:  non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

PP6.  Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation, PP7.  Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,  PP8.  Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,
PP9.  Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,
PP10.  Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

PP11.  Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

PP12.  Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

PP13.  Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

PP14.  Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

PP16.  Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,  PP17.  Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,
PP18.  Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,
PP19.  Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
 PP20.  Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,  

PP21.  Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008), 

1.   Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2.   Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

3.   Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

4    Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

5.   Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force; 

6.   Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices  as soon as possible, and welcomes the Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;

7.  Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

8.   Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;  

9.   Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty todevelop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty,

11.       Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of   addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

12.       Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard: a.       Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately, b.      Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system, c.       Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council  accordingly as appropriate;  

13.       Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter; 

14.       Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirms that a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal; 

15.       Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

16.       Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

17.       Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment; 

18.       Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment; 

19.       Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

20.       Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

21.       Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

 22.       Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;   

23.       Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard; 

24.       Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology; 

25.       Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security; 

26.       Decides to remain seized of the matter.